Chronicles

May 1999 A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE $3.95

Home Economics

Death, Taxes, and the American Family

News Unfit to Print:

"Bomb Turkey Now!"



#BXBFHFJ AUTO ******** ALL FOR ADC 945
#94301UZZ555BY003# OCT 2000
14 TURE 231 S0124
RON UNZ
555 BRYANT ST # 371
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

0 73361 64629 3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The British Roots of American Culture"

The Rockford Institute's Second Annual Summer School
20-24 July 1999
at The Rockford Institute, Rockford, Illinois

featuring Hume, Johnson, Burke, Shakespeare, Scott, Trollope, and Dickens on liberty, responsibility, community, blood, and friendship

FACULTY INCLUDE

Fr. Ian Boyd, Thomas Fleming, Samuel Francis, Scott P. Richert, and Peter Stanlis

Open to students of all ages. Registration is limited. All prices increase $50.00 after June 15. Prices do not include required books.

Please enroll me in The Rockford Institute's Second Annual Summer School.

☐ Full Registration ($350.00)—includes tuition, lodging (double occupancy), and daily dinner

☐ Full Registration, single occupancy ($450.00)

☐ Commuter Registration ($125.00)—tuition only

☐ Commuter Registration plus daily dinner ($225.00)

Name(s) _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

Phone _____

☐ I cannot attend, but I want the Summer School to be a success. Enclosed is my contribution of $_____.

☐ Please send me a brochure.

Please mail form with check to: The Rockford Institute • 928 North Main Street • Rockford, IL 61103

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chronicles
A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE

PERSPECTIVE

Defending the Family From Its Defenders 10
by Thomas Fleming

Family values versus family autonomy.

VIEWS

Family Formation in America 13
by Virginia Deane Abernethy
Revitalizing the American family.

Family Policy Is Not Welfare 17
by Jean-Didier Lecaillon
Lessons from the French experience.

Mommy's Little Monster by Philip Jenkins 21
Does the family breed serial killers?

OPINIONS

Wonderful Illusions 26
by Fr. Hugh Barbour
E. Michael Jones: *The Medjugorje Deception.*

The elastic bounds of orthodoxy.

REVIEWS

E. Christian Kopff's *The Devil Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition* is lively, informative, and intelligent, writes **Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones** ◆ **Paul Gottfried** recommends *The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses* by Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silverglate ◆ Jeff Walker misses the point in *The Ayn Rand Cult*, reports **Justin Raimondo** ◆ Wendy Shalit's *A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue* is not prudish but romantic, writes **Karina Rollins** ◆ 29

CORRESPONDENCE

Letter From London: The Strange Death of Her Majesty's Opposition 36
by Derek Turner

Letter From Florence: Leonardo's Flying Machine 37
by Andrei Navrozov

Letter From Inner Israel: Religion or Ethnicity? 38
by Jacob Neusner

Letter From Mexico: The First Racquet in the West 40
by Geoffrey Wagner

VITAL SIGNS

ECONOMICS: Globalization and the Decline of the Family 42
by William R. Hawkins

POLITICS: Restoring Families by Restricting Government 44
by David Hartman

LAW: How a Court Can Derail a Culture 45
by George Ward

Legislative Tyranny in Massachusetts 47
by Eugene Narrett

DEPARTMENTS

POLEMICS & EXCHANGES 4

CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS 6

SIGNS OF THE TIMES 24

PRINCIPALITIES & POWERS 34
The Un-Magnificent Obsession
by Samuel Francis

THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN 49
The View From Out Here
by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

POETRY
The Recovery 20
by Alan Sullivan

Endurance 33
by Bradley R. Strahan

ON THE COVER

Cover and inside illustrations by Stephen Schildbach.

MAY 1999/3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITOR
Thomas Fleming

SENIOR EDITOR, BOOKS
Chilton Williamson, Jr.

MANAGING EDITOR
Scott P. Richert

ART DIRECTOR
H. Ward Sterett

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Katherine Dalton, Samuel Francis, George Garrett, Paul Gottfried, J.O. Tate, Michael Washburn, Clyde Wilson

CORRESPONDING EDITORS
Bill Kauffman, Donald Livingston, William Mills, William Murchison, Andrei Navrozov, Jacob Neusner

FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDITOR
Srdja Trifkovic

LEGAL AFFAIRS EDITOR
Stephen B. Presser

RELIGION EDITOR
Harold O.J. Brown

EDITORIAL SECRETARY
Leann Dobbs

PUBLISHER
The Rockford Institute

PUBLICATION DIRECTOR
Guy C. Reffett

CIRCULATION MANAGER
Cindy Link

A publication of The Rockford Institute.
Editorial and Advertising Offices:
928 North Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103.
Editorial Phone: (815) 964-5054.
Advertising Phone: (815) 964-5813.
Subscription Department: P.O. Box 800,
Mount Morris, IL 61054. Call 1-800-877-5459.

U.S.A. Newsstand Distribution by Eastern News Distributors, Inc., One Media Way, 12406 Rt. 250 Milan, Ohio 44848-9705

Copyright © 1999 by *The Rockford Institute*.
All rights reserved.

Chronicles (ISSN 0887-5731) is published monthly for $39.00 (foreign subscriptions add $12 for surface delivery, $48 for Air Mail) per year by The Rockford Institute, 928 North Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103-7061. Preferred periodical postage paid at Rockford, IL and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Chronicles*, P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris, IL 61054.

The views expressed in *Chronicles* are the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Rockford Institute or of its directors. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope.

Chronicles
A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE

Vol. 23, No. 5 May 1999

Printed in the United States of America

On the Managerial State

Considering his kind assessment of my work ("Force and Idea," February), which is matched by my judgments of his, it may seem ungenerous to criticize Sam Francis's treatment of my comments on ideology in *After Liberalism*. I bring up our difference of opinion only for purposes of clarification. In most of our views about the managerial state, particularly about its necessarily anti-bourgeois and relentlessly globalist character, the two of us have no disagreement. What we disagree about is the rationality, or lack thereof, of managerial ideology. Unlike Dr. Francis, I do not believe that the managerial class is merely "masking its drive [for power and wealth] by adopting and invoking convenient ideologies that justify expanded government and state manipulation of social functions." Nor do I think this elite merely feathers its nest by "denigrating, debunking, and delegitimizing the older pre-managerial class and the institutions and values by which it dominated." Such an interpretation of social behavior seems reductionist and disregards the irrational sources of ideological struggle.

Careerists, like Bill Clinton, undoubtedly trim their sails to favorable political winds; and some fit must exist, as Pareto points out, between the prevailing psychological climate and victorious elites. I would go further and stress the necessity for elites to make legitimizing ideologies suit their historical situation; in our case, one shaped by a rotting WASP-dom, an international managerial economy, the popularity of public administration, and a consumerist culture.

I am unwilling to make two assumptions that Dr. Francis treats as self-evident. One, it is not clear that the political class manipulates, without in varying degrees embracing, the "ideological symbols" tied up with its domination. Though it may not *consistently* uphold these symbols and may even backslide into "homophobia" or "sexism," to whatever extent our elite believes anything, it embraces its declared ideology. The fact that someone benefits politically from a specific set of beliefs does not mean that the beneficiary privately scoffs at those beliefs. Eighteenth-century British vicars were certainly placeholders, but there is no indication they were not equally Christians, even if they had personal reservations about one or more of the Anglican Church's 39 Articles. Bourgeois Protestants may have drawn economic or political advantage from their theology and confessional communities. But there is no evidence that they were not (for the most part) sincere about the Calvinist doctrines they professed.

Two, I do not share Dr. Francis's confidence that those now hacking away at Western Christian society are mere political opportunists. Most seem genuinely driven, though their passion may also be helpful to the managerial elite. Alan Dershowitz, who surely qualifies as a successful appendage of the political academic class, does not rage against the presumed white gentile establishment simply because he craves wealth and power. He could have both without being hysterically bigoted. Like Hitler, Dershowitz deeply hates those he attacks. While it is possible to explain such irrationality by linking it to someone's long-range interest, such groping for an orderly thought-process overlooks the obvious. Politics are fueled by hate, and rising or established elites are subject to that emotion. At particular times, such a feeling may be politically useful; at other times, it is something to be worked around. It will not do as an explanation, however, to equate impassioned, spiteful debunking with strategic planning.

—Paul Gottfried
Elizabethtown, PA

Dr. Francis Replies:

I am afraid that Paul Gottfried still does not quite take my point, which is not that I think exponents of certain ideas do not believe in those ideas, but rather why some ideas and those who espouse them prosper at the expense of other ideas. Regardless of the assumptions that I may or may not treat as self-evident, I think that Dr. Gottfried is assuming that there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is a clear disjunction between a political class "manipulating" the "ideological symbols" connected to its dominance and the same political class "embracing" those symbols. In my view, there is no such disjunction.

It is not simply an accident of history that most members of the dominant elites in the Western world in this century have "manipulated" the idea-system generally known as "liberalism." Those ideas clearly serve the interests of elites seeking to enhance the power of a state they control, discredit the institutions and codes of rival elites, and consolidate the controlling elites' dominance through social engineering and therapeutic policy.

At the same time, I do not doubt that these elites and their members (whether Dick Armey or Alan Dershowitz) "really believe" in (i.e., "embrace") the ideas they espouse. To note that an elite has a material interest in "manipulating" an idea (i.e., invoking it as a defense of its conduct) does not mean or imply that the elite does not also "really believe" in the idea.

I reject what seems to be an overly rationalistic interpretation which views human behavior as the obedient and consistent servant of the logical implications of various intellectual systems. I suspect the process by which "ideas have consequences" is usually more akin to the psychological defense mechanism known as "sublimation," whereby an actor comes to believe in an idea not because of its own correspondence to reality or its logical coherence but because believing in it offers him some psychic or material satisfaction and because, through his own socialization experience, he is culturally disposed to believe in it.

One problem with the "rationalistic" view of ideas having consequences (classically stated by Richard Weaver in the first chapter of his famous book) is that it offers no explanation of why some ideas have flourished while alternative ideas have languished. In my view, the correspondence of ideas to reality (their truth) and their logical coherence have far less relationship to their influence on human behavior than their usefulness for various social and political forces that find some ideas more expedient for pushing their interests and therefore more desirable to embrace than others. This view does not imply that those ideas are any less ardently embraced, but it does suggest that the psychic and social usefulness, and not the rationality and truth, of the ideas are the main determinants of whether they will be embraced.

On Education in Texas

David Hartman's comments about the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) tests are on the mark (*Cultural Revolutions*, February). It is a widespread practice for Texas teachers to "teach the TAAS." Depriving students of a broad-based liberal arts education has never been so common. History classes are being downgraded to "social studies" status so that the popular, politically correct ideology of the time can be promoted.

I have been married for 15 years to a 21-year veteran educator in the Ector County Independent (a misnomer) School District. During that time, I have witnessed a steady decline in the morale of teachers not only in my wife's system, but also in our own Midland Independent (ditto) School District. I attribute this decline to the Texas Education Agency's bureaucratic preoccupation with requiring ever more paperwork from teachers, who are already suffering the effects of the erosion of discipline in the classroom. The liberal establishment's belief in more accountability from teachers and less from students has created an almost unbearable situation. Only those veterans who are near retirement stay on. Younger educators, for the most part, leave after three to five years, and not solely for economic reasons.

I cannot comprehend why school board members across the state submit to the whims of the TEA. This cancerous agency remains unchallenged by the Texas legislature, locally elected school board members, and their constituencies. Nothing will change until economic conditions have driven several generations of unemployable graduates to the welfare lines.

The state of public education today is a result of the policies of self-serving educrats who have implemented their liberal agenda across this country. The most technically advanced and industrialized nation in the world was built from a locally based educational system. Why was it scrapped? I believe that educational "reform" was an effort to change the fundamental beliefs of Americans by focusing on the "me first" mentality and the promotion of class envy. It is difficult for me to believe that the educrats' motivation is a genuine concern for our children. An uneducated, illiterate, dependent society is easier to manipulate than an educated, literate, and independent citizenry.

I agree with Mr. Hartman's conclusion that any effort to reform education must begin by returning control to the local level. Allowing choice and competition would revive true excellence in the classroom.

—J.P. "Pat" McDaniel
Midland, TX

I couldn't help being amused by David Hartman's earnest account of a former New Zealand MP and cabinet minister, Maurice P. McTigue, telling Texans how to run their school system.

Canada has suffered a surfeit of Kiwi expertise. It seems to have started about 1989 with another former New Zealand cabinet minister, Sir Roger Douglas, who was brought in by the spendaholic Mulroney Conservatives to tell us that we needed a seven-percent federal goods-and-services tax on top of all the other taxes which cripple the Canadian economy. A few years later, this versatile sage popped up in Alberta to tell us that we need a low-tax, low-spending government policy.

For a while afterward, Albertans could not get enough Kiwi advice. Hardly a week went by when either the provincial government or some special-interest group did not import a New Zealander to tell us that what the last New Zealander had told us to do was wrong. Eventually, however, the deluge from Down Under dried up. Maybe we went through all three-and-a-half million of their experts.

Mr. Hartman does not say how Minister McTigue came to address the conference in Texas. In Canada, we paid the Kiwis, either through special-interest-group grant money or directly through our taxes. Since Mr. Hartman seems receptive to advice from foreigners, let me pass this on: You need not pay New Zealanders to come to your country to tell you how to run it any more than you need pay Jamaicans to come to your country to tell you that you are racist. They will do it anyway.

—Greg Klein
Calgary, Alberta

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABORTION has been a part of the American national religion for several decades, and in February a federal court in Oregon decided that it was blasphemy to criticize the ritual sacrifice of unborn children. At issue was a pro-life website ("The Nuremberg Files") featuring Western-style wanted posters for "physicians" who made their living by practicing infanticide.

In the course of the trial, both sides wrapped themselves up in the hallowed robes of civil-rights marchers, but in awarding $107 million to Planned Parenthood and other merchants of death, the jurors made one thing clear: Civil rights, including the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, are restricted to members of the established church and not to the surviving practitioners of the Christian faith. Perhaps this judgment will persuade one or two members of the pro-life movement to drop their infantile invocations of Dred Scott, slavery, and segregation as the ultimate evils. Perhaps they will even come to realize that the murder of millions of innocent children is a more serious crime than incivility or prejudice or even slavery.

In any event, it is too late in the day to delude ourselves with fantasies about moral restoration. What we regard as moral truth (about abortion and divorce, for example) is, by and large, an expression of an explicitly Christian morality that is accepted by a small number of non-Christians. Pagan societies may regard abortion as unpleasant or tasteless, but few of them would take the trouble to criminalize the murder of children who cannot defend themselves. Of course, pagan Rome did not give special privileges to abortionists who violated the highest principle of their profession. That step forward was left to the post-Christian—or rather, anti-Christian—governments of Europe and North America.

If we are no longer free to use "Wanted" posters as a political satire against those we regard as murderers, the obvious consequence is that we are no longer free to describe abortion as murder. Christians had better let this fact sink in: The United States is not their country anymore, and the leaders of the so-called Christian right could do nothing to change things, even if they wanted to, which they don't, any more than policemen want crime to go away or environmental regulators want to clean up pollution. Give them your money, if it makes you feel better (that is all they want, in any case), but rid yourself of the delusion that the people who voted for Bill Clinton are ever going to give us our country back. They won't.

Paul Weyrich has belatedly come to agree with us on this point, though it is highly unlikely that any Washington conservative will ever understand what we are up against. They will always find signs of hope, whenever Abe Rosenthal says something sensible or Hollywood produces a "wholesome" lying movie about Moses. The response of the Christian right to *The Prince of Egypt* should really have been the last straw for anyone who takes these latter-day Elmer Gantrys and Father Coughlins seriously.

So long as Christians continue to think of themselves as in the mainstream or as a "silent majority," they will be incapable of resisting this anti-Christian regime, even in their private lives. As long as Christian activists continue to fall into the trap of endorsing films produced by anti-Christian studios like Disney and Dreamworks, they will be turning over the consciences and characters of American children to Herod and his friends.

—*Thomas Fleming*

HYPOCRISY, the Duc de La Rochefoucauld told us, is the tribute which vice pays to virtue. Tributes of this kind have been flowing lately from the members of the United States Senate and the mainstream press who clamored for some sort of censure of President William Jefferson Clinton, or who scrambled, for a while, to produce a "finding of fact" which would have declared what bad things the President had done. All of this was in the sure knowledge that a two-thirds majority of the Senate didn't have the courage to reach the obvious (if politically incorrect) conclusion of the House managers and a majority of the House of Representatives that the President had committed impeachable offenses.

By the end of the Senate "trial," no one denied that the President had failed to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth regarding his relationship with "that woman," Ms. Lewinsky, or regarding what he said to potential witnesses in grand jury proceedings, and no one denied that Mr. Clinton had attempted to mislead investigators, nor that he was instrumental in getting others to furnish false testimony or conceal evidence. The House managers argued cogently that this conduct constituted the serial commission of felonies, and that such felonies were clearly the sort of "high crimes and misdemeanors" that the Framers believed ought to result in impeachment and removal.

But so popular was William Jefferson Clinton, and so successful was the White House in presenting the President's prosecution as merely being about private erotic pleasures, that removing a felon from the highest office in the land was all but unthinkable. A scant few days after the failed removal of Mr. Clinton, a credible allegation from the woman known as "Jane Doe #5" that he had assaulted and raped her when he was attorney general of Arkansas appeared to cause little public stir even though it was published in a long article on the *Wall Street Journal* editorial page, followed by a front-page story in the *Washington Post*, and then a prime-time half-hour on NBC.

The miracle is that the impeachment proceedings got as far as they did. For a few weeks, inspired by the House managers and their extraordinarily courageous leader, Henry Hyde, there was some serious consideration of the intentions of the Framers and—*mirabile dictu*—a consensus among both scholars and politicians that the original understanding of the Constitution ought to guide House and Senate proceedings. In this age of postmodern legal thought that produced a William Jefferson Clinton—where one can struggle over what the meaning of the word "is" is—this was at least small comfort for the friends of the rule of law and the friends of common sense.

If there are no final victories in history, or if lost causes are the only ones worth fighting for, or if political development is best regarded as an ongoing conversation that never stops, then those of us who wanted this President cashiered did not struggle completely in vain. We failed in our short-term goal, of course, but those who persisted in their plan to keep the First Felon in office were forced to ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knowledge how little virtue meant to them and, perhaps, that the American presidency was not as important as the champions of big government have thought, if such a man could be left in such a position.

President Clinton's defenders will likely continue piously to pronounce that he was wrong to do what he did, but by their actions in permitting him to remain President, they have severely weakened the office, with effects both foreign and domestic, by establishing that honesty, virtue, character, probity, and judgment are not requisite for the occupant of the Oval Office. They have also killed the prospects for renewal of the independent counsel statute, and probably succeeded in gutting the laws against sexual harassment. Some of this is all to the good, of course, because the presidency has recently often threatened to overwhelm the other engines of state and federal government, and the laws circumscribing what could and could not be done in the workplace have often worked in ways antithetical even to what their drafters desired, as has the Independent Counsel Act. Indeed, if this sorry episode did anything, perhaps it led us further to question whether government is the answer to most societal problems, or whether we should be more worried about preserving liberty than we are about promoting regulation.

Conservatives who fear the nanny state may take small comfort in a weakened Clinton presidency. But those who believe in the Constitution, like the House managers, can hardly feel good about the fact that senators did not permit the managers to call even a single witness before the Senate. The Constitution gives the Senate the sole power to try impeachments, but this was, apparently, the first impeachment in our 210 years since 1789 where an impeachment (of a president or a judge) was "tried" without live witnesses. Whatever tribute the senators paid the managers, it did not include actually allowing them to try their case.

Following the failure of two-thirds of the Senate to convict Samuel Chase in the only impeachment trial of a United States Supreme Court Justice, the great Democratic orator Robert Rantoul dismissed impeachment as a "bugbear" that had "lost its terrors." Impeachment, though, has been a tool that Congress, particularly in the 20th century, has used to remove corrupt federal judges. The Framers wanted a republic, with virtuous statesmen at the helm. They were horrified at the notion of government by plebiscite, and they knew what Athenian raw democracy did to Socrates. Perhaps their worst nightmare was that we might elevate to high office demagogues skilled in manipulating public opinion to serve their partisan or personal purposes. Sadly, it now seems that we are living that very nightmare, and, at least when he stands high in the polls, impeachment cannot be used to remove a corrupt and venal President. The whirring noise you hear is Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson spinning in their graves.

—*Stephen B. Presser*

THE ACQUITTAL of William Jefferson Clinton by the United States Senate is a good thing, although amidst the gloom that justifiably surrounds this *fin de siècle*, one is tempted to overlook the good side of the bad news. The acquittal should help dispel three dangerous illusions that still prevail among many Americans who cling to the hope that things are not quite as bad as they really are.

The first illusion is the notion that there is a "Moral Majority" out there somewhere, its heart in the right place and its mind supposedly concentrated on the need to win America back for the Good People and the Good Life. We now know that most Americans either don't find the rot so comprehensively embodied in Clinton objectionable at all (about a third), or simply don't care (another third), as long as the Dow is heading for five digits and the weekly paycheck covers the rent, truck payments, cable, beer, and chips.

The remaining third is powerless, disenfranchised (it cannot assemble even a simple majority in the "Republican"-controlled Senate), and rapidly diminishing. Its children belong to the Dominant Tendency, and their home-built defenses are bound to crumble under the steady onslaught from every screen, billboard, and printed page in the land. The loud minority of nihilists, perverts, and devil-worshippers who compose and control those messages are the ones who now have a "Silent Majority" behind them. They know it and they like it. The drums may yet beat in the heartland, but only to celebrate Kwanzaa.

The second illusion now in pieces is that, for all the shortcomings of its dominant elites, America is still fundamentally ruled by law. *L'affaire* Clinton only confirms what the O.J. Simpson charade made glaringly obvious: America is ruled by "due process." This due process is at the mercy of political and ideological vagaries, and fully detached from any recognizable concept of "truth" or "justice." Even before the "trial," 34 Senate Democrats declared that they would not find Clinton guilty. In doing so, they firmly (and proudly) joined the moral ranks of the O.J. Simpson jury.

Whereas the Simpson jury's flawed judgment sprang from poverty, stupidity, and racial-tribal allegiance, U.S. senators can plead no such mitigating circumstances. They sinned with their eyes wide open and their heads held high. They were joined by the remaining ten Democrats (so much for "bipartisanship") and—disgracefully—by ten Republicans scared by the polls (and, in several cases, by the skeletons in their own closets). One can only speculate which way they would have voted had the pollsters declared that two-thirds of us *supported* impeachment.

The third illusion now dead is that America is a "democracy," in the sense of the *res publica* of informed and responsible free citizens exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations. With Simpson at large and Clinton in the White House, we know it is not. Alas, for those hoping to "save the American democracy," our polity has lost sight of a rational and self-authenticating principle at the root of moral distinctions. Its subjects are encouraged to *participate*, but they are no longer expected to make a meaningful *contribution* to a rational society, and most of them would not want to. They no longer know that "participation" requires living morally and acting justly. If they were told that to live otherwise is to be spiritually diseased and unworthy of the appellation of "citizen," they would laugh or stare blankly.

A patient with advanced cancer may have a slim chance of recovery, but even those odds are reduced to naught if he remains oblivious of the seriousness of his condition. The remaining authentic Americans may yet miraculously wrestle their country back, city by city and state by state, but they need to be aware of the magnitude of the task. Clinton and the U.S. Senate have helped enlighten them. But for that unintended service to the cause of decency, February's specta-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cle would have been as completely futile as it was disgraceful.

—*Srdja Trifkovic*

A LAME DUCK PRESIDENT? To suggest that this is Bill Clinton's condition is to be unkind to handicapped fowl. Clinton and his colleagues seem to be on the brink of madness. The administration's domestic policy moves are haunted by the ghosts of the impeachment process, while its foreign policy team stumbles like drunkards from pillar to post—from one manufactured crisis to another.

Take the latest debacle: With a single stroke of its diplomatic pen on February 25, China blocked the continued deployment of U.N. troops in Macedonia. The 1,100-member "peacekeeping" force has been in Macedonia since June 1993.

The reason for China's U.N. Security Council veto? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, invented after the Cold War by George Soros and his globalist State Department pals over Greece's objections, recently took one billion dollars from Taiwan in return for diplomatic recognition. The Red Chinese promptly broke off diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Taiwan is worth much more to them.

And so, Washington ended up with another diplomatic egg on its face. The Chinese government effectively terminated the deployment of U.S. troops. The Clinton administration lamely declared that American troops may stay in Macedonia, but under a different flag—perhaps even the Stars and Stripes?

Michael New, the American soldier who refused to serve in Macedonia under the U.N. flag, is probably having a good chuckle right about now. It took the Red Chinese to get the U.N. blue out, and the American red, white, and blue in.

Not a bad turn of events, however bizarre. Except, of course, that foreign troops have no business in a sovereign country like Macedonia, especially since there has never been a war there and, therefore, no need for "peacekeepers." In other words, the U.N. flag has always been a fig leaf covering the planned intervention in the neighboring Serbian province of Kosovo.

Now that China has stripped that fig leaf away, the whole world can see that the Macedonia deployment was merely a preamble to an eventual NATO occupation of Kosovo. The upcoming act of aggression against a sovereign country is not a spontaneous reaction of the Clinton administration to some made-for-TV massacre blamed on the Serbs, but part of a long-term strategy to tear this part of Serbia away.

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration's desperate efforts to sell yet another war to the American people are occasionally producing absurd results. According to a CBS Radio news broadcast on February 25, "50 percent of Americans in a poll do not know where to find Kosovo on a map; 54 percent favor sending U.S. troops there."

So what are we to conclude from this poll? That 54 percent of Americans favor shooting first and aiming later? That the other 46 percent of Americans would also send U.S. troops to Kosovo, if only they could find it on a map? That at least four percent of Americans would send U.S. troops anywhere, even if the place is not on any map? That pollsters cannot compute, but they can lie?

The New World Order types have never been too concerned about their mathematical deficiencies. Their solution to most problems seems to be, "If it doesn't compute, change the rules until it does." Sometimes this works, and sometimes it doesn't, as in the case of Macedonia, where the best laid plans of mice and men seem to have been set back by Beijing.

The Clinton administration's reaction was uncharacteristically swift. "One year after saying China had improved its human rights record, the Clinton administration today issued one of its harshest condemnations of Beijing to date, and described some of the most serious human rights violations in recent years," the *New York Times* reported in a front-page story on February 27.

Funny thing, this sudden discovery of Beijing's multi-year human rights abuses, only one day after China's Security Council veto. You don't suppose the State Department's report had something to do with Macedonia, do you?

China's action has made it all too clear who is really wagging the Clinton administration's tail, and it raises an interesting question: Why don't we "outsource" our entire foreign policy establishment to China? Based on what's happened with Macedonia, at least, the U.S. taxpayers may be better off.

Fewer Americans would risk their lives in foreign adventures, and fewer taxpayers' dollars would be spent on overseas deployments (e.g., two billion dollars per year on Bosnia, and perhaps another two billion dollars annually on the planned Kosovo force). And our national security wouldn't be any more compromised than it is today, since our government officials, from Henry Kissinger onward, have been spilling the beans to the Chinese anyway.

The Chinese would also be better off, since they would not have to waste their money on buying U.S. politicians.

Finally, Americans' prestige in the world would rise. With Beijing conducting our foreign policy, American officials would make fewer stupid statements, which make the rest of us seem like morons, too.

—*Bob Djurdjevic*

OBITER DICTA: This special issue on the family was made possible by a generous grant from the Walter and Charlotte Kohler Foundation.

The Rockford Institute, publisher of *Chronicles*, invites applications for a clerical position. Duties include, but are not limited to, bookkeeping, word processing, database maintenance, event organization, and writing. Occasional travel. Excellent benefits. Qualified applicants will hold views consistent with those expressed in *Chronicles*.

Two poets are featured this month. The first, **Bradley R. Strahan**, teaches poetry at Georgetown University. Over 500 of his poems have been published in such journals as *America*, *Christian Century*, the *Seattle Review*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *Orbis*, and *Poetry Australia*. Mr. Strahan leads the Washington Poets' Workshop and is the publisher of the *Black Buzzard Review*.

Our second poet is **Alan Sullivan**. A novelist from North Dakota who turned to poetry a few years ago, Mr. Sullivan's work has appeared in many journals in the United States and the United Kingdom, including *Poetry*, the *Dark Horse*, and the *Spectator* of London.

Our artist this month is **Stephen Schildbach**. He received his Master of Fine Arts in illustration from the Savannah College of Art and Design. He started his career in illustration in New York City while working as a graphic designer at a book publishing company. He has provided illustrations for magazines, books, and newspapers, and lives in Seattle, Washington.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHRONICLES' BACK ISSUES, TAPES, AND BOOKS

* On Family Policy, Welfare, and Immigration *

EUROPEAN AMERICA: LAND OF THE FREE, HOME OF THE FRENCH—April 1998—Thomas Fleming on the heart's geography, Jean Raspail on defending civilization, Kenneth McDonald on how culture and federalism can coexist, Scott P. Richert on the European roots of American life, and Samuel Francis on the other face of multiculturalism. Plus Ben C. Toledano on Creole culture.
Back Issue #: T984 **$7.00**

NATIONAL SUICIDE—July 1997—Thomas Fleming on learning a lesson from the Czechs, Curtis Cate on the French debate over immigration, R.J. Stove on Pauline Hanson's influence in Australia, Justin Raimondo on the future of the Pacific Northwest, William Murchison on why Mexico lost Texas, and Gregory McNamee on the state of Native Americans.
Back Issue #: T977 **$7.00**

MEN VS. WOMEN—May 1995—George Watson on the death of feminism, Mark Racho on the disappearance of the lady, Clay Reynolds on sexual harassment in the academy, and Thomas Fleming on "What do women want?" Plus Peter Shaw on why feminism is a plot concocted by men, John Lofton on Madonna and Norman Mailer, and Christopher Check on licensing parents.
Back Issue #: T955 **$7.00**

90'S MEN: PUSHY QUEERS, TOUGH JEWS, AND SENSITIZED WASPS—February 1994—Chilton Williamson, Jr., on the syphilization of American manhood, Harold O.J. Brown on the importance of sports, Paul Gottfried on the stereotypical Jewish male, and Thomas Fleming on the extermination of manliness in American culture. Plus E. Christian Kopff's "Real Men's Studies."
Back Issue #: T942 **$7.00**

UNCLE SAM'S KIDS: CHILD ABUSE AND THE ABUSE OF POWER—January 1993—Allan Carlson on the parenthood of the state, Thomas Fleming on the tragedy of making children common property, Philip Jenkins on the "Believe the Children" ideology, and William N. Grigg on false accusations of child abuse in Lehi, Utah. Plus Samuel Francis's response to William Buckley's "In Search of Anti-Semitism."
Back Issue #: T931 **$7.00**

FACES OF EVE: GODDESS, STARLET, POETESS—March 1992—Janet Scott Barlow on the devolution of women on the screen, Thomas Fleming on marriage as the real right to privacy, and R.S. Gwynn on American women poets. Plus Betsy Clarke on the politics of rape, Anne Marie Morgan on the new technology of fertility control, and Samuel Francis on Buckley versus Buchanan.
Back Issue #: T923 **$7.00**

BREAD AND CIRCUSES: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE—February 1992—Allan Carlson on how federal housing policies have contributed to the breakup of the family, William Murchison on the doctor and the state, and Christina F. Jeffrey on making Social Security family-friendly. Plus Barbara McCarthy on welfare and illegal immigration, and Jeffrey Tucker on Jack Kemp and HUD.
Back Issue #: T922 **$7.00**

IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN IDENTITY—Softcover—A collection of essays that appeared in *Chronicles* between 1985 and 1995. Featuring Peter Brimelow, Richard Estrada, Thomas Fleming, Samuel Francis, Paul Gottfried, Garrett Hardin, E. Christian Kopff, Richard Lamm, John Lukacs, Grady McWhiney, Claes Ryn, Chilton Williamson, Jr., Clyde Wilson, and Pete Wilson.
Book #: MGRT **$17.45**

ALIEN NATION—Hardcover—Peter Brimelow's blockbuster 1995 study of immigration is out of print, but we have a limited number of copies available at 50 percent off of the original cover price. Packed with facts and figures that destroy the arguments of the pro-immigration crowd, this book is essential reading for anyone who cares about the future of America.
Book #: BRIM **$12.00**

RECONSTRUCTING AMERICA: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION—Audiotape—Samuel Francis urges Americans to recapture their national identity, Thomas Fleming chooses Jefferson's decentralism over Mussolini's nationalism, and Scott P. Richert discusses the federal government's attempts to manufacture Americans. A two-tape set.
Tape #: R8J2 **$15.00**

Special Offer: With any order over $50, you will receive a free copy of the October 1997 issue of *Chronicles*.

IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY—October 1997—Patrick J. Buchanan on Mr. Lincoln's War, Samuel Francis on the demise of checks and balances, Llewellyn Rockwell, Jr., on executive branch evils, and Donald Livingston and Thomas Naylor on the *real* meaning of the Pledge of Allegiance. Plus Thomas Fleming on how presidents became our masters and Marian Kester Coombs on the attempt to feminize mathematics.
Back Issue #: T970 **$7.00**

PRODUCT ORDER FORM

Name_____

Address_____

City/State/Zip_____

☐ Check or money order enclosed

☐ Please bill my: ☐ MasterCard ☐ Visa

Card #_____

Expiration Date_____

Signature_____

Please mail form (with payment) to:
Chronicles/Products
P.O. Box 800
Mount Morris, IL 61054

or, to order toll-free, call 1-800-397-8160

Product Code	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Price
Subtotal			
20% Discount (on orders over $50)			–
Shipping & Handling INCLUDED			
Tax-Deductible Donation to The Rockford Institute			+
Total			

APROD

Offer expires 12/31/99

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


Stephen Schildbach

Defending the Family From Its Defenders

by Thomas Fleming

The phrase "family values," as it is used by politicians, marks one of the official borders between left and right in the United States. The fact is infuriating to Republican moderates who want to turn their party in the direction of opportunity and choice, which—translated into moral terms—mean adultery, divorce, and infanticide, the apparent credo of the Northeastern Republican senators who handed President Clinton his triumph over impeachment. Out here, however, a thousand miles from Sodom and Gomorrah, a man cannot entirely rid himself of the idea that the whole point to economic opportunity is to be able to make enough money to take care of his wife and children. Such a man will never be able to compromise with a party that advocates cheating and infanticide.

On both sides of the moral frontier, there are a few émigrés: leftists like David Blankenhorn, who have made capital (political as well as economic) out of marriage, and conservative Republicans like Phil Gramm and Steve Forbes, who in the 1996 campaign hardly mentioned the family. These exceptions, however, only prove the rule: Blankenhorn is denounced as a conservative by the *Nation*, even though he is a leftist who used to hang out with the communists at Highlander Folk School; and Steve Forbes has had to change his political tune sufficiently to accommodate a few bars of "Mother" and "Sonny Boy."

For moral reactionaries (a.k.a. "social conservatives"), the problem is the family, whose desperate condition is signaled by high rates of divorce and illegitimacy (to say nothing of the host of related problems of working mothers, daycare, declining birth rates, abortion, and same-sex "marriage"). The family is in crisis, they cry; poisoned by a permissive moral code and undermined by an anti-family tax code that penalizes marriage and children. As their numbers dwindle—even Paul Weyrich concedes they are now the Moral Minority—their hostility to the regime continues to deepen.

The moral struggle over the family, however, has become too complex for most people to understand. It was simpler back in the 1970's, when there were leftists who actually celebrated the family's decline, calling for the government to take over responsibility for children and celebrating incest as a revolutionary attack on the Oedipus Complex. Feminists and culture-critics on the left invoked Freud's attack on the family as a perverse institution that sexually warps its victims. Some even hearkened back to Engels' attack on the family as the creation of patriarchal males who also invented private property as a tool of exploitation.

By the 80's, however, leftists (outside the academy or the pages of the give-away *Village Voice*) had pulled in their horns, and people like Hillary Rodham were giving "pro-family" arguments for nationalizing childcare. The family was a valuable, if fragile, resource, like air and water, that required massive government action to clean it up, restructure it on egalitarian lines, and maintain it as a socially useful institution that mediates between government programs and individual tax-consumers.

In recent years, the conservative response to the problem of the family has followed the line taken by Peter and Brigitte Berger. In an analysis that goes back to Max Weber, the Bergers and their followers lament the passing of the bourgeois family that inculcated the virtues on which a democratic-capitalist society depends: industry, thrift, moral restraint. Many, if not most, take the further step of calling for government actions to restore motherhood and fatherhood to a place of respect, to eliminate the marriage penalty, and to foster a social atmosphere conducive to large families. Some have gone so far as to call upon the United Nations and national governments to save the family, which is a little like asking the Escobar family to curtail the international drug trade.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In most political debates, only the smallest particles of historical truth are allowed entrance—as much as will provide the skeleton for one or another ideological myth. In the debate over family values, historical scholarship on the left and right has emphasized the uniqueness of the bourgeois family, and although I am doing violence to the differences among ideologically diverse social historians like Philippe Ariès, Lawrence Stone, Edward Shorter, and Lloyd de Mause, their impudent contempt for human experience, tendentious arguments, and hasty generalizations deserve no better treatment.

Though leftists may deplore what conservatives laud, their socioeconomic premises are often quite similar. The family may have always existed, so the assumption runs, but it took bizarre forms, even in Europe, where several generations were crowded into one peasant cottage. Conjugal affection was difficult, if not impossible; chastity, an impossible ideal; and parental authority, typically abusive. Leftists might denigrate the bourgeois household as a hotbed of Freudian complexes, but conservatives celebrate it as the seedbed of all virtues.

Like the Marxists, conservatives link the development of the family to a specific economic class structure; both see the family as an essentially social invention; both look back to earlier ages—classical antiquity, the Middle Ages—with something like revulsion (admittedly for somewhat different reasons); and both point their fingers at the dark ages past, when men abused their wives and children, whom they treated as chattel or objects of sexual exploitation.

Capitalists and Marxists disagree on the solution, but they are remarkably close in their analysis—another example of the left's increasingly complete triumph over the conservative mind. The problem with this approach should be obvious. If the family is a fragile historical construction, parents cannot be trusted, and families must be propped up artificially by government agencies—the very agencies that have been undermining the family for a hundred years. Even if the Marxist/capitalist myth of family history were true, it would provide a dangerous incentive to erect a labyrinthine bureaucracy out of the ruins of the family authority usurped by socialist governments. But it is not even partly correct: It is simply wrong.

To prove it is wrong, I might assemble a team of social historians who could muster the evidence that no one would ever read. Instead, I shall briefly discuss one or two extreme cases, beginning with the Roman father's celebrated *patria potestas* (paternal authority), which included a life-long power of life and death over his dependent children and, to some extent, over his wife. Yet even under these circumstances, concludes historian Susan Treggiari, Romans considered a "particularly close relationship between man and wife" as "normal and desirable." Prof. Treggiari did not limit herself to literary evidence but also examined funerary inscriptions.

Similar studies of inscriptional and testamentary evidence confirm what we already knew from literature about Roman fathers. The ideal of paternal authority was described by Seneca as "the most restrained . . . putting the child's interests before his own." Once a Roman child was acknowledged, the father could take its life only under certain circumstances, e.g., if a daughter were found guilty of fornication or if a son committed acts of treason against the commonwealth or violence against the father or had sexual relations with his mother or stepmother. These were all capital crimes, by the way, but Roman law (in principle) assigned responsibility for punishment to the father (who was supposed to consult a council of the family) rather than to the state. One father who flogged his son to death was torn to pieces by a mob; another, who summarily put his son to death (for sleeping with his stepmother), was sent into exile by the Emperor Valentinian.

> We have to quit talking about what governments can do to save the family and concentrate on undoing all their massive efforts to impoverish families and undermine their autonomy.

The ideals of Italian family life have not changed enormously from the families described by Livy in the first century B.C. to Renaissance tracts written by Alberti and Tasso down to the current time, when Italian men who pretend to rule their little world are in reality nothing but *mammoni*—mama's boys. Obviously, there were bad husbands and bad fathers in ancient (and Renaissance) Italy, but the European ideal of man and wife as partners in life who dote on their children owes rather more to the Romans (and much less to the Bible) than is commonly supposed.

The ancients were civilized people who might be expected to lead quiet domestic lives, but our barbarian ancestors—Germanic, Celtic, and Slavic—also lived in close-knit families bound by affection. Even the notoriously cold-blooded English give evidence in every age of conjugal affection, and Barbara Hanawalt's careful examination of parish records in the later Middle Ages, while it turns up evidence of quarrels and abuse, reveals a set of marital norms that bourgeois Protestants would be proud to claim. "The majority of marriages," she says, "do not fit Shorter's dismal picture of the 'Bad Old Days' in which wives were dispensable or, at best, servants to their husbands. . . . Partnership is the most appropriate term to describe marriage in medieval English peasant society." Hanawalt takes pains to point out the problems in these peasant marriages, but quickly adds that we moderns have no reason for smugness: "It is not necessary to paint a foul picture of traditional peasant marriage in order to suggest that marriage is somewhat different in the modern period. Certainly, our high divorce rate gives us no grounds to consider the modern mode of marriage superior."

In diaries, letters, and documents, children, too, are spoken of in affectionate terms, and leftist historian John Demos has suggested that child abuse, so far from being a long-standing problem that we are just beginning to address, is far more prevalent today than it was in pre-modern England or colonial New England.

There are differences, undoubtedly, between ancient and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

medieval families, and even in the ancient world Greeks, Romans, and Jews practiced differing marriage customs and pursued somewhat different styles in rearing children, but one of Aristophanes' characters—Strepsiades in the *Clouds*, for example—could have swapped stories with the patriarchs or with the father of the Prodigal Son, and both might come to appreciate, after a few weeks of observation, the affection that lies beneath the bizarre rituals of family life in New Guinea or New Jersey.

There is, in fact, a wealth of solid information, from historians and anthropologists, on non-Western cultures, and despite the creative richness and ingenuity men and women have displayed in devising exotic forms of marriage and family, they converge upon a human norm of a monogamous pair mated more or less for life and dedicated to the happiness and well-being of their children.

The keys to understanding this universal phenomenon are not hard to find. Human children require prolonged care and socialization, which necessitates a degree of parental commitment not required even of chimpanzees. Although the contours of the male/female division of labor may vary slightly from age to age and tribe to tribe, they are far from arbitrary: Men, being bigger, stronger, and more aggressive, are universally hunters, warriors, and statesmen; women, who are hormonally and neurologically programmed for nurturing and compassion, have charge of the softer side of life (which often involves the harder work).

There may be specific biological differences in human beings that nudge us in the direction of marriage, but even if there were not, the sexual dimorphism of our species, when combined with the extended care needed by our children, would make the institution inevitable in all but the most desperately sick societies. I know there are young men and women who have concluded that ours is one of those sick societies, but cheer up. If they are right, we shall simply disappear, and good riddance.

The family is universal, an inevitable institution created out of our very nature. Governments did not invent it, and most, if not all, state interventions into the family are destructive. This is clear not just from policies that undermine family autonomy—compulsory schooling, laws on delinquency and child abuse, no-fault divorce—but even more from tax policies that confiscate (in my case) over half the family's household income to waste on pernicious follies like "Star Wars" defense systems, free infanticide, and the subsidies for drugs, crime, and illegitimacy which, in polite usage, are called "welfare." We have to quit talking about what governments can do to save the family and concentrate on undoing all their massive efforts to impoverish families and undermine their autonomy.

The family is not some rare exotic art form, like stained glass, whose secrets must be preserved and drilled into generation after generation of human beings. Two dumb kids stranded on a desert island would reinvent marriage and family without any prompting. Marriage and family are natural institutions, and although they can be corrupted, distorted, and damaged by human arrogance and folly, the results will always be the same: social collapse followed by a renewal of all the ancient and beautiful things without which human life is impossible. If we could ever succeed in lifting the dead hand of government from our everyday lives—cutting taxes and rolling back virtually all the social legislation of the past 100 years—we should not have to worry about the family. American families would take care of themselves, as they have always done. c

DICTATIONS

Values Clarification

"Family values" is one of those political slogans that promises much and delivers nothing. It is a first cousin of such equally meaningless Billbennetisms as "Western values" and "Great Books." The primary problem with such expressions is that they are, well, value-free.

At least in the case of "Great Books," there are actual books to lie about. When we come to the word "values," however, it is generally a lie from start to finish. The primary and legitimate meaning of "value" in English is price or worth. I don't know how "values" came to be used as a vaguer synonym for words like "principles" and "beliefs." Perhaps the origin lies in the use of values as an aesthetic term, e.g., as in the color values of a painting, or it may have descended the slippery slope from 19th-century economics to Max Weber's social theories to Nietzsche's "transvaluation of every value." Isaiah Berlin seems to have popularized the use of "values" in the dishonest modern sense. Berlin claims to have believed in "objective values"—which, logically speaking, should be a contradiction in terms: As any Misesian can tell you, value is the subjective importance you attach to something or, in crude terms, what you are willing to pay. But Berlin, playing upon the subjective and objective meanings, goes on to talk about the incompatibility of values and opens up the whole debate on "values."

To understand the difference between a value and a principle, consider "family values." When we speak of various moral principles of family life, we know what we mean: that, for example, abortion is homicide or that a man who divorces one woman and marries another is guilty of adultery. When, however, we speak of "family values," we mean only that families are good things, that children are nice, and that stable marriages are worth having.

There is nothing judgmental about values. You have your values, I have mine, and so long as each of us sticks to his set of values, everything is—as we used to say—"copacetic" (another meaningless word). In the global marketplace of prices and values, there is room for Western values and Eastern values, family values and rugged individualist values, and when we go down into that marketplace, we exchange ideas and presumably swap values. It is no doubt very convenient for politicians and undersecretaries of education who want to base their campaigns on "Christian values" without ever letting on what they actually stand for, but anyone who seriously uses "values" without the quotation marks is probably trying to pass counterfeit money in the marketplace of ideas.

—*Humpty Dumpty*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Family Formation in America

by Virginia Deane Abernethy



Stephen Schildbach

Parents, some say, are people who use the rhythm method of family planning. One might better say that parents are optimists, people who think that the present is good and the future probably better. People who look forward with confidence often have an extra child; those who think that their situation may worsen are cautious about increasing family size.

In fact, most people want children, but not more than can be raised well given family standards. When people believe that economic prospects are brightening, they marry early and plan to have children quickly, a phenomenon that I call the *fertility opportunity effect*. The perception of expanding opportunity explains the various episodes of high fertility in America.

In the colonial and frontier periods, for example, the natural wealth of the American continent invited population increase, and, indeed, very large families were common. Settlers in the New World averaged much higher fertility rates—that is, more children per woman—than were usual in the societies from which they came. Numerous authors, beginning with Adam Smith, attributed the very large family size typical in the colonies to the seemingly boundless natural resources that required human labor for transformation into wealth.

The transition from high to low fertility followed the frontier as it swept westward. Free land vanished, and good land became expensive as isolated homesteads became settlements, then established agricultural communities. Land prices became a consideration for families wishing to set up on good farms. Saving for investment in land became a barrier to early marriage and, with the foresight that it would be difficult to buy additional farms for children, was a disincentive to the early colonial pattern of very large family size. Economist Richard Easterlin has shown that denser settlement was linked to higher land prices and decreasing numbers of children per family.

In addition, cycles of prosperity saw a parallel decline or increase in the fertility rate—with the expected lag time for gestation. This relationship was clear in Concord, Massachusetts, an offshoot of the Massachusetts Bay Colony which was settled by Puritans in 1630. Lumber and agricultural exports earned Concord's early colonists the British pounds with which to import goods that they could not grow or make for themselves. They needed trade.

Initially, the bottleneck to trade was the availability of shipping, and hulls bound for England depended upon the return trip of ships that brought new colonists. English Puritans temporarily stopped emigrating (between 1642 and 1650) when the Roman Catholic Stuart king, Charles I, was imprisoned and beheaded. Ironically, improvement in the Puritans' political fortunes at home brought recession and a birth dearth to Concord. Later interruptions in trade were caused by a collapse of demand and prices for raw goods in England. Political scientist Brian Berry summarizes the relationship between colonial economic cycles and fertility rates: "These bad times of plummeting commodity prices and falling real incomes came in the 1640's, the 1690's, the 1740's and the 1790's, and are clearly identifiable in the Concord birth record."

Eventually, the American market assumed greater importance, and domestic economic cycles began to drive demographic adjustments. Late in the 19th century, however, large flows of immigrants damped the direct impact of the labor market on Concord's established residents and their fertility rate. By the 19th century, most of the adjustment to poor labor opportunities in Concord took the form of reduced immigration.

These long-term trends toward later marriage and smaller family size were punctuated by cycles of higher or lower fertility in response to fluctuations in the economy. Depressions in

Virginia Deane Abernethy is professor emeritus of psychiatry at the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine and the author of Population Politics *(Plenum Press).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the agricultural sector had the greatest affect on the established population because, until 1930, half of the U.S. population lived in rural areas. The break in farm prices in 1920, for example, was followed by a fertility decline in rural America. More than ten years later, urban fertility fell in response to the Great Depression.

The U.S. fertility rate was reviving by the end of World War II and, in the years 1946 to 1962, recovered to levels not seen for decades—the fabled Baby Boom. Conditions favored the growth of a strong middle class. Specifically, by 1946, Americans enjoyed a surging demand in the labor market because of economic growth and the limited number of men entering the labor force. (The small generation of the 1930's, as well as the G.I. Bill, which encouraged college attendance as a near-term alternative to employment, saw to that.) The small labor force relative to job openings created excellent entry-level opportunities and accelerated promotions, while technologically driven growth in productivity checked inflation. Immigration had virtually no impact on the labor market (except for the Southwest *bracero* program) and was minimal until 1965.

The opportunity structure gradually changed, and, by 1962, the Baby Boom ended. Upward mobility stalled as the employment pipeline filled and the labor force grew rapidly, mostly from Baby Boomers coming of age. Vernon Briggs observes that, "In 1964, one million more people reached the age of 18 than the year before and the entry number remained at this high level until 1980." Competition for entry-level positions stiffened, and, while many people saw their standard of living rise, progress for white Americans was significantly slower than the steamy pace that had been taken almost for granted since World War II. At the same time that inflation-adjusted income failed to rise at the accustomed pace, schools became overcrowded, and taxes rose to pay for new schools and other infrastructure. At the national level, war launched the country into a renewed bout of deficit spending.

Further developments included the 1973-74 oil embargo. Higher oil prices and spot shortages set off the "quiet depression," with productivity and wage increases much below those of the previous three decades. Pushed by inflation and recession, the economy fell from its historic growth trajectory of three percent per year to a modest one percent.

In fact, most working Americans have seen a decline in their personal economic circumstances since about 1973; the majority of working people have experienced either stagnant or declining earnings measured in inflation-adjusted, after-tax dollars. Worsening labor market conditions for blacks were initially somewhat offset by new civil rights and welfare assistance. By the 1990's, however, the impact of these programs had worn thin, because an *accustomed* level of opportunity is not perceived as particularly good, and, in fact, most blacks are among the 80 percent of Americans whose real income has not appreciably increased for 25 years.

Not all sectors of American society participated equally in the periods of economic growth after 1980. Only the top 20 percent of families, and especially the upper five percent, made significant income gains; the middle class fell into decline.

In many families, both spouses work in order to maintain accustomed amenities and educational opportunities for children. Few young couples believe that their children, if they are to receive necessary parental attention and educational advantages, can have as many brothers, sisters, and cousins as they themselves had. Small wonder that the average age of marriage has risen, and that family size has declined.

Women and couples delay marriage and are cautious about expanding their family if they think that their personal economic prospects are narrowing compared to a reference standard (their own parents' lifestyle, for example). Just as the Great Depression made many people wary of childbearing, economic conditions beginning in the mid-1970's depressed family size in most sectors of American society.

Persuaded by the history of fluctuations in the fertility rate, the Advisory Council on Social Security has adopted a similar theory. Their 1994-1995 *Report* argues that a small birth cohort, whose members encounter ample job opportunities relative to their number, will command high wages, see rapid career advancement, and, therefore, have big families. On the other hand, a large birth cohort tends to flood the labor market, resulting in stagnant or falling wages and benefits and a decline in desired family size. Notably, the Advisory Council not only accepts the principle that perceived opportunity is a determinant of the fertility rate, but also assumes that rapid population growth depresses the earnings of the average working person.

Few young couples believe that their children, if they are to receive necessary parental attention and educational advantages, can have as many brothers, sisters, and cousins as they themselves had. Small wonder that the average age of marriage has risen, and that family size has declined.

In fact, it is well documented that a change in the size of the labor force, all else being equal, affects wages. Ronald Lee, examining pre-industrial England, and Claudia Goldin, reporting on early 20th-century labor markets in cities heavily impacted by immigration, find that an increasing labor supply depresses both wages and conditions of work. The converse is also true: Economic growth combined with the relatively small labor force after World War II raised compensation, prospects for promotion, and family size.

The predictive value of the 1994-1995 *Report* of the Advisory Council on Social Security is weakened, unfortunately, by failure to take into account the labor market effects of immigration. Indeed, as the example of Concord, Massachusetts, shows, these exogenous flows of labor may smooth out the na-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive-born fertility rate, including what would have been its peaks.

The U.S. fertility rate drifted lower through the 1960's, declined faster after the first oil-price increase, and reached a new low, 1.7 children per woman, in 1976. Among whites, the fertility rate declined to approximately 1.4 children per woman. These rates are well below the number needed to replace the population. (A fertility rate of about 2.1 children per woman just replaces its parents, assuming low child mortality.)

The fertility rate is now rising. In 1997, it was 2.05, essentially the replacement level. However, this statistic combines births to native-born Americans with those of the foreign-born. Among the native-born, it appears that the black fertility rate has declined to approximately replacement level, and white fertility remains at approximately 1.8 children per woman. Only immigrant fertility is high. In 1994, for example, the foreign-born were fewer than 10 percent of the population but accounted for approximately 18 percent of births.

Newcomers to the United States often do not share the trepidation of natives who sense that opportunity for themselves and their children is deteriorating and who, therefore, feel compelled to husband resources by limiting family size. Newcomers feel well off because economic opportunity is usually greater than in the country left behind, the social safety net is stronger and broader, and educational opportunities for children are often far superior. Not surprisingly, those coming from a culture where large family size is highly valued feel free to raise their childbearing target to a number closer to their ideal. Comparisons suggest that some immigrants—Mexicans, for example—have larger families in the United States than if they had remained at home where opportunities are more limited. Different perceptions of opportunity result in different fertility rates.

If native-born Americans are to replace themselves in future generations, their fertility rate should rise and immigrant fertility should fall (converging on replacement level), and immigration itself should be reduced to an annual flow no greater than the number of emigrants who leave the United States.

This discussion of fertility rates exposes issues that invariably raise the emotional pitch during discussions of immigration policy. Should immigration serve the national interest? If such interest is judged to be moral, how should it rank among competing interests? Is it moral to give *priority* to the national interest? Should American citizens define the national interest? Do American citizens have the right to define immigration policy in the light of national interest? Is the United States a nation-state in the sense that other politically defined, geographically bounded entities are nation-states? Are Americans entitled to a country, or is the United States, as Ben Wattenberg says, "the first universal nation"?

Some advocates for a high level of immigration question whether American citizens have a legitimate interest in preserving their representation in the population, arguing instead that global humanitarian goals should control immigration policy. This debate would have been familiar in the early 20th century, as Kevin MacDonald showed in a March 1998 article in *Population and Environment*. Over the vehement opposition of mostly Jewish self-styled humanitarians who assaulted immigration restrictionists with charges of racism, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924. This legislation significantly reduced the annual flow of immigrants, established quotas that reflected the European origins of the 1890 population, and remained the law of the land until 1965. The act encouraged assimilation of the large foreign population then in the United States. Over time, it also reduced prejudice against non-northern Europeans and created opportunity for black and white Americans from the rural South, who were recruited into well-paying industrial jobs in the North—jobs formerly filled by immigrants. The small labor force in the decades immediately after World War II—limited mostly to native-born Americans—laid the foundation for the prosperity, higher productivity, growth of the middle class, and civil-rights achievements which were a triumph of the American way of life.

> Where is the proper moral indignation when young Americans avoid occupations in which immigrants depress wages, or when job seekers find their options narrowing?

The discouragement of middle-class Americans today stems from a combination of factors. Most worrisome to many is the growing disparity between high and low earners and the temporary nature of jobs even for those who try to remain employed. Between 1980 and 1996, *median* income (in 1996 dollars) rose less than $2,000, while income to the wealthiest one-fifth rose by more than $26,000. In 1980, the richest quintile had an income 10.3 times that of the poorest fifth of the population; by 1996, the multiple had grown to 13.4. This disparity is greater than in any other industrialized country, and greater than at any time since the Great Depression.

The relative decline of middle-class income and the perceived scarcity of non-financial resources—family time, recreational time, and community amenities, including the quality of public schools—contribute to the perception of diminishing opportunity. This trend not only discourages childbearing, it undermines the vitality of democracy, which depends upon a participating middle class with a self-conscious stake in community and country.

Population size stabilizes over time if families are small—given zero net immigration—and this adjustment might be all that is needed to restore opportunity to average Americans. One generation's low fertility gives their (few) children the advantage of reaching maturity in an economy that is probably experiencing a labor shortage. The limited supply of labor leads to a bidding-up of entry-level wages. Promotion opportunities improve through better-capitalized jobs, as well as through the shortage of labor.

Step by step, tracking the improving economic prospects available to young people, the fertility rate rises. That is, the fer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tility rate adjusts to conditions created by the high (or low) childbearing of the previous generation; thus, both high and low fertility are self-correcting over time.

Rapid population growth in a post-frontier, post-industrial society is one cause of the many reverses in opportunity, financial security, and lifestyle that native-born Americans have experienced in the latter half of this century. The United States ended World War II with a population of 135 million. In 1950, the population was 150 million; in 1970, about 200 million. By 1995, it had reached 263 million, and the National Academy of Sciences estimates that, with a "medium" level of immigration, it will be 277 million by the millennium, with no end to growth in sight.

Such population growth has major environmental, fiscal, and economic effects. For example, the population added from 1970 to 1995, i.e., 63 million persons, accounted for over 90 percent of the increase in U.S. energy use over the period. The rising demand for energy hastens the depletion of domestic oil and natural gas supplies (already the United States imports over 60 percent of its oil). The enormous dependence on fossil fuels may also exacerbate economic dislocations if, or when, the U.S. economy is shackled by a requirement to cut carbon dioxide emissions.

Population growth also accelerates the destruction of habitat for wild species by transforming agricultural and wilderness lands to urban and suburban building. In drought-stricken areas such as Southern California, the growing demand for water by urban users threatens agricultural uses of water. Nationally, aquifers (underground water accumulated over millennia) vital to agriculture are being depleted 25 to 50 percent faster than the replenishment rate.

Population growth also results in crowding roads, schools, and recreational areas, and it is exceeding the capacities of water-treatment and waste-disposal facilities. The ensuing demands for new infrastructure—including roads, schools, fire, police, water and sewage treatment, electricity-generating and hospital capacity, and library and recreational facilities—result in higher local taxes. Although community-development boosters often claim that new growth pays for itself, population growth actually imposes net *per capita* tax burdens on established residents. Newcomers' taxes cover only a fraction of the costs of infrastructure constructed on their behalf. Whether through bond issues or current taxes, established residents bear most of the costs of development that would not have been needed or even contemplated if community size remained constant.

Certain facts are indisputable. First, population growth forces established residents to pay for growth, although it is not obvious that they receive any benefits or increments to their quality of life. On the contrary, some indicators show diminished quality: The ethos of a small, close-knit community, good public education, and open space is almost inevitably sacrificed to growth. And, although it is "common knowledge" that more people mean a larger market, the tax nibble on disposable income may *reduce* discretionary spending. The larger share of *per capita* earnings that goes to pay taxes, as well as the earnings-depressing effect of a rapidly growing labor market, may offset the increased market: Poor people do not buy.

In a nutshell, population growth is the result of more births than deaths, and more immigrants than emigrants. The immigration impact is annual immigration, plus births to the foreign-born, minus deaths and emigration of immigrants. The native-born account is births minus deaths, and emigration of this sector.

The annual share of U.S. population growth attributable to immigration rises continuously as births to recent (post-1969) immigrants are added to the flow of new arrivals. In 1994, immigration and the children of recent immigrants accounted for over 60 percent of U.S. population growth. Mexico and the combined flow from the republics of the former Soviet Union (coming mostly as "refugees") are the two largest sources of legal immigrants.

The annual flow and first-generation births do not fully represent immigration's long-run impact on national population size. The cumulative difference can be seen from the 1997 projection of the National Academy of Sciences for the year 2050. With zero immigration (beginning, hypothetically, in 1995) the population would peak a few years before mid-century and then decline to 307 million (which is just about 27 million more than today); with "very high" immigration, the mid-century population would be 463 million, with no end to growth in sight.

Note that these are only projections, not predictions. Other demographers estimate that, if current trends continue, the population of the United States in 2050 may be well in excess of one-half billion. There is widespread agreement, however, that population growth in the 21st century would be almost entirely (over 90 percent) due to immigration, if present trends continue.

Since the cause of low fertility (below replacement level) among American women is understood, the changes needed to raise fertility are also clear. Optimism must return to the middle class. The fundamental conditions are satisfactory compensation from work (real, personal, after-tax income) and pride in country and culture.

The discouragement which oppresses many young Americans is mediated through jobs, environment, community, and family, but underlying many negative signs is a single cause: rapid population growth and lack of confidence in America's right to reduce immigration. Where is the proper moral indignation when young Americans avoid occupations in which immigrants who will work for less depress wages, or when job seekers find their options narrowing?

Many of the Americans affected are the young, who have traditionally used technical specialties to get ahead. They delay marriage and childbearing until they feel established professionally. In today's employment climate, that confidence is likely to be some time coming.

Unlike trade, which can be stopped at any time, immigration leaves footprints. Newcomers stay, reproduce, and change both culture and community. Rapid population growth destabilizes American communities and deprives young Americans of educational and employment opportunities even as they seek to become productive members of society. The economic growth of the past decade should have brought prosperity and hope to all Americans. Instead, it has principally benefited the few.

Middle-class America would gratefully return to its traditional family way. But this is not likely to happen until conditions of work, opportunity, and national pride encourage the young to believe that America cares and that the future will be good, again.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Family Policy Is Not Welfare

Lessons From the French Experience

by Jean-Didier Lecaillon

Family policy is strangely absent from debates in Europe (the word "family" plays no part in the treaty of European Union signed at Maastricht). In France, however, it has become the object of numerous controversies. From these debates, several lessons can be drawn which would enable policymakers to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

France is often cited for having developed an original model of family policy, but that model was not built up in a day, and over the years it has progressively deteriorated. A careful analysis of this experience should help us to avoid reproducing the same confusions or falling into the same traps.

Any serious reflection, to be useful, requires agreement—right from the beginning—on the meaning of words. At the same time, to be practical, that is, to find solutions assured of giving positive results, it is essential to know what one is talking about, and this brings us to a distinction which is at the heart of the entire question of family policy, the distinction between social policy and family policy.

The expression "social policy" makes us think first of everything that concerns life in society. But under so broad a definition, each and every policy ends up being social in this sense. To speak at such a level of generality is close to saying nothing. It is better to take "social" in its second sense, which refers to programs aimed at improving the condition of the least advantaged. A related expression would be "assistance" or "welfare," and it derives from the concept of the welfare state.

The purpose of this sort of policy would be the struggle against a condition which is neither desired nor desirable: poverty. In the beginning, the object is to alleviate the harshness of poverty by reducing the negative effects. But in the end, it becomes a question of doing everything possible to eliminate a condition that is considered inherently evil.

This aspect of the welfare state provides a criterion that allows us to make a fundamental distinction between social policy and family policy: The vocation of the former is to eliminate itself, since the disappearance of a social policy is the best sign that it has worked; the more ephemeral a social policy is, the better it has done its duty to the extent that the evil it was created to combat has disappeared.

The same reasoning does not apply to family policy, unless the family is considered as a sickness, an obstacle, a handicap—in short, a condition to escape from as quickly as possible. If, on the contrary, we regard the family as something that does good, and if we want families to flourish, then any policy that promotes this mode of social organization ought to be established for the long haul. By definition, then, a family policy aims at prolonging the condition which it was created to address and not at eliminating the condition.

On the level of fact, however, things are not so clear. The reasons used to justify the adoption of a family policy are diverse and vary from age to age and country to country. Also, family policy is rarely given institutional recognition under the form of a cabinet ministry or of a government department. This absence, undoubtedly, can be explained by the all-inclusive (or "global") character of family policy: Questions that touch the family are so broad that every government department can justifiably claim to be concerned. But in practice, it is the ministers of social affairs who take on responsibility for family matters, and they are trained to eliminate problems,

---

Jean-Didier Lecaillon is a professor of economics at the University of Paris. This article is translated from a speech given in Warsaw as "Politique Familiale, Politique Social: Un Distinction Sociale."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than to promote good institutions. This assumption of authority creates an obvious confusion.

With so many fingers in the pie of "family policy," it is easy to see why the meaning of "family" is often missing.

At the end of the 19th century, France basically pursued pro-natalist policies based largely on arguments developed by demographers, who were interested in the living conditions of large families. The assistance that was provided had the object of restimulating fecundity. On the other hand, none of the measures put into place made reference to a precise conception of the family. Even in the 1930's, the "birth dearth" and aging of the French population influenced public officials to take a certain number of concrete measures that resulted in the law of July 29, 1939, called the "Family Code." The scale of family allowances became strongly progressive; couples were encouraged to have their children early; there was a real commitment to assist the formation of large families.

Another ideal to be seen in the French experience is the desire to promote the family as the basic social unit or "*cellule de base*," which became the dominant idea after World War II. From that point on, the family was explicitly regarded as the natural basis of individual happiness. This recognition originally meant that business leaders regarded grants to families as a genuine family wage. These employers thought that a worker with responsibility for a family, should be paid more than a bachelor whose income served only his personal needs. . . . It was only later (in 1932) that these family grants were generalized to include all salaried workers.

The Family Code gives privileges to a specific type of family: one with three children and a stay-at-home mother. More generally, the promotion of marriage or of stay-at-home mothers (in recognition of their contribution to the formation of human capital) is based on the very specific role played by the institution of the family in the development of society. A fiscal arrangement such as the *quotient familial* (family allowance), established in France in 1945, is a concrete realization of this new attitude toward the family. Contrary to what a superficial analysis might lead one to believe, this arrangement was not a simple measure designed to provide fiscal incentives but a fundamentally original approach. In the first place, it is the family, and not the individual, which is in contact with the fiscal administration. Under such a program, family functions receive social recognition, and the existence of the family as an autonomous entity is, in some fashion, made official. The same approach emphasizes the family's rights to social security (for example, health insurance for stay-at-home mothers, and inheritable pensions).

Elsewhere, family policy concentrates on very specific situations, whether they are peculiar to the institution of the family or not. In Germany, for example, family policy is treated as an aspect of social planning, and the object is to maintain equilibrium in the different phases of family life. But in the Netherlands, there are measures designed to ensure the emancipation of women or the integration of at-risk groups into society. In France, as we have seen, only certain families benefited from the system of compensation designed to reimburse families for their responsibilities. But from the beginning of the 1970's, a fundamental shift in perspective took place, from paying families for the cost of rearing a child (the policy inaugurated after World War II) to advocating the rights of the child. In the former system, the birth of a child—of whatever class—was not supposed to impose a lower standard of living on the family, whatever its resources might be; while the latter system may justify the setting of income restrictions on the amount of grants for which a family is eligible.

This change is a tangible illustration of the gradual slide from a policy that supports the family toward a policy that tries to remedy social inequalities. This tendency is increasingly accentuated, particularly in Sweden and Denmark, where pro-natalist concerns and encouragement of the family as a mode of social life are completely absent: The primary goal is to make sure that maternity does not get in the way of women's liberation.

Pro-family legislation can also be passed in order to benefit the national economy. This is the case when a government decides to jump-start the economy by distributing buying power, or to redirect economic activity through fiscal incentives, or to stimulate employment by creating and subsidizing family businesses, or to develop certain business sectors, such as housing, by easing access to property or making the levels of rent payment attractive to investors.

To complete this little survey, we should consider that in certain countries there is an almost total absence of family policy. In this category, one can put Spain, Ireland (even though the existence of a family code shows that the family is considered in law), or the United Kingdom (despite certain declarations recognizing the fundamental importance of the family's well-being as the basis of a stable, responsible, and free society). This category includes both nations where the state refuses to get involved in what is regarded as an essentially private domain or where the term "family" is banished from official texts, as it is in the Netherlands, in the name of neutrality.

In short, there is no unity of motive or method that can be traced in the varieties of family policy, and European unification will not make up for the absence of pro-family provisions in the Maastricht Treaty. On the contrary, the effect will be a reduction to the lowest common denominator—a family policy brought down to its simplest expression.

Such an evolution is not good news for families living in countries that have preserved a system of family allowances. To understand the consequences, some thought must be given to possibly high opportunity costs that are inflicted when a family policy is absent or disappears.

Responsible politicians who wish to act intelligently must be shown what might be the interest of managing time and money in support of a specifically family-oriented policy. It is essential to demonstrate that, on the level of basic principles, the distinction between social policy and family policy is *de rigueur*. On this point, the recommendations made in 1996 by the Steering Committee in charge of preparing a French National Conference on the Family are very precise:

> The first question to be clarified concerns the conception of the family. . . . If the expression "basic unit of society" is almost naturally applied to the family, this should not cause us to forget that it refers back to a very precise conception of the social order resting upon the existence of communities of stable persons that one should recognize at all institutional levels. From this perspective, the family is the first human community because it assures reproduction and supplies the first elements of education. It is the kernel of society in the sense that it alone could assure its continuity and its fu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ture. This conception is fundamentally different from that which makes the individual (autonomous and isolated) the basic unit of society, which would then consist, simply, of one individual added after another. This second perspective ends up in the notion of the individualist family . . . the family becomes an option, one mode of social existence among others.

To illustrate concretely the difference between the two ways of conceiving of the family, we may say that the first justifies marriage regarded as a social fact while, with the second, the formation of couples will be able to be considered a strictly private affair. . . .

A family policy worked out in the context of a plan making the family the basic unit of society will step in, *a priori*, to promote, to privilege, and—quite simply—to prevent harm from coming to this mode of life. Starting from the point at which the family is considered better and more balanced when it rests on the lasting unions of men and women who intend to rear children and that individuals are naturally destined to thrive in this setting, family policy will be conceived as a means to providing both incentives and preventive measures. On the other hand, from the individualist perspective, the point will be to insure that each individual can associate himself under the best conditions when he considers that it is necessary for his success in life. In the end, intervention will be made, *a posteriori*, if his choice entails negative effects. Family life becomes a risk; the State intervenes to correct the situation on behalf of social justice.

The main point to bear in mind, in a question of family policy, is, first, that it must rest on a precise analysis of social organization, and second, that it is by its very nature preventive, not only to the extent that intervention is made *a priori* in favor of a social organization that is a given of human society, but also because this action must contribute to reduce the importance of welfare assistance. Unfortunately, to make family policy on the basis of social policy means that intervention is *a posteriori* in favor of certain categories of persons, to correct failures or compensate them for hardships they have encountered, whether they are the consequences of deliberate choice or simply the expression of differences among human beings. . . .

In France, actions taken in the realm of family policy are, because of the complexity, not easy to interpret. In particular, the number of family allowances that are paid (28 different types, currently) makes it a delicate task to evaluate the results. At the same time, it seems difficult to simplify the system without penalizing this or that category of family. Nonetheless, one useful step that could be taken, which would eliminate much of the confusion, is to spell out the specific objectives of the different programs. A group of experts directed by Madame H. Gisserot has, in fact, issued a report that makes considerable progress in this direction. According to the report:

> Family policy, insofar as allowances are concerned, should seek to reestablish equity between persons responsible for a child and those who are not; in the logic of compensation, allowances should not be, on the level of principle, made conditional on income and resources nor subject to taxation; [such a policy should also seek] to recognize the parents' participation in the creation of wealth; finally, in providing resources for certain families to make them solvent—this assistance is distinct from family allowances and belongs more to a guaranteed minimum familial income than to a recognition of family investment.

This statement does a good job of putting together the givens of the problem. Based on a recognition of the family as the basic unit of society, an operational family policy requires: re-establishment of equity and additional resources for particular families, but also recognition of the parents' role in creating true wealth. When this objective is overlooked, the end result is a failure to hold on to any dimension of family policy that is not "social," i.e., that is not welfare assistance.

The slide from family policy toward welfare policy entails several difficulties. The first of them is connected with the need to establish thresholds beyond which all assistance would be suppressed.

This is the case when there are plans to fix an upper limit on the income and resources of a family that is eligible for support. In 1998, the French government announced a relatively low standard (25,000 francs for a couple) without being able to justify this total. It is, however, difficult to decree that someone is rich or poor solely on the basis that he has a few francs more or less than a certain total; in addition, the progressive diminution of the number of beneficiaries is an inevitable fault of a procedure that regularly reevaluates the threshold. To this mechanical difficulty is added the much more delicate problem of selecting which resources to include, as well as the need to define the appropriate scales of equivalence. (This is a problem in the most favorable scenario, where family size is taken into account.) Even the evaluation of wealth levels derived from income would deserve long discussions, to say nothing of an additional source of discrimination—the desire not to help "the rich" in their task of forming human capital, resulting in the establishment of a different ceiling depending on whether there are one or two sources of income.

> The French experience helps us to see that, as family policy has been transformed step by step into welfare policy, it has ceased to be effective.

More serious, obviously, are the consequences of welfare assistance when they result in the creation of a veritable poverty-trap. This is the case when government actions maintain the beneficiaries of assistance in their dependency instead of helping them to escape. A bondage of this type is the result of AFDC programs in the United States, where it is legitimate to wonder if welfare does not end up encouraging women not to acknowledge the father of their children. The result is an increase in the number of single-parent families, which is para-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doxical in itself, at least if one considers that the ideal situation (promoted by a family policy) is that a child has both mother and father. This concern, in France, led the participants of the Conference on the Family to put their finger on the dangers lurking in measures reserved strictly for isolated parents.

We are at the frontier between actions which encourage or assist a positive choice and the necessity of correcting failures. But one must be clear that the correction is real only if the victim actually escapes from the circumstances of distress in which he finds himself, and not if he is permitted simply to endure his situation with less difficulty.

The French experience helps us to see that, as family policy has been transformed step by step into welfare policy, it has ceased to be effective, not only in the sense that the constitution of the family has not been encouraged (as seen in lower marriage rates), but also the stability of marriages has deteriorated (higher divorce rates), while fecundity has been reduced at the same time that the comparative circumstances of families, whatever their level of income, underwent a profound erosion.

In recalling these facts, we are in a position to oppose the conclusion that a family policy would be ineffective—a conclusion based, in fact, on the confusion between social policy and family policy.

Here are the alternatives: either to decide to promote the family as family and base support on the notion of family (rather than social) policy; or to consider that this is a question of a strictly individual choice and to help certain parts of the population (e.g., the poor) to make their choice, not because it would be beneficial for the family, but because they are in trouble. It is here that the idea of social policy comes to the fore.

In the first case, the familial reality is a goal in itself. It is also a bet on the future, since one is never sure that there will not be failure. But the point is to put the maximum number of trumps in the game by anticipating problems. This supposes, obviously, that the family is actually considered as something beneficial to society.

In the second alternative, this conviction is not necessary: The reality of the family is not a goal in itself, it ends up disappearing completely in the sense that it is accorded no particular preference. The sole preoccupation is to proceed, periodically, to observe the damages and to intervene when there is distress.

As in the case of every investment, the burden (the cost) precedes the return (the revenue). To bring children into the world and to rear them procures, from the emotional point of view, great immediate satisfactions. But in the economic sphere, children are from the first instant of their lives consumers, and it takes many years for them to become self-sufficient and to become productive. However, this delay is a condition necessary to economic and social development. Not only reproduction but also human capital formation (acquisition of technical skills, transmission of tradition, etc.) must be assured in the best conditions. The stable and durable union of a man and woman planning to have and rear a child or several children—a definition of family on which we should be agreed—is the mode of existence that offers the best chance of obtaining successful results.

Every investment involves a hope for future return. The notions of risk, of betting, are closely related. Only a correct understanding of "a return on investment" can justify the venture. It is important that those who make the attempt and emerge victorious (from the struggle to rear children) are not considered as slackers, or penalized systematically. This appeal to responsibility is a new means of grasping the importance of the clear distinction between family policy and social policy. If parents have decided to bring children into the world and rear them, and they are creating true wealth which will profit the entire society, it is only just to recognize the contribution they are making, and it is also reasonable to take steps to prevent the spring from drying up. ·c·

The Recovery

by Alan Sullivan

Beside her bed he set to sketching
The faint frown on a sleeping face.
Already he heard critics retching:
Staid, insipid, commonplace.

The livelihood he thought to fashion
From such unfashionable themes
Was palling like an artist's passion
In attics of forsaken dreams.

He left his work to dust and darkness,
Doubting times or tastes would change;
But critics one day favor starkness,
The next, prefer eclectic range

And under stacks of dross discover
The paradigms of modern life.
He only meant to sketch a lover
Resting from domestic strife.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mommy's Little Monster

Does the Family Breed Serial Killers?

by Philip Jenkins

Stephen Schildbach

Monsters are an ancient phenomenon in human history: There have always been individuals whose characters are marked by brutal, sadistic cruelty, who lack any redeeming instincts of compassion or mercy. Call them what we will—fiends or psychopaths, ghouls or serial killers—this type is by no means new to the later 20th century, however much the media preach to the contrary. What is new to our age, however, is the explanation that we give for the production of such creatures, which in recent decades have been explained in terms not of moral evil but of the offender's upbringing and family environment.

A cascade of true-crime books and television programs has established as social orthodoxy the idea that monsters, serial killers, and child molesters are not born but made, and made by the most extreme forms of sexual and physical abuse, committed by parents and intimates. As psychiatrist Park Dietz declared when he was asked how society could prevent the creation of serial killers: "Parents should stop torturing their children." We can readily find plausible examples of revolting cruelty which have had understandably devastating consequences on the lives of the unfortunate child victims. But equally disturbing is the extent to which such family violence has now come to be seen as a commonplace phenomenon, and thus to serve as an all-purpose explanation for virtually any type of crime, violence, or depravity, a magic key to interpreting all social failings.

The familiar themes emerge in myriad books and magazine articles, in thousands of television talk shows and newspaper advice columns: Repeat killers commit their deeds because they are taking vengeance against the parents who abused and humiliated them; molesters abuse children because they themselves were abused. And while such individuals fortunately represent only a tiny proportion of the population, they are only acting out in extreme form the traumas inflicted to a greater or lesser extent upon all of us. As the therapy industry asserts, we are all "secret survivors" of our family horrors. In this jaundiced view, the Western family is "a nightmare from which we are just beginning to awake."

Our current social ideology presumes that all evils result from the ills of the family and that individual misdeeds must be understood, and presumably pardoned, in that context. The attack on the family thus merges with a wider assault upon the idea of individual moral responsibility.

Alan Dershowitz coined the phrase "the abuse excuse" in his 1994 book of that name. The potential value of that excuse became apparent to an amazed public in the early 1990's, in a series of incredible cases in which flagrantly guilty criminals escaped punishment by claiming that their actions resulted from their disastrous family setting and upbringing. One of the more spectacular cases involved the Menendez brothers, who had killed their parents (according to most accounts) because of an overwhelming desire to gain an inheritance. In court, however, the brothers testified that the acts were the consequence of lifelong sexual and physical abuse at the hands of these sinister parents, and in memorable scenes broadcast nationwide, this evidence was accompanied by some of the least convincing and least spontaneous tears ever produced outside a mediocre high-school drama production. But the jury bought it—or at least decided that the appalling abuse which the brothers had suffered more or less justified their violent response.

This remarkable miscarriage of justice was soon rectified, but the case sent a frightening message about the extent to which the child-abuse idea had established itself as a social ideology. We had come a long way from the dark, superstitious days of "the devil made me do it": As every behavioral scientist knew, my father's abuse made me do it. In 1997, James Q. Wilson's book *Moral Judgment* bore the justifiably alarming subtitle, *Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten our Legal System?*

Philip Jenkins is Distinguished Professor of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania State University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Menendez case raised questions about just why and when ordinary Americans had come to accept such an apocalyptic view of the extent and severity of intra-family abuse. The beginning of the trend can be dated quite precisely to 1962, when an epoch-making article in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, "The Battered Child Syndrome," declared the discovery of baby-battering, which resulted from the violence that parents inflicted on small children. Professionals came to see physical abuse as a common phenomenon which could pose a lethal danger to the young. By the mid-1970's, these perceptions were disseminated by the media, demanding a prompt official response. Politically, the issue offered wide appeal: Everyone could agree with a measure to protect vulnerable children, and liberals and feminists supported a campaign against the patriarchal family. In 1974, Senator Walter Mondale sponsored a federal law which mandated the reporting and investigation of abuse allegations and promised matching funds for states that identified abused children and prosecuted abusers. The measure justified the creation of state and local agencies whose whole *raison d'être* depended on the investigation of child maltreatment—originally physical violence, but soon including sexual abuse. Mandatory reporting swelled abuse statistics, though basing investigations on anonymous reports opened the way to a high volume of groundless or malicious charges. Abuse seemed to be vast in scale and indiscriminate in its victims.

By the 1980's, exploding abuse statistics were giving a potent weapon to critics of traditional family structures, especially to feminists who could claim that the nuclear family was an arena of rape and battering. It was rhetorically vital to show not just that such abuse occurred on a vast scale, but that its consequences were lifelong and deadly. We heard repeatedly that abuse victims were at high risk of becoming juvenile delinquents or adult violent criminals. Therapists argued that repeated child abusers had themselves been abused as children, while abused women became the wives of abusers and connived in crimes against a new generation of children. At this point, the questionable theory of the cycle of abuse became entrenched in therapeutic orthodoxy. And if in fact abuse (broadly defined) affected one-third or two-thirds of the population, the implications were staggering. Was society breeding a new generation of millions of potential molesters?

Ideas about the effects of family abuse were reinforced by a powerful therapeutic trend, as the failings and anxieties encountered by adult patients were traced to forgotten instances of early abuse, which therapists recovered through hypnosis or suggestion. Once identified as incest survivors, patients could confront their problems and begin a process of healing their inner child, usually through self-help groups of comparable survivors, all struggling to free themselves of the bitter legacy of their "toxic" parents. In the most extreme cases, the child victims were believed to have retreated into secret dream refuges within their minds, constructing alternative personalities which would reappear sporadically throughout their lives. Thus was born the myth of multiple personality disorder (MPD), a hugely influential (and lucrative) subset of the therapy industry.

This was the era in which the "dysfunctional family" became a catchall explanation for personal sins and failings, a process described in Wendy Kaminer's hilarious anatomy of human gullibility, *I'm Dysfunctional—You're Dysfunctional*. Theorists of the dysfunctional family extended that damning term to at least 90 percent of American households, but if a vast majority of families are dysfunctional, what norm is being applied to assess "functionality"? By definition, we cannot all be abnormal.

Contrary to received wisdom, virtually no credible evidence exists for the prevalence of child abuse, and even less for its long-term effects.

Though these ideas about abuse, dysfunctionality, and so on have come to be thoroughly institutionalized, it is striking just how recently so many of them have been developed: They would have been utterly strange to all but a handful of therapists just 20 years ago. The sharpest change from earlier orthodoxies is in the harm said to be caused by child abuse, especially of a sexual kind. Thirty years ago, the common assumption was that such abuse was not likely to be terribly damaging if the child had a supportive family and the case were not dragged through the bureaucratic channels of police and courts. Today, of course, this view seems barbaric, because we have been told that any sexual contact with an adult, even of the most fleeting kind, devastates a victim's entire life. In fact, equally plausible research and case studies can be produced for either the extremely optimistic attitude of the 1960's or the pessimistic theories prevailing today. As is so often the case in social science, once you know the ideological approaches of the scholars conducting the research, you can predict their findings pretty accurately.

Contrary to received wisdom, virtually no credible evidence exists for the prevalence of child abuse, and even less for its long-term effects. Many modern assumptions about child abuse rest on foundations which, on closer examination, prove to be utterly insubstantial: For example, given the outpouring of articles and books on MPD, there still remains to be found even one case of the supposed disorder that will stand up to critical examination. The phenomenon may exist, but even if it does, it occurs in perhaps a few instances in every million people, not (as it sometimes seems) in every other client unwise enough to wander into a psychiatric facility with some unspecified malaise.

Much of the evidence for the whole ideology of abuse and dysfunctionality stems from "monsters," that is, from very high-profile cases of extremely violent or criminal individuals subjected to intensive examination, whose life stories are subsequently publicized and popularized through the media. These tales can be found in hundreds of true-crime books or in documentaries broadcast almost nightly. Though these stories are generally reported uncritically ("When Bob was a toddler, he was savagely beaten and repeatedly raped by his alcoholic fa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ther"), the means by which the alleged facts are produced are profoundly suspect.

Consider, for example, one case of the late 1970's, which happens to have been studied in great detail. (Though the event took place some years ago, little has changed in terms of therapeutic orthodoxies; if anything, therapists have become even more credulous.) When Kenneth Bianchi was first arrested for his role in the "Hillside Strangler" murders in Los Angeles, news reports stated that he was a striking case of MPD, a classic Jekyll-and-Hyde pattern. While "Ken" seemed a pleasant and peaceful individual, this superficial personality was occasionally replaced by another, a brutal killer, and the killings had been the work of this alternative part of the psyche—another "alter," in the jargon of the trade. Bianchi's personality split could be traced back to childhood unhappiness and abuse. Two eminent psychiatrists vouched for this interpretation; the only problem was that it was a flagrant ruse to avoid first-degree murder charges. A third psychiatrist proved this by inducing Bianchi to invent more fake personalities while on camera. Minutes after being told that it was unusual for true multiples to have only one extra personality, Bianchi was speaking in a silly, childlike voice, and another alter was born. It makes for riveting television, and if the circumstances were not so tragic, it would be very funny.

Bianchi's motives in this situation were clear enough, and it is staggering that the first psychiatrists on the scene could have been so naive about what was at stake. One psychiatrist later recanted his diagnosis of Bianchi after he took a job in a prison and found to his astonishment that convicts and criminals spend their lives lying and seeking to manipulate others. This fact is already familiar to most of the lay public, who do not possess the benefit of psychiatric qualifications.

A similar gulf between popular and expert views became obvious a decade later in the trial of Arthur Shawcross, who had killed a dozen prostitutes. His defense was that he suffered from MPD, and one of his alters was a 15th-century cannibal. As reported by a well-regarded therapist, Shawcross's unfortunate situation resulted from his extreme sufferings while being abused as a child. On cross-examination, the therapist appeared shocked when asked whether she had ever thought that Shawcross might have ulterior motives for reporting abuse or feigning MPD; she declared, no doubt with total sincerity, that such a thought had never crossed her mind. Shawcross described his feelings and experiences, and she faithfully reported them to the court. (The psychiatrist's televised appearances became so outrageous that a local radio station greeted them with a jingle based on an old rock song: "Yakkity-yak, Dorothy's Back.") The stories of Bianchi and Shawcross have been repeated in a thousand other cases, and in most, the therapists involved come across as equally naive and just as determined to use the cases to prove their cherished theories.

Criminals, killers, and molesters very often report suffering severe childhood abuse, and maybe some of them did have such awful experiences—though virtually nobody seeks external confirmation of the alleged events. Having said this, anyone finding himself in peril before the justice system knows that there are certain obvious ways to improve his situation, and one of these is to lessen responsibility for his actions. The abuse excuse is invaluable in sentencing hearings, and downright essential before a parole board. Indeed, the childhood trauma theory is so deeply embedded in our expectations that a failure to produce adequate horror stories is a sure symptom that the defendant is suffering from denial and has not taken the first steps to recovery. Doesn't everyone know, as surely as the night follows the day, that sex offenders do what they do as part of the ongoing cycle of abuse? The medical authorities expect, even demand, tales of abuse, and of course they get them; in turn, these tales confirm and expand the initial expectations.

Ever since parole boards were invented in the 19th century, it has been a prison truism that the way out of the institution is to find the nostrum for crime currently in vogue and to cite it with all passion as the reason for one's life of wrongdoing. In the 19th century, the usual explanation was the demon rum, and convicts and defendants invoked this enemy as the force driving them from the straight and narrow. For much of the mid-20th century, Freud held sway, and legions of inmates stood before the board members asserting how much they detested their possessive mothers. (Inmates would privately regret telling such dreadful lies about beloved parents, but the circumstances forbade honesty.) About 1980, child abuse became the obligatory explanation, the approved formula for creating criminals and monsters.

When psychiatrists appeared before lay audiences, they could quite genuinely say that they had heard the same stories a thousand times before, that all their cases had reported similar tales of torture and abuse. Being surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, it was incredible that anyone could doubt the pervasive nature of rape and torture in the American family. The therapists never asked themselves whether the criminals in question had any option about telling the tales they did, or whether they would have been believed if they had denied being abused. The questioners knew exactly what answers they were going to get, and of course, they got them. Of such are orthodoxies born.

To say that the plethora of modern-day abuse tales are dubious does not, of course, mean that the behavior does not exist: Some parents do torture their children, physically, sexually, and emotionally. However, an historical perspective might raise doubts about the exact effects of violence suffered in childhood: For most of Western history, severe corporal punishment has been the normal experience of virtually all boys and most girls. If the modern consensus is correct in seeing this type of behavior as abusive, then presumably it should have had obvious aftereffects in the form of high rates of violence and sex crime. Crime rates do change over time, but there is not the slightest evidence of correlation with strict child-rearing practices. In fact, it is the recent, post-Spock generations—which grew up largely without corporal punishment—that have recorded the most spectacular increases in crime and violence.

This is a troubling observation, because if we deny the social impact of childhood conditions, we have subverted a very large part of the justification for the therapeutic professions, to say nothing of the rationale for state intervention. If the claims about the vast effects of abuse are hokum, how do we justify the huge edifice of social-work agencies and overpaid therapists which we have constructed to deal with the supposed problem? Even worse, without the explanation of family abuse and maltreatment, how do we explain criminal behavior itself? We might even be driven to explanations based on personal morality, on the notion of evil, and we could not have that, could we? It is so much easier to invoke that familiar whipping boy, the institution of the family. c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"All the News Unfit to Print"

Signs of the Times

Vol. 1 No. 5 May 1999

The best commentary on the Clinton affair predictably came from abroad. Writing in the *Daily Telegraph* (London) on February 10, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard lamented the fact that the Republicans were too timid, or too enmeshed in Clintonian intrigue themselves, to pursue the *real* charges against Clinton. The counts concerning Lewinsky were bound to be misconstrued as "lying about sex" and to serve as a perverse vindication for the President:

> But there is so much else. Congress did not have to confine the impeachment to the findings of Kenneth Starr. . . . By doing so, it became a prisoner of Mr. Starr's own subtle agenda. . . . Mr. Starr is most assuredly not an "independent" counsel. He is a creature of the Justice Department, where he once served as chief-of-staff. His team . . . has been dominated by fellow insiders and he has relied slavishly on the FBI to do the donkey work. But it is precisely the politicisation of the Justice Department and the FBI that forms the core scandal pervading the abuses of this administration.

Evans-Pritchard went on to lament Starr's reluctance to confront the FBI, his focus on "harmless follies that could be prosecuted without collateral damage," and his turning a blind eye to the warning of an FBI cover-up in the investigation of Vincent Foster's death. In addition, "negligently—or worse," he failed to take testimony from key witnesses in the "Filegate" affair, and the story—including Hillary Clinton's key role—is emerging instead from a civil lawsuit:

> [T]he Republicans have always been skittish about exposing the dirtiest of Mr. Clinton's dirty linen, lest their own (lesser) indiscretions come to light. [That's why] they backed away from probing whether Mr. Clinton knowingly solicited laundered campaign funds from Chinese military intelligence in exchange for restricted missile technology . . . [and] why they have been so wary of discussing Mr. Clinton's astounding ties to Arkansas's 1980s cocaine king, Dan Lasater. . . . Arkansas played a role in the Reagan administration's clandestine supply flights to the Nicaraguan Contras . . . A forbidden subject. Mr. Clinton gets another free pass. Impeachment is thus reduced to two measly counts on Monica Lewinsky, and the Republicans . . . put on a show trial with a scripted outcome of acquittal, calibrated to wound but not to kill. . . . So the man caught red-handed in perjury, obstruction of justice and ungallantly smearing his lover as a demented stalker is hailed as the winner. The world knows that he is guilty, but he is the one enjoying a victory cigar.

Someone definitely not lighting any cigars—but possibly having them extinguished against his skin—is Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan. While his Kosovo-Albanian equivalents basked in media limelight, American political support, and French gastronomy at Rambouillet, Ocalan was grabbed in Nairobi and flown to a Turkish jail. The *Toronto Sun* (February 21) explains the mystery:

> Ocalan was clearly tracked and shadowed by U.S. intelligence and, very likely, Israeli intelligence. Both services have important posts in Nairobi, and work closely to monitor East Africa. Israel, Turkey's new strategic ally, provides Ankara with substantial anti-guerrilla training, equipment and interrogation techniques. The U.S. supplies Turkey's 525,000-man army with weapons, including armour and helicopters used to fight PKK guerrillas in eastern Anatolia.

A wave of protests by Kurds throughout Europe ensued, many targeted against Israeli diplomatic posts. In the aftermath of the killing of three Kurdish protesters by Israeli consulate guards in Germany, Israel's government dissociated itself from Ocalan's capture. According to the *Jerusalem Post* (February 19),

> "all efforts" are being made to spread the word that Israel had "no connection whatsoever with the Ocalan affair." . . . Mossad chief Efraim Halevy . . . sent out a memo . . . denying the Mossad had any connection with Ocalan's capture.

While Israel protested its innocence, the official U.S. position remained unabashedly supportive of Turkey. This is not surprising: The Ocalan issue coincided with an escalation in the ongoing American bombing of Iraqi targets. As the *Independent*'s Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk reported (February 21), more than 70 American and British air raids in the first two months of 1999 inflicted more damage than the pre-Christmas bombardment:

> Iraqi missile sites have been attacked without warning and radar stations targeted solely because their presence . . . was said to menace American forces in the Gulf. US aircraft bombed a[n] . . . anti-ship missile battery on the Fao peninsula which, according to a spokesman, "could have [sic] threatened shipping in the Gulf." . . . By attacking Iraq almost every day while issuing only routine information about the targets, U.S. and British officials have also ensured that their "salami" bombardment has provoked little or no interest in the press . . . On February 11, General Sir Michael Rose, a former UN force commander

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> in Bosnia, condemned the offensive in a speech at the Royal United Services Institute: "The continual TV images of the West's high-technology systems causing death and destruction to people in the Third World will not be tolerated forever by civilised people."

Turkey's help—and the use of its air base at Incirlik, in eastern Anatolia—proved far more important to Washington than the Kurds' struggle. Ocalan's capture was preceded by a statement from State Department spokesman James Rubin on February 1: "[C]ountries should take steps consistent with their national legal system to assist Turkey's efforts to bring Ocalan to justice."

Anyone unfortunate enough to have a first-hand experience of Turkish "justice" may beg to differ, as the *Independent* reports (February 19):

> Kurds are being systematically subjected to electric shock treatments and other sophisticated tortures by the Turkish government. . . . Men and women are being suspended naked from the ceiling, hosed with cold water, and beaten on the soles of their feet, [a] two-year study reveals. The shocking findings, by the British-based Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, . . . [are] based on a study of 78 patients who were examined at the Foundation's London headquarters between January 1997 and March 1998. . . . A source at the Foundation said: " . . . Those carrying out the practices were clearly aware of how far they could go and when they should stop for fear of causing death." Of the 70 male and eight female patients . . . only 15 were charged with an offence and only three convicted.

While deploying scorched-earth tactics against Kurdish villagers suspected of supporting separatists, the Turks have no qualms about supporting Albanian armed separatists in Kosovo. *Kanal-7 TV* in Istanbul carried an interview (February 1) with Suayip Muya, who represents the Kosovo Liberation Army in Turkey. Asked what he expected from Turkey, Muya replied: "Based on . . . political, cultural, religious and other ties, the [KLA] considers Turkey to be the prime source of support and expects everything from Turkey and we thank you for the aid extended by the Turkish people."

Simon Jenkins, in the *Times* (February 19), advised Messrs. Clinton and Blair:

> BOMB Turkey now. Let's not wait. Flatten Ankara, Tomahawk the Bosphorus, take out Izmir. If we can bomb Serbia for the Kosovans and bomb . . . Saddam Hussein for the Iraqi Kurds, we can surely bomb Turkey for their mountain brothers. Why wait until "more people die" or until "Robin Cook's patience is exhausted"? New Labour bombs sooner. It bombs for peace. Thatcher bombed but Blair bombs bigger. What hypocrites we are. We showed not the slightest interest in Kosovo until a violent faction of the Kosovan separatist movement began killing people. Then suddenly Kosovan autonomy is an "issue of international security and human rights." Likewise with the Kurds. Only when a violent minority takes its violence to the ambassadorial ghettos of Western Europe is every newspaper alert to the cause, every radio sounding the grievance, every talk show fawning for a spokesman.

Jenkins argues that the PKK (the Kurdish separatist movement) is ideally placed for intervention:

> What could be more glorious than for Tony Blair to take on the last unfinished business of 20th-century statecraft and grant the PKK its wish? The Turkish suppression of the PKK and that movement's bloody retaliation scream out for a Lancaster House conference. Turkey may be a sovereign state, but then so are Iraq and Yugoslavia.

Bombing is not always all fun and no risk, reports the *Independent* (February 5). The United States may be forced to acknowledge that it mistakenly attacked a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan with cruise missiles last year.

> The owner of the plant, Saleh Idris, has asked the US to apologise, to unfreeze his assets and to compensate him for damage to the factory. . . . "We'd like to settle this peacefully," said John Scanlon, who represents Mr. Idris in New York. But a legal action was under preparation . . . Mr. Idris . . . has also retained Kroll Associates, the world's leading firm of private investigators, to examine the evidence. Mr. Scanlon said it proves that there was no chemical weapons plant in the factory, that it had never belonged to Mr. bin Laden and that there were no links between Mr. Idris and Mr. bin Laden or the Iraqi government. . . . One US government source told *The Independent* that it was a case of "right country, wrong building."

While the eventual U.S. apology may be accompanied by a hefty check, signed by the American taxpayer, Ted Turner's meal of humble pie in February at least did not cost him any money.

Turner had to apologize first to the Pope and then to the people of Poland for telling a "joke" at a pro-abortionists' rally in New York that was insulting to the Pontiff and offensive to all other Poles. That, in itself, is unremarkable: Christians and Europeans are fair game in Turner's scheme of things. What *is* remarkable is the closing paragraph of a Reuters report (February 20) on Turner's remarks:

> A Turner spokesman said Friday that he likely would wait to consult the State Department before apologizing, but a spokeswoman said Saturday he decided to apologize sooner to quickly bring an end to the matter.

How bold of Ted! His daring act of apology, without clearance from Madeleine Albright, shows the injustice of our suspicions that Turner's CNN, unfairly known in some foreign lands as "Clinton's News Network," was in cahoots with the powers-that-be in Washington. A man who can act so independently in personal matters can surely be trusted to give us an unbiased and comprehensive story on Iraq, Kosovo, the Kurds, or Juanita Broaddrick. God bless him and our independent media!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wonderful Illusions

by Fr. Hugh Barbour

"The remembrance of death, like all other blessings, is a gift of God: otherwise how is it that often when we are by the very tombs, we are left tearless and hard?"
—St. John of the Ladder

The Medjugorje Deception
by E. Michael Jones
South Bend, IN: Fidelity Press;
385 pp., $19.95

◆

More than 20 years ago, I was counseled by an orthodox Roman Catholic professor at UNC-Chapel Hill to cool my teenage zeal for ferreting out heresies among the higher and lower clergy. "You will find quite enough trouble within the elastic bounds of orthodoxy, Mr. Barbour," he wisely told me. He advised me not to worry about the sad legion of the heterodox: They would do themselves in—and everyone else a great favor—even before the magisterium of the Church got around to the happy task. The real trouble in the Church would begin with the bewildered orthodox reaction to an almost unbridled heterodoxy and heteropraxis. In those days, I could not have imagined how prophetic his words were. (Note to those affected by higher criticism: "Prophetic" means "He knew they would come true.")

Back in the mid-70's, there was no organized, robust movement of reaction to post-conciliar modernism. To be sure, there were the *Wanderer* and *CUF*, but the orthodox household had not yet burgeoned into the great mass of colleges, new religious institutes, publishers and publications, movements, etc., which exists today. "The elastic bounds of orthodoxy" are stretching wider and wider and are ready to snap. Today's "orthodox" Roman Catholic can be anything from a



Stephen Schildbach

"traditionalist" (and this title includes both the uniate Lefebvrist and semi-Origenist aestheticist), to a neoconservative, ex-60's leftist turned *Wall Street Journal*-personalist, to an intellectually irritable, but resigned, ex-Anglican Thomist, to an ex-five-point Calvinist biblical apologist who *still* believes in limited atonement, to a slain-in-the-spirit charismatic with a pending double annulment case. When one considers that this list is not exhaustive, and that its characterizations are not adequately distinct, then the number of possible combinations and variations is daunting, e.g., a charismatic mother superior in full-wimpled habit who enjoys an occasional Tridentine Mass and now admires Madeleine Albright since Vaclav Havel does. ("They say he likes the Holy Father!" she gushes, which for her is an abbreviated syllogism. Mother Enthymeme, we can call her, or "Men" for short.)

Today's orthodox Catholics, of paleo-, neo-, charismatico-, or whatever stripe are surely as right as right can be about the necessity of doctrinal fidelity. What they have not understood, and what has led to the intellectually indigestible silliness of much of what is served up and sold as right-believing Catholicism—worse, to the much less publicized moral failings of its proponents—is amply, if unevenly, demonstrated in E. Michael Jones' *The Medjugorje Deception*. In the Medjugorje movement, my old professor's prediction comes true with a vengeance. Jones has done us all a favor in narrating, though not exactly documenting, its fulfillment on a grand scale.

The Medjugorje Deception teaches the reader that it is not enough to be orthodox. It is not enough to be an enthusiast for the papacy, Eucharistic and Marian devotion, and the pro-life cause to be a guaranteed channel of grace and truth. Since orthodoxy seems so beleaguered and rare, and yet so necessary, it can, when found in a robust form, seem like a maximum of Catholicity, when it is in fact only a mere minimum. Thus the orthodox believer begins to take on a certain rash confidence in his own judgment during a time of great confusion because, in comparison to the spiritual desert around him (usually identified with the local chancery office or major seminary), he has an abundance. He becomes amazingly self-assured in fields where previously all lay and most clerical angels feared to tread, e.g., the outer reaches of extraordinary mystical phenomena, the theological significance of

Fr. Hugh Barbour, O. Praem., is the prior of St. Michael's Abbey, Trabuco Canyon, California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liturgical rubrics, current events in a biblical perspective, and a Christian approach to psychotherapy.

The Fathers of the Egyptian Desert would have recognized the problem right away: *illusion*. A self-conscious "orthodoxy," especially with all its hyphenations, is no guarantee against spiritual delusions. In fact, in today's Church, it may become a proximate occasion of this sin. Perhaps a more precise, and therefore more charitable, title for this book would have been *The Medjugorje Illusion*. The seers and their promoters are not necessarily engaging in deliberate deception, but are rather the victims of their own illusions. This is, in fact, one of Jones' suggested explanations. The Medjugorje seers have been seeing something, but they are under the illusion that it is from heaven, when its origin may be merely, albeit ominously, preternatural.

In 1981, the Blessed Virgin is alleged to have appeared to some teenagers on a hill by a village in Bosnia, beginning a movement which is still continuing, along with its apparitions, and which has had a tremendous impact on many Roman Catholic faithful in the United States. The parish church of Medjugorje is the focus of numerous pilgrimages, and the movement which promotes the messages of the apparitions is found in practically every parish in our country. Conversions, souls returning to the sacraments and to a fervent life of prayer are attributed to the experiences undergone as a result of contact with the messages of Our Lady, the "Queen of Peace." A serious Catholic would not reject these apparitions out of hand, given their "fruits" and the orthodoxy of their message of prayer and penance. E. Michael Jones shows us why they should be rejected, even though it is unlikely that he will convince anyone who does not already tend to agree with him.

What is it that made a series of adolescent group experiences into an international religious phenomenon of nearly two decades' standing? There is, of course, an ecclesiological explanation: on this, more later. But Jones' explanation of the Medjugorje movement has several angles of approach. There are political, economic, and sociological causes, seen in the light of the historical *onera* of the Ustasa, communism, and the dubious alliances of the Cold War. I will not comment on this aspect of Jones' analysis, except to point out that the book's way of treating these matters is what will make it in large part a rhetorical failure. The audience which most needs the insights of *The Medjugorje Deception* (the kind of pan-orthodox Catholics who subscribed to Jones' *Fidelity* magazine until he questioned Medjugorje) will not be able to follow the ramblings of Jones' powerful journalistic intuitions. He is preaching to the saved (perhaps a Serbian Orthodox hieromonk, or that aforementioned—and undersigned—intellectually irritable ex-Anglican Thomist), the sort of reader who is a devotee of *Chronicles* and occasionally glances at the *New American*. Jones' insights are worthy of the former, but, alas, his prose and editorial acumen are more akin to the latter. He should have written a work in which the political analysis was as distinct as possible from the ecclesiological. As the book is written, it will allow the Medjugorje follower to discount his analysis of the apparitions as politically motivated, or as unrelated to their strictly religious aspect. An enthusiast can hardly be expected to abstract from the geopolitical aspects in order to see the point for his own spiritual life.

As any examination of various apparitions since the 17th century will bear out, both authentic and spurious apparitions can have significant political connotations: for instance, the banners and badges of the Sacred Heart in the Vendée in revolutionary France, or the travels of the Pilgrim Virgin of Fatima throughout South Vietnam in the early 70's. Indeed, unless one is a Freemason, it is hard to see what is wrong with heavenly realities mixing with history and politics. As an intensely devout Catholic, Jones would surely agree. The political manipulation of the Medjugorje apparitions in favor of Croatian nationalism or a papal strategy for destabilizing communism would not in itself prove that the apparitions are fake, unless those political ends inferred from the apparitions are evil in themselves, and this, of course, Jones does not intend to say. To attack manifestations of supernatural religion as false *because* they have the effect of promoting political as well as religious ends is a typically leftist, secularist approach.

The strength of Jones' argument lies in the accumulation of evidence of a state of spiritual illusion afflicting the seers, devotees, and promoters of the apparitions. He gives the general key to understanding a certain disposition for delusion on the part of orthodox Roman Catholic faithful when he remarks that every time the bishops neglect to discipline a single pro-abortion nun, they send a planeload of pilgrims to Medjugorje. The followers of Medjugorje, when push comes to shove (as it literally did in the case of the violent abduction of the bishop of Mostar, an opponent of the apparitions and the ordinary of Medjugorje), do not trust the authority of bishops, since the bishops do next-to-nothing to hinder the widespread doctrinal abuses in the Church. They are far more likely to believe some seers who seem to be reaffirming central verities of Catholic faith and practice. Bishops and priests are judged by their acceptance of the apparitions, rather than the converse. This leaves the right-believing faithful open to every kind of fakery, as long as it is "orthodox." Jones chronicles numerous examples of this from within the Medjugorje orbit with entertainingly savage clarity. His descriptions of the faded *virago* Vassula Ryden, of the "seer from Wendy's," or of the Assembly of God archimandrite seeking work in the Philippines do not disappoint as a sort of working-class Firbankian church satire in the so-funny-I-forgot-to-laugh category.

At times, Jones seems bewildered by the inaction of Church authorities in regard to the numerous irregularities connected with the Medjugorje movement. The local bishop's flat condemnation of the apparitions is not supported, it seems, by his brother bishops or the Holy See. Yet the explanation should be clear enough. Church authorities, faced with massive dissent from Catholic teaching and practice (and being unable or unwilling to do anything about it), are only too ready to content themselves with the thought that at least the faithful are praying and having recourse to the sacraments, and supporting the Church in general as a result of their involvement in the apparitions. They can overlook, or even benefit from, the instrumentalization of the faithful's piety for the ends of ecclesiastical or secular politics, as long as the faith of the people is strengthened or at least not disturbed. This, too, is a spiritual illusion which leads one to wonder if such prelates and pastors got their notions of the *cura animarum* from Plato's *Republic* rather than from the Holy Gospels. These clerics undermine their own authority by increasing the influ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence of the pan-orthodox, anything-goes-as-long-as-I'm-not-a-modernist minimalism in contemporary Catholic life. Jones has been combating this attitude for some time, so it is surprising that he does not categorically indicate it as the fundamental "permissive cause" of the Medjugorje mess. For most of the book, he only hints at it. Perhaps he does so out of a certain deference for authority, especially that of the Holy See. Only on the very last page does he make the point with any cogency, and then it is by way of a sledgehammer *memento mori* directed at the Pope, who I doubt would be offended by Jones' words: John Paul II is, after all, the personalist Pope of dialogue. Yet the Pope is not as much to blame as his admiring minions are: The neo-orthodox love to take the name of John Paul II in vain. To use an expression drawn from one of Jones' early *Fidelity* articles on the Marian apparitions movement, the Holy Father, just like the Blessed Virgin, "takes a beating from his friends." In the 18 years since the first apparitions, the Pope has said *nothing* publicly about them, although the promoters of Medjugorje eagerly repeat things he has allegedly said in private, as though these nullify the official, public teaching of the local bishop and of the former Yugoslav Episcopal Conference. Such shoddy reasoning, found in irresponsible books like *Medjugorje: What does the Church Say?* (Santa Barbara: Queenship Publishing, 1998), is an example of the wildly imprudent outlook of those who think they are infallible because they love the Pope as a media personality, while they ignore his teaching on the office of bishops. As any Catholic knows, the Pope's privately expressed opinions are not a *locus theologicus*.

To be sure, E. Michael Jones is no skeptic. His preferred theory of the real nature of the events of Medjugorje, at least in the beginning, is that the souls of some 600 Serbs, among them a community of Orthodox monks thrown to their deaths on the other side of Medjugorje's apparition hill in 1941, returned to ask for prayers and reconciliation. According to Jones, there is some circumstantial evidence that this could have been the case before the apparitions were derailed by being moved to the parish church and placed under the direction of clergy at odds both with their bishop and their religious order superiors. Here, at least, would be a message worthy of the Queen of Peace and the Mother of Sorrows venerated by both Serbs and Croats, an effective reminder and remedy indeed against exaggerated nationalism or internationalism: Pray for the dead. As the Desert Fathers teach, compunction is the sure cure for illusion.

But perhaps the best message is that of Blessed Aloysius Cardinal Stepinac. Responding to an inquiry about Marian apparitions during his confinement at his Croatian hometown of Krasic in 1956, he wrote: "No one needs to look for pretexts for more of them. Even if some look for a sign from heaven, one isn't necessary." No illusions here, just faith. ✠

THE MEDJUGORJE DECEPTION

Proponents of Medjugorje like to talk about its fruits, but ignore the broken families, the pregnant nuns, the poor people bilked of their money, the division in the Church, the *de facto* schism, the worst fighting in Europe since World War II, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from Gradno, just five kilometers from Medjugorje—all of which followed inexorably from those children on that hill in Bosnia in June of 1981. *The Medjugorje Deception* breaks the conspiracy of silence that has surrounded one of the biggest hoaxes of the 20th century. It tells the full truth from beginning to end, from the bloody atrocities during World War II on the other side of Apparition Hill to their bloody sequel in the ethnic cleansing of Mostar's Muslims with money raised by Medjugorje groups. *The Medjugorje Deception* is more than a book; it's a spiritual work of mercy, and it's available now for $19.95 plus $3 shipping and handling from Fidelity Press.

E. Michael Jones has written a passionately objective book that finally puts the Medjugorje phenomenon in an historical context. Based on first-hand interviews and a careful reading of the documents, The Medjugorje Deception *is a cautionary tale about the dangers of mixing religion and politics.* Catholics who refuse to read this book are running away from the truth.

—Thomas Fleming
Chronicles

THE MEDJUGORJE DECEPTION
$19.95 plus $3 Shipping and Handling

Mail orders to:
Fidelity Press
206 Marquette Avenue
South Bend, Indiana 46617

Phone orders:
(219) 289-9786

Fax orders:
(219) 289-1461

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Secretary of Education Doesn't

by Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones

The Devil Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition
by E. Christian Kopff
Wilmington, DE: ISI Books;
313 pp., $24.95

◆

Monsignor Ronald Knox, when asked to conduct a baptismal service in the English language, replied that the Devil knew Latin, thus supplying a title for this lively, informative, and intelligent book. Many of its chapters have already appeared in periodicals, particularly *Chronicles* and *Academic Questions*. But five of them have been made by the addition of four new chapters to form a more or less organic whole, which is the book's first section, entitled "Civilization as Narrative." The second section, containing six miscellaneous chapters, is called "The Good, the Bad, and the Postmodern." The third section, "Contemporary Chronicles: Role Models and Popular Culture," contains seven such chapters, of which two are new. Also new are an epilogue, called "Optatives and Imperatives for the Next Millennium" and an appendix, called "Doing It On Your Own." The most important parts of the book are the first section, the epilogue, and the appendix.

The first section offers an intelligent, well-written, and well-informed account of the importance of classical studies and the reasons why their disappearance would be disastrous. Ignorance of the past history of our culture would mean a decline into barbarism. Neither Christianity nor Western philosophy and science can be fully understood without a knowledge of their origins. Kopff shows why a program based on "Great Books" in translation cannot be a wholly satisfactory substitute for one in which some of them are studied in their original languages. Of course, it is desirable to know as many languages and as many cultures as one can; but for most people the possibility of learning is limited, and the languages that help us most to understand the culture within whose domain we live are Greek and Latin, and next the modern European languages. Referring to Carl J. Richard's important book *The Founders and the Classics*, Kopff shows that the origin of the United States cannot be fully understood without awareness of its special relation to Greek and Roman antiquity.

Kopff casts a critical eye upon the abiding influence of the Enlightenment. With reference to the work of Hayek, he shows how easily that influence leads to dangerously sweeping generalizations, such as a belief that free trade is in all circumstances a good thing. In particular, he finds fault with the influence of Rousseau, especially in the matter of education. That influence can be seen in the harmful theorizing of people like John Dewey: because of their prejudice against Memory, who—as the Greeks knew—is the mother of the Muses, the years when a child's aptitude for learning languages is strongest are wasted in an attempt to teach him other things which are more easily learned when at a more advanced age. This, together with the effect of various elements of the popular culture—especially television—is responsible for the distressing ignorance of college freshmen which, in recent years, few teachers can have failed to notice.

In a chapter headed "The Ghost Dance: Liberalism in Crisis," Kopff remarks that "liberalism is drowning in cultural relativism." He strongly argues for this view, with reference to Alasdair MacIntyre's two important books *After Virtue* and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, and in a chapter in the second part of the book, he deals effectively with "postmodernism" and "deconstruction," illustrating the point by describing the disgusting career of Paul de Man. MacIntyre, he says, "sees no hope of restoring genuine ethics in the tradition of Whig conservatism, which begins with Burke and is now represented by the Neo-Conservatives and other liberals who call themselves 'conservatives.'" MacIntyre himself has joined the Church of Rome, but one can oppose relativism without being a Christian, and it can hardly be denied that others are effectively combating relativism from a standpoint not very far from that of Burke.

In an interesting chapter on "The Classics and the Liberal Arts," Kopff refers not only to E.D. Hirsch's *Cultural Literacy* but to the *Theory of Education in the United States* of Albert Jay Nock. In a brief but useful sketch of the history of classical studies in this country, he mentions the unfortunate fact that the first volume of an edition of the Vergilian commentator Servius brought out by a team of Harvard scholars in 1946 was shown by a great European expert to be wholly inadequate. That does not alter the fact that the American contribution to classical studies during the second half of the 20th century has been considerable; indeed, in recent times, the edition of Servius has been resumed by far more competent editors. But Kopff is surely right to draw attention to some of its limitations. These are much in evidence in the dreary rubbish based on modern literary theories by politically correct persons positively infected with the diseases spread by such gurus as Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes. These fashions will pass, and indeed it is already clear that many students are bored stiff with them; but a more permanent limiting factor is the fact that so many students begin the study of ancient languages so late. One remembers with regret that the modern school established by George Bancroft and Joseph Cogswell at Round Point (near Northampton, Massachusetts) during the 1920's in order to remedy this and other such deficiencies did not survive. If even a few more schools of this kind could be established, there would be more American classicists who knew Greek and Latin really well.

The essays in the later part of the book are of somewhat uneven quality. Those which deal with popular culture, particularly films, are for the most part beyond the scope of this reviewer. In a chapter headed "Passion and Pedantry," Kopff singles out A.E. Housman, Sir James Frazer, and Gilbert Murray as classical scholars whose names were well known to the general public; his main concern seems to be to reprove them for not having been Christians. "Feminists in classics," he tells us, speaking of Housman, "boast that no similar figure could survive today": Would they tear him to pieces as the Maenads did Orpheus? One chapter is devoted to the pioneer bluestocking Margaret Fuller (1810-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1850), who is given respectful attention; one misses a mention of the story that she once declared that she had decided to accept the universe, causing Carlyle to exclaim, "By God, she'd better!" Another chapter is devoted to the Scottish classical scholar and poet Douglas Young, who ended his career at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where Kopff and Thomas Fleming were the two pupils of whom he was most proud. Young was a friend to whom I was greatly attached, and I read with much interest Kopff's account of how he was twice imprisoned for resisting conscription on the ground of his determined Scottish nationalism. That was one of the reasons that prevented him from getting a chair in Scotland, as I discovered when I spoke on his behalf. But despite his great energy, liveliness, and charm, his scholarship had faults, including a streak of silliness which, though endearing, was also disabling; in his generous affection for his former teacher, Kopff seems to me to overrate its quality.

One of the most interesting chapters in the book is entitled "Scholarship and Bricolage," which reproduces a review (which appeared in the April 1996 *Chronicles*) of the very important book *Shame and Necessity* by the distinguished philosopher Bernard Williams. In that book, Williams argues that the ethics of early Greece, before the time of Plato, have much to teach us. Kopff strongly approves of Williams' rejection of what he calls "progressivism," the belief that the passage of time is accompanied by a steady moral progress, and of the notion that Greek culture evolved from being a primitive "shame culture" to being a more advanced "guilt culture." Thus he agrees with Williams' polemic against philosophers who, like the neo-Kantian John Rawls, separate moral judgment from social context and historical contingency. But he complains that Williams ends up on the same side as Kant in their common mission of salvaging the Enlightenment. With this, he contrasts the attitude of MacIntyre, who has "understood that the rejection of Kant means the rejection of the Enlightenment, and of the liberal regime." Indeed Williams, like Nietzsche, whose sympathy with early Greek ethics had an important influence on his work, does not hold that ethical beliefs should be sanctioned by religion. But though the ancient Greeks were not Christians, they had a religion, and Zeus, their principal god, although the workings of his justice were difficult for humans to discern, was thought to punish the crimes of men. The importance of this element in early Greek ethical attitudes should not be forgotten, as I argued in my book *The Justice of Zeus*.

In the epilogue, Kopff offers some very noteworthy suggestions for educational reform. He would simplify the elementary school curriculum so as to concentrate on languages and mathematics; he would take certification away from the schools of education; and he believes that American churches should begin to teach the sacred tongues: Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. It is refreshing to find an American who has no faith in schools of education, but holds that those who have it in them to teach well will learn to do so by observing good teachers.

The appendix, entitled "Doing It On Your Own," contains information that will be greatly valuable to people who set out to teach themselves Greek and Latin. I know some people who, though they started late in life, have done this with considerable success.

Let us hope that, when this very valuable book appears in paperback, it will have an index, which would appreciably increase its value.

Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones is professor emeritus of Greek in the University of Oxford.

The Devil Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition

"Examples of the inhumaneness of humanities departments are, unfortunately, plentiful. In his writings, Foucault, speaking of power/knowledge, passionately protested against the suppression of the Otherness of the mad and the criminal. Feminists like Julia Kristeva sought a fuller life for oppressed women. Other feminists argued that scientific statements about women were not factual but rather the expression of males' desire to dominate. . . . Paul de Man declared that history, and presumably biography as well, is only 'a written text' and therefore a just target for deconstructive sabotage.

"There are, of course, logical problems with critical theory. If we are trapped in the closed box of language, for instance, with no objective reality to correct, falsify, or confirm our notions, on what basis do we condemn or approve? The Deconstructive Turn was good at showing up false certainties in science, progress, and other Western accomplishments. But on what basis did it condemn the West for being trapped in its own linguistic conventions? That trap is the human condition after all, is it not? Moreover, if there is no objective reality, physical or moral, how can we denounce, or even criticize, the Holocaust Revisionist for his denial of the gas chambers? Or how can we excoriate Israel for her treatment of the Palestinians? Or men for their subjugation of women?"

—*E. Christian Kopff*

Occupied Territories

by Paul Gottfried

The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses
by Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silverglate
New York: The Free Press; 415 pp., $27.50

◆

The introductory chapter of *The Shadow University* contains a powerful indictment of contemporary higher education. Kors and Silverglate get it right when they characterize university administrators as "careerists who have made a Faustian deal." They are correct as well about the professorial, political, and cultural pressures that have turned institutions of learning into conduits of multiculturalism and victimological concern. Since administrators need to stay in the graces of nonideological trustees, vocationally minded parents, and charitable alumni, they typically shove the nuttiest professors and the silliest courses into the liberal arts.

To deal with minority grievances, administrators appoint deans who invariably form working alliances with liberal arts protectors. This is the way universities infect themselves, according to Kors and Silverglate: by creating and "walling off a shadow university" that exists to accommodate aggrieved ideologues. By now, the authors argue, the "walled-off"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secondary university, having swallowed up the original one,

> engages in systematic intimidation. . . . The first imposition, in the classroom, is merely an abuse of a power that generally may be awarded by choice and in any event is not accomplished in secret. The second imposition of the shadow university is inescapable and is an exercise in something truly chilling; a hidden, systematic assault upon liberty, including idealism, dignity, due process, and equality before the law.

Alan C. Kors is a professor of European history at the University of Pennsylvania and, unlike Harvey Silverglate—a long-time civil rights lawyer—views himself as a conservative libertarian. The horror stories which Kors and Silverglate relate in detail about gay, feminist, and black racist bullying of students and faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Delaware, Cornell, and other institutions of learning have received earlier publicity. But until this book shed light on the walled-off part of university life, few trustees and alumni knew much about these issues, if only because of the mendacious advertising earmarked for such groups. Alumni publications from Yale and Harvard foster the illusion that those universities have changed only minimally in the last several decades.

Kors and Silverglate believe that their disagreeable research will force alumni and trustees to see their alma maters clearly and encourage them to restore to these institutions some measure of their former dignity. They argue that faculty-demanded "hate speech" and "hate thought" codes are not simply concessions to governmentally imposed guidelines. Once in high gear, liberal arts faculties and minority affairs deans ignore judicial decisions protecting free speech. In one grotesque case, cited by Kors and Silverglate and featuring an art exhibit at the University of Missouri, the EEO director on campus ordered pictures taken down and then put back up, depending upon his changing opinion of whether they depicted blacks "in a sufficiently positive light."

The authors devote much—perhaps too much—of their attention to the case of Eden Jacobowitz. An Orthodox Jewish student and descendant of holocaust survivors, Jacobowitz was temporarily ousted from the University of Pennsylvania after calling a noisy black girl a "water buffalo." Like other white male students accused of insensitivity, Jacobowitz was made the object of hysterical maltreatment: However, he was able to count on the support of the Anti-Defamation League, the ACLU, and other left-of-center, Jewish organizations that raised hell in his defense. The otherwise flawlessly p.c. dean of the Temple Law School, Robert Reinstein, broke ranks to come to the aid of this son of holocaust survivors. Jacobowitz told his accusers "that everything in his being, his upbringing, and his religious commitments forbade racism," but in such cases, the expressed beliefs of the accused hardly matter. The simple truth is that he was being railroaded from the university by *government*-sponsored bullies, while the black student groups involved in his departure were playing a politically profitable game by going after him. When the forces arrayed against Jacobowitz in early 1993 turned on a gentile, Greg Pavlik, it was Kors who stood up to them. That this student newspaper editor who refused to lie about black violence on campus managed to survive at the University of Pennsylvania may have been entirely due to Kors' intervention.

Despite the unflattering but altogether accurate portrayal of the p.c. epidemic at the University of Pennsylvania, and the shocking exhibition of minority-kowtowing given by its president, Clinton-backer Sheldon Hackney, one doubts that Penn's "betrayal of liberty" or of scholarship will cost it any students. People will continue to apply there in droves, despite the lack of due process and the prevalent Star Chamber techniques that mark the university's handling of cases involving minority grievances. There are social and professional advantages to attending and graduating from prestigious institutions, and no matter how strongly critics like Kors rage against them, the tangible value of attending certain schools will, for many people, overshadow the truly alarming situation described in *The Shadow University*.

Paul Gottfried is a professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College in Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania, and the author, most recently, of After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State *(Princeton).*

Hojotoho! Hojotoho!

by Justin Raimondo

The Ayn Rand Cult
by Jeff Walker
La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing;
396 pp., $19.95

◆

What is it about Ayn Rand that so fascinates her enemies as well as her admirers? Her two major novels, *Atlas Shrugged* (1957) and *The Fountainhead* (1943), are enduring pillars of popular culture. Her paeans to egoism make Nietzsche look like a piker, and, quite unlike that sickly aesthete, she had a life as dramatic and eventful as a Wagnerian opera, and there was about her the air of a valkyrie. Some 15 years after her death, Rand has become the object of renewed attention. While the critics have always hated Rand and academia shunned her, ordinary people who do not know what is good for them buy over half a million copies of her books each year. Anything with her name on it is money in the bank for publishers, authors, and hawkers of Rand memorabilia, and lately the market has been going up. It was inevitable that Hollywood would get in on the action, and two Rand films have already been made, including a Showtime movie entitled *The Passion of Ayn Rand*, scheduled for release before this issue of *Chronicles* hits the stands. The movie is based on the part-hagiographic, part-hateful, and entirely self-serving memoir of her ex-disciple, Barbara Branden, who recently turned a cool million-plus by auctioning off her collection of Rand memorabilia. In true Randian fashion, her ex-husband, Nathaniel Branden, once Rand's chief disciple, has engaged in none-too-friendly competition with Barbara to see who can profit more from the rise in Rand's stock. So far, he seems to be losing out: His own memoir, *Judgement Day*—a sour grapes kiss-and-tell potboiler that focuses not on Rand but on his own bombastic self—followed Barbara's book and did not do as well. But like one of Ayn Rand's heroic entrepreneurs, who delight in cutthroat competition, Mr. Branden has not given up: His book is being reworked and reissued under a more salable title: *My Years With Ayn Rand*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ayn Rand herself, it is safe to say, would have been appalled by nearly everything produced by the Brandens. One may infer, moreover, how she would have evaluated the stilted, derivative, and unconvincing writings of her latter-day followers, which lack the essential ingredient she infused into all her writings—passion—while undergirding a movement that has inherited all of her crankier, more tiresome, and least interesting eccentricities: her fanaticism, her didacticism, and her obsessive hatred of Immanuel Kant, a philosopher whose works she never bothered to read. This movement is the focus of Jeff Walker's *The Ayn Rand Cult*, the latest book—and, perhaps, one of the strangest—in the ever-expanding field of "Ayn Rand studies."

Here is a tome of some 300 pages, seemingly devoted to proving that Rand was a psychopath who delighted in dominating and then destroying her followers, and whose megalomaniacal rages were fueled by amphetamines and a full-blown delusional system of almost demonic power. Walker's story relates how Rand, after the publication of *The Fountainhead*, gathered a circle of much younger acolytes around her, and how this group expanded and soon took on all the characteristics of the classic cult: worship of the leader, blind dogmatism, psychological abuse, indoctrination and mind-control in the guise of "therapy," and periodic purges on the model of the Moscow Trials. What he fails to tell us is why we should care—or why, for that matter, *he* cares.

In his preface, Walker suggests that reading *The Ayn Rand Cult* as an attempt to refute Rand would be "missing the point": His main concern is not her ideas but rather the cultist nature of the movement she created. While the author develops a valid thesis, his focus on the organizational and personal dynamics of the movement excludes nearly everything else: There is almost no discussion of Randian ideology, and precious little mention of the source of the whole movement and its attendant organizations, theoreticians, and internecine squabbles—Rand's novels. Walker assumes that the reader already knows the plots of her novels and is familiar with the principal characters, as well as the ideology, that animates them. Without a chapter summarizing the ideological and emotional context in which the events described took place, the cumulative effect of Walker's catalogue of purges, excommunications, and betrayals is to raise the inevitable question: So what? He quotes one of Rand's excommunicated acolytes as bitterly exclaiming that her experience in the cult was "'a major traumatic life experience,' its splendors attached to 'a lot of agony.'" But what *about* those splendors? Of this there is nothing, and so the great appeal of the Rand cult remains mysterious. Walker notes that "nearly always, new converts to Objectivism are *young*," but fails even to speculate on why this is so.

Although seriously flawed, *The Ayn Rand Cult* does provide a useful service in debunking Rand's claim to have invented reason, individualism, and the concept of natural rights. While this claim may be absurd on its face, the old saw that any doctrine (no matter how deluded) can find at least some adherents applies to the libertarian movement in spades. The libertarian myth that, before Rand, there was only Darkness and Old Night is as false as the conservative myth that, before the founding of *National Review*, the American right did not exist, save in some barely recognizable form. Walker also performs a public service in exposing Nathaniel Branden as a con man and a cad who not only exploited Rand financially, emotionally, and in every other way, but had the gall to write a most unpleasant book about it.

In Walker's book, Rand holds her followers in thrall by the sheer force of her personality and her indomitable will. Yet they would never have fallen under her spell in the first place had not the sheer narrative power of her novels made them susceptible to it. Like Rand's contemporary followers—and like Rand herself after the publication of *Atlas Shrugged*—Walker loses sight of the artist and sees only the founder of a sect. He cavalierly dismisses her fiction as thinly disguised capitalist agitprop, and yet *The Fountainhead*—the story of a principled architect who refuses to compromise his ideals—dramatizes the essence of authentic individualism without any explicit reference to politics. While the literati were churning out slender novels about sensitive young souls in search of the ineffable, Rand had a vision of a sturdier and far healthier aesthetic. She also had a great satiric sense, a talent for drawing a devastating portrait with just a few well-placed brushstrokes; the young and adventurous were naturally drawn to her iconoclasm. And so the smoke from Walker's scorched earth approach to his subject obscures the really interesting question about the Rand cult: How could a movement ostensibly devoted to individualism become so mired in groupthink and dogmatism?

Justin Raimondo writes from San Francisco.

Natural Woman

by Karina Rollins

A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue
by Wendy Shalit
New York: The Free Press; 304 pp., $24.00

◆

Women of the younger, liberated generation have been raised to believe that being equal to men means being the same as men. Thus, they try hard to convince themselves that casual sex is harmless "fun" as long as they "play it safe." In *A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue*, Wendy Shalit presents the radical notion that men and women are, yes, different. Men can engage in sexual activity without becoming emotionally attached. Women, Miss Shalit observes, generally cannot.

A young woman surrounded by casual sexuality all her life—from safe-sex lessons (which she boycotted) in grade school to young men and women "hooking-up" serially and meaninglessly throughout college—Miss Shalit fails to observe the suppression of anyone's wish for promiscuous sex. She is concerned that society ignores the fact that most women simply do not want as much random sex as possible. Consequently, she argues, women must often suppress their hopes and dreams and pretend not to be what they really are: women.

The reason women have to try so hard to be like men is because it does not come naturally, and women most often get hurt by giving their bodies to men who do not care about their souls. How unfair that men should have all the fun when the sexual revolution promised women that they could, too! But there is method in Mother Nature's madness. Women are, by nature, equipped with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a protection mechanism against such hurt: modesty. Modesty is what makes a woman instinctively pull back from sleeping with a man of whose lasting affections she is not sure. But a woman who refuses premarital sex today is usually counseled to overcome her "hang-ups": Society no longer sanctions female modesty. "Before," as Miss Shalit points out, "it was a woman's prerogative to say no—she didn't have to join some political rally to enjoy this right—while now it is a man's prerogative to expect sex." The reason most men used to respect physical rejection was that "female modesty gave men a frame of reference for a woman's 'no.'" Today, "taught from day one that women are always as ready to receive advances as they are eager to make them, the modern male always takes a 'no' as a personal rebuke," leading, Miss Shalit thinks, to the increase of "date rape" and violence against women.

Obsessive sex education in public schools and, to a lesser extent, pornography carry much of the blame for the devaluing of female modesty, says Miss Shalit. When, from early childhood, children are beaten over the head with the message that sexual activity is "healthy" and "normal"—outside any moral context of when and with whom it is appropriate—they feel that *not* engaging in such activity is unhealthy and abnormal. So the liberal agenda of freeing everyone of hang-ups and liberating women has resulted in women trying to act like "unpaid prostitutes" and in men treating them as such, to the horror of women besieged by predatory males. Like many conservatives before her, Miss Shalit correctly lays blame at the feet of feminists: "They want the men to be gentlemen without having to be ladies." But she also hits conservatives with her insistence on some long-overdue responsibility of their own: "Conservatives, mostly men, for their part, want the women to be ladies, while still getting to do whatever they want, and clucking 'boys will be boys.'"

Miss Shalit has another bone to pick with conservatives: the belittling of girls' self-esteem problems, which often result in severe eating disorders and other forms of self-destruction. She presents case after case of girls as young as 13 who unhappily succumb to the social pressures of their peers and sleep with boys they hardly know, so they will not have to be ashamed of their sexual inexperience. Not too long ago, grown women had to hide any premarital sexual experience; today, schoolgirls have to conceal the fact that they are still virgins. This makes young girls so miserable, Miss Shalit argues, that more and more physically harm themselves, often through anorexia and bulimia. She has an interesting theory about eating disorders (one no less plausible than the feminists' insistence that "the patriarchy makes them do it"): "In a culture that permits food hang-ups but not sex hang-ups, it's become the new way for a girl to express her modesty, to restore distance between men and herself."

Despite its sad anecdotes, *A Return to Modesty*—unlike many feminist plaints—is not a sob story. Indeed it is not even a complaint, but a recognition of what has gone wrong—and how a bad situation can be fixed. "Any return to male courtesy must begin with a change in women." From saying "no" to casual sex to saying "yes" to men opening doors for them, women should be "equal to men *as* women." They must also rebuild the "cartel of virtue"—if women stop slamming doors on men's fingers, men will not have to think twice before opening them, and if women stop engaging in casual sex, men will have to think twice before making crude advances.

But *A Return to Modesty* is not merely a utilitarian strategy to make men behave; nor is it prudish. It is above all romantic. Men *do* fall in love and want to be committed to one woman—if they have the chance to love her soul before they love her body. (And, yes, women enjoy sex too; they just prefer great sex with one man to bad sex with many.) Miss Shalit writes not to accuse, but to celebrate the very real and lasting romantic (and erotic) love that has existed between men and women, and still can today. With true charm, wit, and grace, she stands unabashedly by her insights into human nature and, at only 23, seems much wiser than the gaggle of feminists screeching that "sexism" is to blame for all of women's troubles. Miss Shalit, in fact, advocates "a good dose of sexist upbringing" for children, because it is precisely the sexist recognition of differences between men and women that creates respect. Believing that women should be men is what makes a society misogynistic.

As succinctly as anyone could, Miss Shalit explains that

> modesty is the proof that morality is sexy. It may even be the proof of God, because it means that we have been designed in such a way that when we humans act like animals, without any restraint and without any rules, we just don't have as much fun.

And for any woman who ever felt there was something unnatural about our society's "natural" preoccupation with sex, this book is the ultimate confirmation that she is right.

Karina Rollins is the associate editorial page editor at the New York Post.

Endurance

by Bradley R. Strahan

How sudden the brightness
smokes off our bones.
Echoes blanch these stones.

Endurance is nothing
but a flower that opens
on a warm winter day

between one unforgiving frost
and another, an etching
on quicksilver.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Samuel Francis

The Un-Magnificent Obsession

Almost precisely a year after the name of Monica Lewinsky began to displace those of Princess Diana and Jackie Onassis from the headlines of supermarket tabloids, the one-time object of Miss Lewinsky's more tender affections emerged triumphant over his foes in what are still laughingly called the "conservative movement" and the "Republican Party." The conservative and Republican crusade to cleanse the land of the Clintonian plague finally whimpered to its pathetic conclusion when the Grand Old Party, after losing the 1996 presidential election to Mr. Clinton and losing the 1998 congressional elections to the Democrats, lost yet a third time in the Senate vote on Mr. Clinton's conviction. On the last occasion, the party was not only unable to cadge the two-thirds majority needed for conviction but also could not even bring along all of its own members. The sobriquet of "The Stupid Party" is entirely too kind; "The Loser Party" would perhaps be a more appropriate label for a political organization so incompetent that, in a series of contests against what is undoubtedly the most corrupt administration in American history, it not only loses but comes close to destroying itself.

Yet to serious observers on the political right, it was always clear that Bill Clinton was never in any danger of being driven from office by his conservative and Republican adversaries. Those on the right who were convinced he would be forced out made the mistakes of insulating themselves in the fortress of their own opinions and grotesquely exaggerating the influence their own propaganda exerts on the American public. The truth is that, whatever the merits of the charges against Bill Clinton and of the many other accusations made about him, as long as his power base in the Big Media and the Democratic Party remained secure, there was nothing the political right could do to him. And that power base did remain secure, not least because the political right never has the faintest idea of how to attack it effectively.

So far from discrediting and destroying Mr. Clinton, the crusade against him by the right has come perilously close to destroying its own sponsors, and it has done so in two ways. First, the failure of the impeachment campaign has backfired on the conservatives who pushed it from the beginning, leaving Mr. Clinton able to crow over the "partisanism" that motivated his adversaries, allowing him and his own party to plan and gloat over the forthcoming political extermination of their conservative Republican enemies in future elections, and enabling the left wing of the Republican Party to claim, somewhat plausibly as a matter of fact, that it has been the party's conservative leadership that has brought the GOP into public disgrace and endangered its majority in Congress.

Almost everything the American right has done in the last six or seven years has centered on discrediting, exposing, and denouncing Bill Clinton—as a KGB agent, an embezzler, a murderer, a drug smuggler, an adulterer, a sex maniac, and a perjurer. The scandals and crimes in which he is supposed to have been at least involved, if not the actual mastermind of, are too many to enumerate, and entire books have been devoted to unraveling and substantiating them. The *American Spectator*, the *Washington Times*, the *Wall Street Journal* editorial page, and various talk-show hosts, publishers, and self-appointed sleuths, muckrakers, and conspiracy hunters have dedicated themselves to ferreting out the sinister "truth" about Mr. Clinton and his "secret life."

But what is now clear, and indeed has been clear for some months if not always, is that this entire crusade has been a total and complete failure. The President has not been discredited in the eyes of most citizens, his popularity is higher than ever, that of his political opponents is lower than ever, the attempt to force him from office has failed, and it is now his adversaries who face political oblivion. House Speaker Newt Gingrich has already vanished into the ample bosom of political oblivion, and it is not unlikely that Mr. Gingrich's colleagues in what once strutted and chirped as the great "Republican Revolution" and their ideological mentors in the "conservative movement" will soon join him there.

The second way in which the obsession of the American right with Clinton scandal-mongering has helped destroy those who spawned it is by driving from conservative consciousness virtually every other serious idea, principle, and issue with which the right should have been concerned. I personally am convinced that this was the intended result of the obsession, that some of those politicians and publicists who pushed the scandal-mongering the most did not really want to mobilize conservative sentiment against Clinton on the basis of serious issues at all. They did not wish to do so because they knew and feared that the issues around which conservative sentiment could be mobilized would be ones they did not want to invoke—issues like immigration, trade policy, a national-interest-based foreign policy, affirmative action and hate crimes, and questions concerning moral and cultural restoration. Is it really an accident that the publications mentioned above as the most zealous in the Clinton hunt are also those most inclined to neoconservative influence? By encouraging rank-and-file conservatives to become preoccupied with Bill Clinton's alleged crimes and misdemeanors, those of his wife and associates, and every tawdry detail of his extramarital affairs even down to the anatomical peculiarities of his masculine equipment, those who pushed and hawked the scandal-mongering made certain that the American right would never concern itself with more important—indeed, nationally and civilizationally crucial—matters.

But even if my suspicions about the intentions of the obsession are unfounded, the results are much the same—the virtual disappearance of any body of thought that mounts a serious critique of what the Clinton administration has stood for. How indeed could the "right" of today, the "conservative movement," have mounted such a critique? When Bob Dole and Jack Kemp debated Bill Clinton and Al Gore in the 1996 presidential campaign, it was anyone's guess as to what they would be able to debate about. Neither Republican candidate had ever made much of an issue over the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bloated scale and power of the federal government, and both candidates agreed with the Clinton-Gore policies on NAFTA, the World Trade Organization, trade policy generally, immigration, a globalist foreign policy, and civil rights and affirmative action. There was, as I recall, some muffled verbal swordplay over abortion and budgetary matters, but at no point in the debates did either Republican candidate reveal any fundamental disagreement with the worldview, values, and political ideals endorsed by Mr. Clinton and his running mate. Such remains the case today, and the two most damning accusations the Republicans can think of to launch against Mr. Clinton's policies are that he has stolen Republican ideas and language and that he has allowed some Iraqis to remain alive. If the distraction of serious conservatism by scandal-mongering was not a deliberate plan to subvert a serious right, then surely scandal-mongering has flourished because it remains the only means that the Republicans and what today pass for "conservatives" have to show that they disagree with Bill Clinton at all.

But whatever the cause of the obsession with scandal, conspiracy, and crime, the result is that both the GOP and the conservative movement are close to being smashed. Only a few days after the failure of the vote against the President in the Senate, liberal Republicans were congregating in Florida to plan how to take over the party from the incompetents of the right. Leading the complaints about the conservatives, Connecticut Governor John Rowland lamented that conservative dominance had "alienated women, union members, immigrants, minorities, the elderly, teachers, homosexuals and environmentalists," as the *New York Times* reported. The good news, the governor reported sarcastically, was that "the rich people and the business people still like us. . . . [But] unless they can vote four or five times each, we've got some problems in the next couple of campaigns."

Well, Governor Rowland is probably correct about his last point, but it may be noted that the constituencies that he is so worried about alienating are the core constituencies of political liberalism. There probably are no policies and positions that any party could adopt that would attract "women, union members, immigrants, minorities, the elderly, teachers, homosexuals and environmentalists" that would not be liberal to left-wing. Every one of these constituencies consist, in practice, not of the actual citizens and voters but of powerful organized lobbying blocs that define the interests and agendas of their members in terms of the left. There is simply no way for the Republican Party to win those constituencies (or at least the organized blocs that claim to represent them) without becoming entirely indistinguishable from the Democrats, which is more or less exactly what the Republican left has always wanted. It should be noted also that, throughout the discussion of their coming takeover of the GOP, at no point did any of the liberal Republicans mention the actual merits of the positions that would appeal to these constituencies. Their discussion was confined simply to the question of how to gain their votes and the naked mechanics of grasping political power by doing so.

Nevertheless, the liberal Republicans had a point, which is that the "conservative" wing has proved itself a dismal failure, an embarrassment, and a danger to the party. Perhaps more to the point, it has proved itself to be a danger to serious conservatism, in part by insisting on Mr. Clinton's removal despite the obvious obstacles to accomplishing it and then abysmally failing to remove him at all and allowing him to emerge from their attack with more power than ever, and in part by talking and thinking about virtually no other issue except Mr. Clinton and his immoralities for the last several years and thereby distracting conservatives from elaborating serious political ideas and mobilizing a coalition around them. It is precisely for that reason that the current crop of "conservative" leaders in the Republican Party should be dispatched to the nearest brick wall and follow their discredited "leader" Mr. Gingrich to political nirvana.

And those who succeed them should not be the governor of Connecticut and his cronies but real leaders able to articulate an authentically conservative critique of Bill Clinton and the New Age globalism that has oozed out of him and his administration, a critique that attracts and speaks to the concerns and interests of Americans, regardless of which power bloc purports to represent them. Of course, what should be done is not necessarily what will be done. By now, it is probably impossible for anyone in the Republican Party to achieve leadership who is neither the flaccid sort of conservative that has led the party to its current contretemps or the sort of liberal that Gov. Rowland and the *New York Times* would admire. During the years when conservatives were jabbering about who killed Vince Foster and how much loot Bill and Hillary scraped out of Whitewater and what the President told Vernon Jordan to tell Sidney Blumenthal, no one bothered to talk about real ideas, real issues, or real leadership, so that today, even if those real things showed up on the doorstep, very few Republicans would recognize them. I, for one, do not regret the ignominious finale of the great impeachment caper of the last few years. Bill Clinton is indeed some of the evil things his adversaries claim he is, but the evil he has done to this nation is dwarfed by that wreaked by Franklin Roosevelt or Lyndon Johnson, to name only two of the most dangerous and harmful political figures in our history, and we can survive Mr. Clinton and his silly little girlfriends as easily as we can survive frauds like Newt Gingrich and Jack Kemp, whose main contribution to conservatism was to cripple and corrupt it. If the defeat, humiliation, and disasters that the pseudoconservatives of the GOP have brought upon their own party and movement result in their disappearance from American political life, that is an outcome every serious conservative can only welcome. If it accomplishes nothing else, it would at least clear the way for the emergence of a movement that at last could confront the left, in both parties, on the real evil it has inflicted on the nation and its people instead of sniping at and snickering over the insipid crimes and misdemeanors in which we have been forced to wallow.

Visit *Chronicles* on the Web

www.chroniclesmagazine.org

and send your letters to the editor to *Polemics@chronicles-magazine.org*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letter From London

by Derek Turner

The Strange Death of Her Majesty's Opposition

◆

The Conservative Party still has not recovered from the disastrous general election of May 1997, when many Britons switched their allegiances to Labour and an even larger number of Conservatives stayed at home, unwilling to vote for either the Tweedledum that was John Major or the Tweedledee of Tony Blair. Two years after the debacle, Her Majesty still has no effective opposition to Labour's progressive disuniting of the United Kingdom.

Labour has been extremely busy, to Britain's disadvantage, despite the complacent predictions of certain Conservatives that Blair was really "one of us" because he is no longer a socialist. Blair and his wreckers have begun the process of Welsh and Scottish devolution by setting up Welsh and Scottish devolved assemblies. This may even lead to full independence for Scotland (although it would be an "independence" under the close supervision of Brussels).

They have campaigned to ban fox hunting, although a Private Member's Bill designed for this purpose was quietly dropped after the massive Countryside Marches in London demonstrated the strength of rural feeling in favor of hunting.

They have tried once, and will keep trying, to legalize homosexual sex at 16; this legislation may even be in place by the time this is printed.

They have indicated that they would like to join the European single currency as soon as the opinion polls tell them they can, pre-election claims of being "British patriots" notwithstanding.

They have exacerbated ethnic-minority resentments, most obviously in the Stephen Lawrence case (Lawrence was a black teenager savagely murdered by unknown thugs, whose sad death has become a *cause célèbre* among the politically correct), and by doing nothing about either multiculturalism or the tide of "asylum seekers" pouring into our islands to get better washing machines (although the Conservatives did even less about asylum seekers, and talked more hypocritically than Labour's Home Secretary, Jack Straw).

Not satisfied with all of this mayhem, they are trying to replace the House of Lords with an elected second chamber. This will have the quadruple effect of destroying one of the world's oldest legislatures, further weakening British national identity, ensuring that Labour legislation is unimpeded, and gratifying the residual class hatred found among Labour MPs and supporters—all in the names of "relevance" and modernity.

With the possible exceptions of devolution and fox hunting, the above "reforms" were not specifically requested by voters. Some of them, especially the action on Europe and the inaction on asylum seekers, are deeply unpopular, if opinion polls are anything to go by. What has kept Labour's public-approval rating surprisingly high (even after recent well-publicized instances of Labour "sleaze" at least as bad as the perceived corruption that contributed to the Tory defeat two years ago) is, first, its undoubted success in education (Labour has reintroduced some of the traditional teaching methods its supporters discarded three decades ago); second, its seeming success in Northern Ireland (where the number of terrorism-related deaths has declined sharply); and, finally, Conservative obscurity.

The Conservative Party has partially disappeared from television. Although the scale of the 1997 defeat coupled with TV's traditional hostility to the right would have helped to bring that about anyway, the party is now often regarded as not newsworthy. Many political stories simply do not feature a Conservative at all. It is not as if there are no targets for Conservatives to aim at—on the contrary. Apart from the radical upheavals mentioned above, on which the Conservatives could easily make some headway, there have been many Labour scandals: the homosexual Welsh Secretary who resigned after his penchant for cruising for black boys got into the press; the Lord Chancellor who has squirreled his millions away in offshore accounts (of which his party ostensibly disapproves); and the Glasgow MP who bribed his opponent to stand down to the influential New Labour Minister Peter Mandelson, whose half-a-million-pound mortgage was so dodgy that he had to resign from the Cabinet.

The reason for Conservative obscurity is twofold—the party says nothing interesting and suffers from a chronic lack of self-confidence. The hierarchy's chief aim now seems to be to avoid controversy at all costs. A symptom of this is the central office's immersion in relatively unimportant administrative reforms to the party machinery, which have occupied them for most of the last two years. When demoralized Conservatives would have liked morale-boosting speeches, they were told about procedures; instead of organicism, they were given organigrams. Even the party's impressive figures, like John Redwood and Iain Duncan-Smith, are quiescent or go largely unreported.

On the rare occasions when William Hague does make comments which are widely reported, they seem to be aimed at the "center ground," if such a thing actually exists, and they always reflect the most numbingly conventional thinking. He engages in gestures which are media-friendly but disquieting to the party's right wing—sending a message of support for homosexual sex at 16 to the "Gay Pride" festival, wearing a baseball cap and dancing as if in enjoyment at the Notting Hill Carnival, and pointedly refusing to support either the House of Lords as presently constituted or the hereditary principle itself (implying a lack of interest in what happens to the monarchy).

Even his chief sop to the right, his pledge to campaign against the European single currency at the next election and to resist the single currency at least "for the lifetime of the next Parliament," is widely regarded as insufficient, with many wishing that he had ruled out joining the euro permanently and on principle and that he would expel the minority of Conservatives, like ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth Clarke, who want to join the single currency. So even his most "controversial" policy is only controversial within certain parameters. One cannot help thinking that modern-day Conservatives are solely interested in one Conservative tradition, a tradition

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that has only been (partially) broken with by Mrs. Thatcher—capitulation to the enemy.

At a time of radical upheaval, this is not good enough. Britain is breaking up, and nobody is protesting. Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition must oppose, or they are being neither loyal nor an opposition. Not only must they oppose, but they must oppose uncompromisingly. The patriotic opposition must regain its confidence and speak out using emotive language and bold tactics. Those who love Britain and the West must do both "that which deserves to be written" and that which needs to be done.

Derek Turner is the editor of Right NOW!, *published in London.*

Letter From Florence

by Andrei Navrozov

Leonardo's Flying Machine

◆

This is probably my last letter from Florence, and I must say that it is with somewhat mixed feelings that I turn my back on the treasury of the Renaissance. Oh, sure, I tried to like living here. I tried it the way the French writer André Gide tried to like living in Stalin's Moscow, reasonably confident that he would not have to live there forever, but nonetheless winding up his stay with a dirty rotten slanderous exposé. In his case, if memory serves, revelation came at the sight of a fellow's badly mangled fingers which, he suddenly realized, had been crushed in the vice of doctrine. In my case, it was the umpteenth glimpse, in a souvenir-shop window, of Leonardo's flying machine, coupled with the sudden realization that the damn thing didn't fly.

Is there anyone out there who has not, at one time or another in the course of a wretched life poisoned by Enlightenment myths, looked with cowardly reverence at that absurd drawing? Medici's Florence and Stalin's Moscow have much in common. Both were designed for propaganda purposes, and each in its own way retains the power to intimidate the skeptic. It has taken me several months to see that the silly contraption didn't fly, never flew, and would probably be more likely to fly if it were designed by a lunatic on the run from a mental asylum, by a marauding Rumanian soldier the morning after he pilfered a substantial wine cellar, or by Fred Flintstone in one of his less practical moods. And the catapult! At least Stalin's weapons were the best of their kind, while Leonardo's catapult would not hurt a Luccan fly, and not because of how big them flies grow out there in Lucca. Yet every gift shop in Florence can offer you, at the price of about $200 U.S., a miniature replica of this pacifist dream made of handsomely varnished mahogany.

At first, I reasoned away the awkward realization the way one usually reasons away such realizations, by analogy. If Uccello's "Rout of San Romano," say, or Michelangelo's "David," were the equivalents of IS-8 (the heavy tank "Iosif Stalin," later known as T-10) or of a MiG (the fighter designed for Stalin by Mikoyan and Gurevich), then the flying machine and the catapult were something like Stalinist architecture, or the gigantic effigy of "The Worker and the Peasant Woman" at the Exposition of the Achievements of the People's Industry in Moscow. While I was reading the technical specifications of the T-10, in a *Jane's Defence* chart comparing it with the main tanks of the West, the analogy held. But then, looking at the "David," with its bovine neck, its outsize hands, and its spirit of arrogant hyper-realism, it occurred to me that this humanist masterpiece was too literally like "The Worker and the Peasant Woman" for the analogy to support itself. And straight away all around me the past of Florence began crashing into the world's present, in a scene from a Hollywood movie about Atlantis starring Kirk Douglas and a volcano of bosomy blondes.

Modern propaganda is a lot like modern art, in the sense that both sell dysfunctional versions of ordinary things, including food and clothing, to a culturally intimidated audience that never dares to ask why the representation is not labeled accordingly. If you see an electric iron that irons shirts, this is an iron; if you see an electric iron that does not iron shirts (especially when it is 100 feet high and stands in front of an office building with an address like 1000 Federal Plaza), this is a work of contemporary sculpture. Similarly, liberty is often a good thing, equality has its uses, and in the context of Christian morality a place for fraternity can obviously be found; but "liberty, equality, fraternity" is political propaganda designed to deceive and to mislead (and to hide the reality of broken fingers from visiting Frenchmen). There was an old Soviet joke about a shopper who asks for a kilo of hunter's sausage, and is told that this is the display. "No hunter's? All right, I'll have a kilo of the display," he murmurs with habitual resignation. The point is that it was in Medici's Florence that modern propaganda was born.

It had to have been born here because, although in name a republic since 1293, by the middle of the 15th century, Florence was being ruled by Cosimo de' Medici, and after his death by his son and grandson, as by "a King in all but name." This "name" business is at the very heart of the matter. Thus we note that the Tornabuoni, Florentine grandees who gave their daughter Lucrezia in marriage to Cosimo's son and dynastic successor Piero, had changed their name from Tornaquinci, having so altered their coat of arms as "to evade the disadvantages attaching to their birth." In other words, the blatantly gaping cleavage between reality and appearance, in a place where noblemen had to change names and renounce their aristocratic past before being eligible for participation in public life, had to be camouflaged, and camouflaged well. It was republican art that introduced perspective into painting, and made verisimilitude its aesthetic aim. And it was republican politics that produced political propaganda as the panacea for the ills of oligarchic dictatorship.

The parallel between the "master of the country," as Aeneas Silvius de' Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II, alternatively called him, and Stalin goes well beyond Cosimo's legendary self-effacing modesty (he held office for a total of 90 days during his 30 years in power) and his famously acerbic, indeed rather Caucasian, sense of humor (asked to introduce a law forbidding priests to gamble, he said that it would be better to begin by forbidding them loaded dice), both necessary qualities for coming to power, as they both did, through the imperceptibly gradual subordination of an existing political *apparat*. There is their total unscrupulousness, in all things great and small: Stalin, a Great Russian chauvinist of his own making, entrusted the design

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of his fighter plane to the team of an Armenian and a Jew, while Cosimo, who piously "emblazoned even the monks' privies" with his heraldic balls, did not hesitate to embrace the "whoremonger and scrounger" Fra Filippo Lippi. There is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the bastard *condottiere* Francesco Sforza, whom Cosimo had shrewdly fostered long before his takeover of Milan was consummated in the marriage to Bianca Visconti, just as Stalin had secretly supported the National Socialists over the communists in Weimar Germany. There is even Molotov himself, in the figure of Cosimo's sidekick Puccio Pucci, and if one looks hard enough one can just make out Trotsky in the "tiresome, vain and cantankerous" agitator, partisan of the exiled Albizzi, Francesco Filelfo.

But the key to the parallel is found in the power of the legitimized lie which Florence's *Pater Patriae* and our own Father of the Peoples have created, and perpetuated, in their epoch-specific, yet kindred, ways. The constitutional reform framed by Pucci in the wake of the rout of the Albizzi in 1434 was, like Stalin's constitution, a gateway to the new era of virtual tyranny disguised as virtual democracy. According to an historian of the period,

> the *Grandi* were now all declared *Popolani* which gratified the nobles, who were thus theoretically rendered eligible for election to office, while pleasing the *popolo minuto* who chose to interpret the measure as commendably democratic. The people were given greater satisfaction when it was seen that the most talented amongst them, despite their humble origins, were now considered, for the first time in the history of Florence, worthy of holding official positions in the State.

Stalin's constitution, it must be borne in mind, allowed for ballot boxes to be delivered to the bedside of the sick on election day. And yet, the historian continues,

> of the 159 newly qualified citizens from the Santa Maria Novella quarter whose names were placed in the *borse* in 1453, no less than 145 were sons, grandsons or brothers of men who had been considered eligible for office in 1449.

In other words, what the Italians would these days call *una grossa fregatura*. A great swindle, which required great art to cover it up. And, great art aside, from here to the restructured new democratic Russia—or, if you prefer, to the American bumper stickers that read I LOVE MY COUNTRY BUT I FEAR MY GOVERNMENT—it is but a short step.

And so I confess that as I leave Florence, this treasury of the Renaissance to which I bid farewell seems almost a part of my childhood, not unlike the enclave of Stalin's writers and artists where I was raised. Yet these grandiose monuments to the sleight of hand known since the days of the Medici as modern democracy are now at the heart of world culture. Can one really ever leave Florence, any more than Gide could leave Stalin's Moscow?

Andrei Navrozov is Chronicles' *European correspondent.*

Letter From Inner Israel

by Jacob Neusner

Religion or Ethnicity?

◆

When people in the academy study "Judaism," they tend to pursue the history of the ethnic group, the Jews, rather than describe, analyze, and interpret the religion, Judaism. In the realm of high culture, the Judaic religious tradition, beginning with the revelation at Sinai, is deprived of its rightful presence alongside the world's other great religions, Christianity and Islam.

Turning on its head Karl Barth's insistence that Christianity is not a religion among religions, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's appeal for a "religionless Christianity," scholars of Judaism are drawn to the subject by ethnic affiliation—Jews studying and teaching Jewish things to Jews. So they end up ethnic cheerleaders, telling Jews why they should be Jewish (stressing "the holocaust" as a powerful reason) or rehearsing the self-evident virtue of being Jewish ("nicer, smarter, more sensitive").

Jewish studies are dumbed down and amateurized; the principal qualification for advertising opinions on Jewish topics is ethnic affiliation. Jewish professors of anything—philosophy will do, or chemistry in a pinch—qualify as experts by virtue of ethnicity. The universities want the Jewish money that comes with the celebration of Jewish ethnicity. Jewish culture is not interested in religion, as Britain's Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks has underscored, and the universities follow the money.

What is wrong with the ethnic model is illustrated by Norman Cantor at New York University, who produced a vile, shallow, and ignorant caricature of ethnic culture. Because he is Jewish and also a professor of medieval history, he felt entitled to proclaim his opinion, full of disdain and disrespect for the very sources of Judaism. That is something he never would have tolerated in his own field. He exemplifies the galloping amateurism of Jewish scholars of Judaism who feel qualified by Jewish birth but are of only marginal professional achievement.

Why do some university officials feel that Jewish ethnics in any field are certified as experts when it comes to Jewish studies, inclusive of religion? Because Jews, they assume, know pretty much the same things when it comes to "the Jewish thing." (Just as, some suppose, we really all do know one another and look alike!) Princeton University's Froma Inselbuch Zeitlin is a case in point. A classicist who practices Judaism, she accepted the chairmanship of the Princeton University Jewish studies program offered to her by the Jewish president of Princeton University. In that role, lacking any professional qualifications, she directed ill-informed dissertations on first-century problems involving rabbinic texts on which she herself has published nothing much. She appointed as the first professor of Jewish studies in a named chair a German Catholic, Peter Schaefer of Berlin, a philologist and collator of textual variants in ancient manuscripts whose scholarship on Judaism carries forward the German academic nihilism that, from the time of Immanuel Kant, has dismissed Judaism as a religion.

Paradoxes abound. The Harvard program in the study of religion does not encompass professors of Judaism, who make their academic home in the De-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partment of Near Eastern Studies. The Yale Department of Religious Studies includes in its Jewish studies anything Jewish, regardless of its bearing on the study of the religion. So when universities do organize the subject, either they leave it out of the study of religion altogether or they define it, within the study of religion, in a way utterly incongruent with the way they study other religions. When Protestant divinity schools make appointments in Judaism, they want Orthodox Jews to teach the Old Testament but exhibit remarkably slight interest in the history of Judaism beyond the advent of Christianity. Whether or not Judaism died at Golgotha, interest in Judaism as a living religion of integrity and autonomy has not survived among Christian professors. So the Harvard Divinity School used its Jewish-funded chair to appoint Jon Levinson, and Chicago used its counterpart for S. Michael Fishbane, both of them skilled exegetes of the Old Testament, but neither a distinguished scholar of Judaism beyond Scripture.

When the ethnic-Jewish scholars of "Judaism" hold scholarly meetings, they study everything but the religion: its traits, structure, ethics, theology, impact upon the social order, and the way of life of its faithful. Judaism, in contrast to Islam or Christianity or Buddhism, finds no hearing. When the European Association of Jewish Studies met in Toledo, Spain, last summer, 300 people assembled to conduct a jamboree of ethnic culture. When the Association of Jewish Studies (U.S. and Canada) meets annually in Boston, its wildly incoherent program accommodates every discipline, every topic, every theory and attitude—except religion, to which no section is devoted. The World Union of Jewish Studies, in its regular meetings in Jerusalem every four years, has no section on the history of Judaism. When the data of Judaism *are* addressed, the parts—mysticism, philosophy, theology, law, institutions, liturgy, and literature—never coalesce.

So much for academic societies. What about Jewish institutions of higher learning? Here, the ethnicization of Judaism finds enormous impetus. Jewish-sponsored and financed universities and research centers make room for everything but religion and the comparative study of religions. Brandeis University, the secular-Jewish university near Boston, has no department of religious studies, nor does the Orthodox Yeshiva University in New York City. The Oxford Centre for Jewish Studies emphasizes research in Jews' histories, languages, and literatures; religion rarely comes to the fore, even in the form of theology. In Israel, departments and programs of religious studies, such as they are, occupy a marginal position in their own universities; topics pertinent to Judaism are treated principally in departments of Jewish thought. Israeli study of Judaism as a religion is carried on by a handful of academicians, only two of international standing. Jews College, London; the Jewish Theological Seminary of America; Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion—none of the principal English-language centers for the education of rabbis encompasses within its curriculum the academic study of religion, and very few professors in the rabbinical schools qualify with doctorates in religious studies.

Why is all this so? Because the Jews in charge of the politics of Jewish culture, and therefore in control of scholarship—those that give the money and those that take and spend the money—insist that "Judaism" means anything Jewish but nothing religious. Above all, they do not want the Jews as a group to be defined as a religious community. A nation (for the state of Israel), an ethnic community (in the Canadian and U.S. mosaic of "peoples"), a community of fate (including anyone the Nuremberg laws called a Jew and anything such a person ever thought, said, or did): To be a member of "the Jews" involves everything except believing something or obeying religious rules.

The moneybags and the windbags concur. So the money goes to Jewish history, especially holocaust studies, and the academic jobs go to those that study something—anything—about the Jews but Judaism. Scholars, whether Orthodox or ethnic in private life, simply dismiss the category "religion" as irrelevant to Jewish learning. Judaism in the comparative study of religions? Whatever for?

Professor Stephen T. Katz, who holds a Cambridge University doctorate and is a professor of Jewish studies and of religion at Boston University, recently asked Cambridge University Press to commission him to edit a volume, *The Cambridge History of Judaism*, to be devoted to "Judaism" in the first six centuries A.D. Cambridge Press has already published two previous volumes, but the second of the two, which appeared a decade or more after the chapters were written and therefore was obsolete on the day of publication, created a huge scandal. Some of the chapters simply ignored not the prior ten but an entire 50 years of scholarship. Over the next decade and a half, Cambridge could not manage to publish the planned third and fourth volumes. After more than a decade of waiting, I withdrew the five chapters I'd written for volumes three and four, since by that point they were woefully out-of-date. Research had moved on—including my own.

But Katz has asked Cambridge University Press to revive the project. When we review the topics he proposes, we see that he and his co-editors, ordained Conservative rabbis all—Reuven Kimelman, Shaye J.D. Cohen, and David Halivni, who teach at Brandeis University, Brown University, and Columbia University, respectively—envision a volume of Jewish history, not the history of *Judaism*.

The topics tell the story: "Jewish status in the Roman Empire after 70," "Jewish revolts and Roman persecutions," "the Bar Kokhba Revolt," "the diaspora from 70-235," "the political and social history of the Jewish community of Palestine," "the economic history of Palestine," "the institution of the Patriarchate and Jewish self-government," "Emperor Julian and the Jews," "Jews in Byzantium," "Justinian and the Jews," and on and on. Others do encompass critical issues in the study of religion (for instance, "the synagogue and the liturgy"), but these are a small part of the whole. More important, not a single entry addresses the theology of Rabbinic Judaism either as a whole or on any specific topic, nor is there anything on ethics, the practice of Judaism, the rites and rituals of the day, the disputes and debates, or the intellectual life of the faith. How Scripture is received and transformed; how the rabbis viewed Israel among the nations; how they interpreted Israel's history from Scripture forward, let alone their eschatological and messianic doctrines and the principles of their creed—none of these critical issues of the religious life is examined. If, in late antiquity, a Judaism other than the Rabbinic kind flourished, or if diverse modes of practicing a single Rabbinic Judaism developed, we will learn nothing about it from this volume. When it comes to the gentile world, antisemitism is covered, but not the views of Judaism set forth by Christian, pagan, and Zoro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

astrian writers—again, the ethnic is in, the religious is out.

So the proposed *Cambridge History of Judaism* uses the word "Judaism" to refer to an ethnic group: its material culture, its politics, institutions, demography, its "life" (whatever that means). A *Cambridge History of Christianity* that dealt with Roman imperial politics and foreign policy, pagan anti-Christianity and persecution of Christianity, but not with Nicaea and Chalcedon, the formation of the New Testament, the invention of the Bible, the theology of Augustine, the history of Eusebius, the councils and creeds and martyrs and saints and Gnosticism and Orthodoxy—such a secular history of Christians would not bear plausibly the title of a "history of Christianity."

When Jewish scholars of Judaism define Judaism as an ethnicity, not a religion, what is lost is any conception that Judaism has a statement to make to the human situation—and a cultural claim and a theological judgment to set forth concerning the intellectual life of humanity.

Jacob Neusner is Distinguished Research Professor of Religious Studies at the University of South Florida and a professor of religion at Bard College.

Letter From Mexico

by Geoffrey Wagner

The First Racquet in the West

◆

Every man has his Holy Grail. Mine was a racquet held in the hand of a truculent priest some four centuries ago. I had heard about the ball player of Yagul in southern Mexico from colleagues in archaeology, but it was only after several trips south of the border that I decided to flush him out. No one else seems to have bothered to do so.

As a racquet-sport enthusiast, I had familiarized myself with what might be called Mayan pelota at sites like Chichen Itzá and Mitla (with its fine Zapotec courts and unique Mixtec friezes). It made for some pretty fast serve-and-volley stuff in its day: This was a game apparently played with hand and hip off short steps which most tourists mistake for ancient bleachers (the legend that a human skull was used for a ball is apocryphal). While one ball court soon gets to look like another, even after a few hundred years, Yagul boasts the largest court yet unearthed. Plus it has a racquet. The racquet.

So, after renting the Burtons' rather tatty house back of Puerto Vallartà for a while, my wife and I slid off south down the achingly endless Pan-Am highway to Oaxaca, leaving the pretty hummingbird that took breakfast with us to its daily ration of Chivers marmalade. Even including jaw-cracking Tlacochahuaya, with its 16th-century Dominican church which the Indians painted over uninhibitedly with flowers and stars, suns and moons, Oaxaca is the ultimate in peasant baroque, hardly a centimeter of its Santo Domingo Church free from ardent decoration, not to mention all those wounded saints reclining most mortally on their litters.

Indeed, as my pilgrimage took me southward to Tehuantepec, gloriously Indian-decorated old churches drifted in their decay in the plains. The sequoia or *sabino* beside the church at Tule is said to be 3,000 years old, nearly as ancient as my racquet. We drove cautiously along the "beaten" road—Jesus Hernandez died here 60 years ago, I noticed on an askew sidetrack shrine.

As we descended, only a minimum of Hollywood Mexico, long cured by realism, overtook us: palm trees drunk with sun, as the old song had it; an Indian matron with a high *huipil* or blazingly white starched headdress; a hoop-earringed cantina girl, all kiss curls and ringlets, inviting us under thatching to piles of tortillas and a sign for *Hat Docs* (phonetic franks); a Warner Baxter cop with pearl-handled pistols, in the plural.

Examining the lace work on a Virgin at Tlacolula, I hear what appears to be some girls giggling behind a chain-mail door leading into a side chapel with gold-leaf churrigueresque at its most perfect. I'm wrong. It is a heavyset Indian woman on her knees, wet lashes pouring out some sorrow to God.

Finally, Yagul. I embrace the entrance column as directed and am told I'll live another seven years as a consequence. Past some cruciform tombs, I am directed to a shabby mini-museum annexed to a sleepy hacienda called *La Sorpresa*. I am shown shrunken heads and flayed faces, some of which are the size of small beads. The proprietor is slumped over his counter, semi-conscious. He allows me, however, to pull out from under an adjacent table the neglected stone slab I have sought—the first racquet handler in the Western hemisphere.

Bearing the outlines of a fierce Zapotec, ecclesiastically robed, the bas relief shows to my joy a well-gripped racquet (Western or continental?) with a ball awaiting impact at the top. The shape of the racquet is akin to that used today in court or real tennis, fast vanishing as a sport. I played that code, with its dedans, tambour, and chases, at Oxford and was horrified to hear recently that its court, one of only a relative few extant, has been chopped up into little cubicles worthy of some motel. That court was 400 years old. Shakespeare refers to the game: "Tennis balls, my liege?" asks a page.

It is thus enormously exciting for me to meet that sunny presence from the athletic past, since it links us in a common sporting pursuit across the centuries. The difference is that the priesthood did the playing then, and I'd wager umpires' decisions went uncontested, since the sacrificial knife was the arbiter. In any case, though neither played in heavy robes, I doubt that McEnroe or Rodman would have disputed that striding, frowning figure from the past. I duly took photos, but the furrows in the stone did not respond dramatically to shadowing. Finally, I searched in vain for stringing. After all, there must have been such in that long-handled racquet. I wondered what those of another century or so would think of the player-priest, or whether he would gradually disintegrate under a Coca-Cola sign.

Geoffrey Wagner is a professor emeritus of English at the City University of New York.

When in Rockford,
Eat at
Lee's Chinese Restaurant
3443 N. Main St.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHAT DIVERSITY?

This past semester Accuracy in Academia's John M. Olin Conference Series traveled to Columbia University and asked if conservative ideas were still welcome in higher education. The answer they received from Columbia President George Rupp was an emphatic "NO!" Rupp dispatched a team of security guards to keep students interested in conservatism from meeting on campus. The gathering was forced to reconvene off-campus in a park, where a mob of activists shouted down speaker Dinesh D'Souza.

Soviet mouthpiece Angela Davis, professional bigot Khalid Muhammed, and human bull's-eye Salman Rushdie all have spoken recently at Columbia without "safety concerns" overriding their right to speak. Yet a group of students interested in conservative ideas is deemed a "security threat." Quite clearly, there are different rules when "politically incorrect" speakers come to campus.

Whether it's a dean of students at Cornell participating in a public burning of a conservative newspaper or a speech code at Brown designed to suppress thought that challenges the liberal establishment, administrators at our top schools are putting students on notice that support for "diversity" should not extend to the intellectual realm.

Activists call to silence Accuracy in Academia; Columbia enthusiastically complies.

Are conservative ideas so powerful that they must be banned lest students become seduced? That's the message George Rupp and other bureaucrats are sending. While administrators are quite comfortable eradicating a diversity of thought, they shamelessly promote the most intellectually vacuous material under the banner of "diversity."

*** Princeton's Center for Human Values recently hired Peter Singer, a professor who condones parents killing their newborns. He teaches, "It is speciesist to judge that the life of a normal adult member of our species is more valuable than the life of a normal adult mouse."**

*** Cornell offers "The Sexual Child," a class requiring pro-pedophilia readings and the viewing of pictures of naked children. A typical assignment complains, "boy lovers are so stigmatized that it is difficult to find defenders for their civil liberties, let alone erotic orientation." Opposing "cross-generational encounters," students learn, has "more in common with ideologies of racism than with true ethics."**

*** While the military's ROTC program is labeled unfit to meet in Yale lecture halls, the school's classrooms have been the site of such courses as "Drag Queens, Transsexuals, and Queers: Anthropological Approaches" and "Feminist and Queer Theory."**

Students at Columbia had to stand outside in a cold park to hear ideas that challenge the campus establishment. You can get this information sent to your own home for only $29.95. Accuracy in Academia's Campus Report is a monthly fact-filled publication that tells the truth faculty and administrators don't want the public to hear. Thomas Sowell says, "If sanity ever returns to the academic world, part of the credit will go to a small newspaper called Campus Report." Find out why by subscribing now.

Whether you are a parent, an alumnus, or simply a citizen outraged by the way your tax-dollars are being used to bankroll the campus Left....YOU NEED TO READ ACCURACY IN ACADEMIA'S CAMPUS REPORT.

Read AIA's Campus Report to find out why conservative ideas are increasingly BANNED ON CAMPUS.

Subscribe today.

Campus Report, Dept. CM1, 4455 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 330 Washington, DC 20008

☐ Please send me Accuracy in Academia's Campus Report for one year at $29.95.

TO SUBSCRIBE BY PHONE CALL TOLL FREE 1-800-787-0429

Name_____ ☐Check Enclosed ☐Credit Card (MC, VISA, AMEX)

Address_____ Credit Card #_____

City, State & Zip Code_____ Ex. Date_____Card Holder's Name _____

☐ I'd also like to make a tax-deductible contribution to help AIA bring their message to schools across America.

(Please make checks payable to Accuracy in Academia) ☐$500 ☐$250 ☐$100 ☐$50 ☐$25 ☐$10 ☐Other

Contributions are tax-deductible under 501(c)3 IRS regulations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMICS

Globalization and the Decline of the Family

by William R. Hawkins

By many important indicators, the American economy is soaring. Unemployment has hit a 30-year low, and productivity is on the rise. These two factors, combined with low inflation, have finally started to push up real wages for most workers. Yet below the surface, conditions are not so encouraging on the economic front and even less so on the broader social-cultural front. As "globalization" increases the pressure on the U.S. economy, the American family is feeling the strain. And as the family fails, the culture implodes.

The pay of the typical worker in mid-1998 was still not as high as it was in 1989, the year of the last business-cycle peak. When the business cycle next turns, the average American worker may find he has not gained much from the seven "fat years" of the 1990's. This is particularly true for men. The wage of the median male has fallen 0.5 percent per year since 1989. Most of the loss was during the 1989-96 period, when the median male wage fell 1.1 percent annually. Strong growth in the last two years has helped low-wage male workers regain some of the ground lost, but their annual income from wages in the first half of 1998 was still about $1,000 below that of 1989. And it should be remembered that wages in 1989 were lower than in 1979, having fallen an average of 0.2 percent per year during the 1980's.

The wage of the median female worker, which rose consistently during the 1980's, fell 0.2 percent per year from 1989 to 1996. Wage increases over the last 18 months, however, yielded a 0.3 percent annual growth rate over the full period. Thus female workers lost less during the 1989-1996 period and have gained more since 1996. While median male workers' real wages fell about 6.7 percent over the 1989-97 period, women's wages increased slightly.

Including non-wage fringe benefits, such as health care and pensions, does not change the overall picture. The hourly cost of benefits grew slightly faster than wages in the 1980's, but slightly slower than wages in the 1990's (primarily due to health-care cost-containment efforts). Moreover, the share of workers receiving employer-provided health care declined 7.6 percent between 1979 and 1997.

This may explain the "angry man" antiestablishment politics of the early 1990's, when President Bush was defeated by "the economy, stupid" in 1992 and the Democratic Congress was overthrown in 1994. It also helps explain why working women have been more supportive of President Clinton than have been men: Women fared better during Clinton's first term than did men.

The increasing role of female workers in "saving" both families and male workers from substantial declines in material living standards was seen most dramatically in the 1980's. After a large increase in the annual hours of paid work in 1979-89, many working families had few additional hours to devote to work. Wives and mothers entered the workforce in large numbers in the 1980's, but this shift had run its course by the end of the decade. In 1975, only 38 percent of mothers with children under the age of six were working; by 1990, this had reached 60 percent. It now stands at about 65 percent. Surveys consistently report that mothers would prefer to stay home and care for their children, but they have been pushed into the workplace to support the family budget.

The social costs of this shift from mother to worker have been enormous. Much of the decline in discipline, so evident in the deterioration of school performance and in public behavior, can be traced to lack of parental supervision. Peer-group pressure and the media fill the gap. Parental responsibility has been transferred to the schools, where teachers and administrators complain of having to spend instructional time on problems more appropriately handled at home. Besides the improper burden being placed on the schools by this trend, the kind of advice that politically correct schools provide to young people must give us pause.

For decades, radical educators have vied with parents for control of children's lives. Nothing could have better aided the educators than to have their opponents taken from the fight and consigned to the workplace. Parents at work not only cannot supervise their children after school, they cannot supervise the classrooms during school. In the attempt to provide a better material life for their children, working parents are sacrificing their responsibility for developing the character and values of their children.

Conservatives, above all others, should be concerned with this trend, yet few have made the connection between economic transformation and the family crises. Conservative political leaders often trumpet statistics on job creation and on how a larger share of the American population works compared to other countries as examples of the power of "free-market" capitalism. Then, a couple of paragraphs down, the same speakers will deplore the decline in educational standards and the rise in immoral behavior among the young as if these developments were an entirely separate subject. Indeed, there are those on the political right who argue that the Republican Party should concentrate entirely on economic issues and abandon "social" issues as too difficult and controversial.

Those advocating this free-market orientation most loudly are the very people responsible for the transformation of the economy and the resulting social problems. A *Fortune* magazine cover story published as the new GOP Congress opened in 1995 expressed alarm that it might be dominated by "small business populists and the religious right." Last summer, the Business-Industry PAC, which advises big business on which candidates to support, complained that the GOP was "coddling social conservatives" and not being "reliably pro-business." The demand from business was to drop the "culture war" and instead enact an assortment of "free trade" measures—or risk a loss of contributions. House Speaker Newt Gingrich immediately sought to comply, but was stymied by an *ad hoc* coalition of labor Democrats and Republican nationalists.

The fear on Wall Street is that a serious attempt to address the agenda of social conservatives will lead to constraints

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on business. And Wall Street is right.

The core of the domestic social problem is linked to the international restructuring of the economy, though obviously this is not its only cause. Economic theory tells us that full employment can be reached at any level of income, and will move toward this equilibrium in the absence of external shocks if the labor market is flexible enough. "Flexible" means that wages must be capable of moving down as well as up, to keep production costs down when the markets for the products are fiercely competitive—as global markets are. Indeed, the stock market has tended to drop in reaction to any announcement that wages are rising.

There are several ways to make wage costs flexible downward. Within a domestic industry, wages for existing positions can be constrained. On an interregional or international level, jobs can be shifted to other labor markets where equilibrium wages are lower (and the threat to do so can be used to suppress wage increases at home). In terms of the total economy, the mix of jobs can be changed to one favoring low-wage work. All three have occurred in the United States.

In the manufacturing sector, employment dropped by 2.5 million positions between 1979 and 1997. The sector which added the most jobs (7.1 million) during this same period was retail sales. The typical manufacturing job pays double that of retail sales and usually comes with substantial health and retirement benefits which most retail sales positions lack. Manufacturing jobs are also primarily a male domain, while retail sales have been dominated by women. In shorthand form, rather than produce goods, people are hired to sell what has been produced elsewhere.

Displaced factory workers face difficulties finding new employment; more than one-third were out of work one to three years after their displacement. When they do find work, their new jobs pay, on average, about 13 percent less than the jobs they lost, and more than one-fourth of those who had health insurance on their old jobs do not have it at their new ones.

This shift did not occur because Americans bought fewer manufactured goods, but because they substituted foreign-produced goods for domestic-produced goods. In 1982, imported goods equaled only 15.3 percent of domestic production; by 1997, imports were up to 39.3 percent of domestic production. The drop in demand for labor in domestic manufacturing reduced the workforce needed and put downward pressure on industrial wages. Those who lost their jobs in manufacturing moved to other sectors, increasing the supply of labor there, which also pushed down wage rates to "clear the market" and create new jobs. Thus, weekly earnings in both the manufacturing sector and the service sector have shown declines.

Markets operate on the margin, so even small changes can have large effects. For example, the worst recession of recent years was in 1982, when unemployment hit 9.6 percent. Today's prosperity has taken unemployment down to 4.6 percent—a difference between boom and bust of five percent of the workforce. During this same period, manufacturing jobs dropped from 22 percent of the workforce to only 17 percent; again, a margin of five percent. The negative impact of the loss of manufacturing jobs is multiplied if we take into consideration the effect that it has had on other jobs, including service jobs, which are linked to industry. This affects not just blue-collar labor but white-collar management slots as well, in everything from transportation and waste disposal to engineering and accounting.

Unfortunately, the left-wing ideological agenda dovetails nicely with the "self-interest" of Wall Street. Shortly after World War II, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was created with money contributed by the National Education Association (NEA) and the Carnegie Foundation. It distributes a steady stream of studies and teachers' guides on the theme that "it is frequently the family that infects the child with extreme nationalism. The school should therefore . . . combat family attitudes." Through "peace studies," "multiculturalism," "values clarification," and "sex education," a program has been crafted to strip children of all loyalty to any higher institutions or belief systems beyond their own desires. Personal gratification, sexual and material, is all that counts. The child is to be molded into the perfect consumer and be indifferent to anything else. Moral constraints on behavior or calls to community duties that would interfere with this "pursuit of happiness" are to be shunned. Greed and selfishness are not the building blocks of patriotism.

They are, however, the building blocks of corporate profits. The antidote to a "free-trade" world run by transnational business is the doctrine of economic nationalism, which seeks to maximize the resources, both moral and material, of a given society. In such a system, business prospers only to the extent that its actions are compatible with these larger objectives. The left is correct to see the family as the origin of the community and the nation-state. An economic system that breaks up the family and empowers radicals in the media and the schools to replace parents suits those business firms which fear any national-interest limitations on their activities.

A few years before he joined the Clinton administration as an assistant secretary of defense, Joseph S. Nye of Harvard wrote about the global "interdependence rhetoric" used by liberals. He noted that adherents of this doctrine "usually argue that conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems." The rhetoric, Nye continues, is "to be used against both economic nationalism at home and assertive challengers abroad." The Clinton administration has emerged as the perfect synthesis of liberal ideology and corporate ambition, built on the doctrine of "globalization."

Social conservatives cannot be indifferent to the choices that the country faces in economic policy. The old fusion between economic and social conservatives, where each paid lip service to the other but generally kept to themselves, became untenable when the nature of the economy changed. Globalization has pushed the agenda of the economic conservatives off the deep end, to the point where the term "conservative" no longer properly applies.

Yet social conservatives cannot simply denounce materialism. Joseph Schumpeter may have been correct when he said "the stock market is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail," but too many people are now wedded to the Dow Jones. Instead, social conservatives must recreate a viable fusion between economics and culture which can promise both prosperity and morality. The first step is to understand that the current economic situation is not optimal, and that this shortcoming opens the door to cultural decline. Economic nationalism, not corporate globalization, is the path to "making America great again" as a civi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lization that can be admired in all of its facets.

William R. Hawkins, a former economics professor, is Senior Research Analyst for U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA).

POLITICS

Restoring Families by Restricting Government

by David Hartman

When we view the monumental seats of government, the palaces and temples of ancient and medieval civilizations, we are awed by their architectural grandeur, the art and culture to which they testify, and the sheer effort they represent. While they are indeed a part of our cultural heritage, these edifices are better understood as monuments to the power of government—including the great temples and cathedrals of state religions.

These great civilizations had the common characteristic that all-encompassing government systematically confiscated as much of the surplus of the citizens' product and labor as possible without inviting revolution or conquest. The surplus product and labor were expended on military defense and conquest, state monuments, and the comfort of those who governed.

In our own century, the most successful ventures in totalitarian control of society by government—communism and fascism—have, fortunately, run the course from inception to discredit and dissolution within living memory. But the socialist democratic republic continues its relentless growth as the representative form of government worldwide. The structure of socialist democracies, much like fascism, is typified by large corporations privately owned but heavily regulated by a strong central government—what John Kenneth Galbraith calls "The New Corporate State."

The average national expenditure on government worldwide is well in excess of *half of personal income*—a remarkable fact, considering that ancient and medieval governments could not extract more than one-third of the product of their subjects. How is this possible in modern socialist democracies?

The greater productivity of the agricultural and industrial revolution is part of the explanation. However, just as important is the fact that the socialist democracies have raised plundering to an art form. This art form has three facets: coerced philanthropy, deception, and demagoguery.

Coerced philanthropy takes the form of the welfare state. In order to perfect society and mankind, government confiscates surplus product to help the helpless, insure the improvident, redistribute income, and rear the child. With such noble motives, the "social justice" of confiscating the surplus of the more productive and more fortunate is unquestionable.

It takes deviousness to cover how costly socialism is, and how inefficient the result. Half of all taxes are invisible in the United States; in Europe, the proportion is far higher. Social-welfare payments are netted from reported U.S. government expenditures and compared to Gross Domestic Product, which *includes* government expenditures. Comparison to Gross Personal Income would provide a truer measure of the real tax burden. So government services are understated in their apparent cost to the taxpayer—and they are "free" to the recipient.

An elaborate set of historical prevarications provides the rationale for the demagogues who champion the socialist government's excesses. For instance:

Social Security and Medicare. The fallacy: Entitlements from current national income are necessary to eliminate poverty for the improvident elderly who failed to save and invest. The reality: Despite an average government dispensation of $20,000 for every elderly person, poverty remains among the elderly, and has been transferred to young workers and families.

Unmarried Motherhood Entitlements. The fallacy: Subsidies for single-parent households are necessary to eliminate child poverty. The reality: An epidemic of illegitimate births and divorces has swollen the ranks of the poor.

State Control of Education. The fallacy: The state must oversee uniform standards of education and scientific methodology for equality of outcomes. The reality: Defective "modern" methodology and the dumbing down of curricula in order to achieve equality of performance have exacerbated inequality of outcomes.

As we conclude the 20th century, the United States has undergone a profound transformation. At the turn of the century, total expenditures of all agencies of government—federal, state, and local—equaled nine percent of the personal income of Americans. Today, government at all levels spends 50 cents of every dollar of income. Are our best interests really served by such a burden?

Vital statistics render a damning verdict on the efficacy of big government's social engineering. Since 1920, the birth rate has been cut nearly in half, the marriage rate has dropped a quarter, the divorce rate has tripled, and illegitimacy has risen tenfold to 30 percent of births. Since 1900, the homicide rate has increased eightfold. By any reasonable measure of social progress, the attempted perfecting of society and mankind by government has been a failure.

Beneath the current cheerful veneer of a rising stock market and full employment lies a potentially unstable economy. The average American family is working a record number of hours. But after paying for the excesses of government and satisfying its own appetite for consumption, the typical family goes deeper into debt and saves less than ever before. State schools and working mothers fail to educate children in math and science. Americans consume far more imports than the goods and services they export: Foreigners invest the difference in American factories and real estate to close the capital-formation gap. However, a capital shortage also results in the exporting of capital-intensive industry abroad, and with it go middle-income jobs. A government that overspends, overtaxes, and is overly indebted lies at the root of these economic difficulties.

State control of education as a means of providing opportunity to all is equally suspect. It is estimated that, as early as 1800, 80 percent of all Americans were literate. Judging by the 18.3 percent of adult Americans who lacked a high-school diploma in 1996 (and the number who could not read the ones they had), we may be no more literate today than 200 years ago.

Perhaps the worst example of the consequences of government confiscation of income is the history of real, after-tax income of married families since the advent of the Great Society. In spite of an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increase of 38 percent in real output per man-hour from 1970 to 1993, the real median income of married families *failed to rise at all*—despite the increased participation rate of wives in the workforce (from 40 to 59 percent). *All* of the surplus of the efforts of married families was confiscated by government for distribution to its clients.

Government continues its relentless growth, extending its control over American culture to serve its ends. Although every vestige of traditional religion has been ruthlessly eliminated by government from public education and public life, Americans *have* a state religion. Its cathedrals are the ivy towers of academia, and its dogma is materialistic humanism. Its tenets are self-gratification, moral relativism, multiculturalism, and atheism. Government-franchised media, licensed broadcasters, and newsprint monopolies are its evangelists. College administrators, government regulators, and editorial boards are its grand inquisitors.

American citizens have sold the free society that was their inheritance from the Founding Fathers for a pocketful of promises of a socialist utopia. We are in the grasp of an all-encompassing government that takes the surplus fruits of our efforts to serve the ends of those who govern—and perverts our culture and heritage.

What hope do Americans have for a counterrevolution to restore our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Fortunately, bold avenues for counterattacking the citadels of big government are open.

Public-school choice with vouchers for use at whichever school parents choose is about to become a reality. It will end the government monopoly on public education and the state's claim to primacy in parenting children. And it will permit moral education in the traditions of our American heritage.

Fundamental tax reform is gaining momentum. A flat consumption tax may replace income and capital taxation. It would replace not only the inequitable and hopelessly complex income-tax code, but also the most despised and scofflaw agency of government, the Internal Revenue Service. Such tax reform would end the capital-formation deficit and dependency upon foreigners to finance growth, close the trade deficit, and supply the necessary capital to restore the earning power of middle-class families.

Information technology, particularly the Internet, offers the promise of radically altering communications and even higher education by expanding the ways by which knowledge and ideas are disseminated. This could serve as the crucial means of circumventing the media and government-controlled academia.

Social Security reform is gaining a popular consensus around the idea that saving for old age should be privatized. This would be a major reversal for the welfare state.

Reduction in the scale of government and its claim on society's resources should be a natural consequence of a citizenry made better informed through more visible taxation, traditional education in citizen-run schools, and the freeing of communication.

Family formation and child-rearing within families would be enhanced, as in the 1950's, by growing real after-tax incomes, the transmission of traditional values by citizen-run schools, and the return of social welfare to families and communities.

Moral and spiritual values would be reinforced by education and religion once again. Choice would allow the return of religion to schooling. The current movement of parishioners from mainline churches in the thrall of socialists to community churches built upon traditional theology and neighborliness will gain momentum.

To what extent can government be curtailed? Adjusted for the Cold War, government on the scale of the 1950's—a time of rising marriage and birth rates and declining divorces, with relatively few illegitimate births—would spend less than *half* the current confiscation of American incomes. Perhaps someday a government spending less than ten percent of incomes, as in 1900, will once again suffice.

The socialist utopias have proved to be empty promises. Americans must radically curtail government if we are to reclaim the American dream which was the legacy of the Founding Fathers.

David Hartman is the chairman of the board of directors of The Rockford Institute.

To Subscribe:
1-800-877-5459

LAW

How a Court Can Derail a Culture

by George Ward

Daniel Patrick Moynihan and others have written volumes about how the Great Society destroyed the American family. But the pivotal role played by Republican appointees on the U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying laws intended to encourage the formation of two-parent families, has gone largely unremarked.

The lightning rod for change was a Connecticut statute which forbade the sale of contraceptives, even to married couples. The Court rejected a 1943 challenge to this statute in *Tileston* v. *Ullman* because the plaintiff (a doctor) lacked standing, and another in 1961 in *Poe* v. *Ullman* because, among other things, the statute was not enforced.

Still, the dissenting opinion in *Poe* v. *Ullman*—by President Eisenhower's first Supreme Court appointee, John Harlan—would drive due process jurisprudence in the wrong direction for the next three decades.

By 1961, earlier disputes over the meaning of the Due Process Clause, as it relates to the validity of a statute, had led to an understanding that an allegedly "arbitrary imposition or purposeless restraint" could be declared unconstitutional. Whether an imposition or restraint was "arbitrary or purposeless," however, had to be determined by an *objective* test: Would a reasonable person find that, even when viewed in its most favorable light, the imposition or restraint had no tendency to advance any goal of the statute?

In his dissent in *Poe*, Justice Harlan rejected the limits that this test imposed upon the Court, arguing that "the best that can be said" about the Due Process Clause is that its "content" will be supplied by the Court, and claiming for the Court what Justice Hugo Black, FDR's first Court appointee, would call a judicial veto power. "Certainly," said Harlan, "Connecticut's judgment is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judgment, expressed in law, on marriage and divorce, on adult

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consensual homosexuality, abortion, and sterilization, euthanasia and suicide." Still, he voted to veto it.

In 1963, in *Ferguson* v. *Skrupka*, the pendulum seemed to swing decisively away from Harlan's position. Writing for a majority which included all justices except Harlan, Justice Black again affirmed that "due process" does not justify courts in substituting "their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."

However, two years later, the Connecticut statute was back before the court in *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*. While the *Griswold* majority was unwilling to invalidate the statute on the basis of Harlan's view that due process "stands . . . on its own bottom," it did conjure up alternative grounds, supported by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan. The statute is void, said the *Griswold* majority, because it is in conflict with a claim of privacy which "*presses* for recognition here . . ." That's right, "presses."

Claiming to protect society's deep-rooted "right of privacy in marriage," the *Griswold* majority ignored the contractual nature of marriage and purported to rely upon "penumbras formed by emanations" from other express rights found in the Constitution. Twenty-seven years later, the Court would effectively acknowledge that, in *Griswold*, it reduced constitutional liberty to therapeutic freedom or "license," which repudiates commitment and discounts the Constitution's historic concern for family and community well-being. *Griswold*, said five Republican-appointed justices in the 1992 *Casey* case, established the wholly selfish "right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Robert Bork calls this the "mystery" phrase.

But there's no mystery, as Morton Kondracke has noted, about its effect:

> Sexual liberation has gone way too far . . . all kinds of people are suffering as a result. . . . [I]nfluential grown-ups ought to encourage old-fashioned virtues—like self-discipline and the postponement of gratification—instead of encouraging young people, as much of the media certainly do, to [blank] their brains out.

If the concern in *Griswold* actually had been to protect "the right of privacy in marriage," all that was required was to hold that the marriage relationship is protected by the Contract Clause. So interpreted, the marital relationship would have received its historical protection from a Court relying on the written Constitution, not "making it up" as it went along; its holding would not have been so broad as to encourage promiscuity, and the future interests of society would have been served by a decision that upheld the *advantages* of marriage. The Contract Clause offered—and still offers—a way of protecting "privacy in marriage," without destroying the obligation of commitment.

Unfortunately, *Griswold* released "the brakes" on the counterculture's promiscuous, discipline-averse worldview of "immediate gratification." The fundamental character of our governance was changed by judicial *fiat*. The mid-1960's, said former Speaker Newt Gingrich in *To Renew America*, marked the beginning of a "collapse in our ability to teach ethical behavior to our own people."

Easing the nation into the full implications of the therapeutic meaning which *Griswold* ascribed to constitutional liberty required a degree of deception. The *Griswold* majority itself gave false assurances that it was drawing the line at promiscuity.

> We deal with a right of privacy older than the bill of rights . . . : Marriage, a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to a degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . . a bilateral loyalty.

The concurring justices gave similarly false assurances. "The Court's holding today . . . in no way interferes with a state's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct." Statutes proscribing "all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital" are "a permissible and legitimate legislative goal."

But soon, *Griswold*'s purported special exception for "a right of privacy older than the bill of rights" and the anti-promiscuity statements of the concurring justices would amount to nothing.

In *King* v. *Smith* (1968), the Court held that AFDC's "man-in-the-house" rule was valid for married couples, but not for unmarried couples. "Alabama's . . . interests in discouraging immorality and illegitimacy would have been quite relevant at one time in the history of the AFDC program," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren. But no more. From then on, the Court held, benefits could be stopped only if the "legal" father remained in the home.

Two years later, in *Goldberg* v. *Kelly*, the privilege of public assistance was converted into a property right which could not be terminated without a trial. To Justice Black, this holding was utter nonsense:

> [A]lthough some recipients might be on the lists for payment wholly because of deliberate fraud on their part, the Court holds that the government . . . must continue, until after an evidentiary hearing, to pay money that it does not owe, never has owed, and never could owe . . . I know of no situation in our legal system in which the person alleged to owe money . . . is required to continue making payments to a judgment-proof claimant without . . . bond to insure that these payments can be recovered if he wins his legal argument.

In *Eisenstadt* v. *Baird* (1972), Justice Brennan put the Court squarely on the side of the counterculture: "Whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same," said the Court in obvious contradiction of its prior position, "for the unmarried and the married alike."

This already libertine reading of the Constitution would be extended, in *Carey* v. *Population Services* (1977), to cover sex between children. *Carey* is still the law of the land. Graduates of some of America's most famous law schools, people reputed to be our "best and brightest," furrowed their brows, listened to learned arguments, pondered the issues for months, and then declared that state legislatures have no power to discourage sex by unmarried minors. At least two justices appeared to grasp that the *Carey* majority's liberal impulse had again strayed into the fringes of anarchical madness. As Justice Lewis Powell said, " . . . the extraordinary protection the Court would give to all personal decisions in matters of sex is neither required by the Constitution nor supported by our prior decisions." Justice

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

William Rehnquist could barely disguise his disgust:

> The Court holds that New York may not use its police power to legislate in the interests of its concept of the public morality as it pertains to minors . . . There comes a point when endless and ill-considered extension of principles originally formulated in quite different cases produces such an indefensible result that no logic chopping can possibly make the fallacy of the result more obvious.

Nor was this all. Whatever remained of judicial support for the commitment to the marriage contract disappeared in *Moore* v. *East Cleveland* (1977). "A couple and their dependent children" said the *Moore* majority, are merely an "arbitrary boundary—the boundary of the nuclear family." By weakening the culture, the Court fueled the expensive and counterproductive programs of the Great Society.

In its primary sense, "promiscuity" means the disposition to give in to "all our impulses" whether good or bad. It is a reversal of the civilizing process and, since surrendering to impulse cannot be confined to sexuality, has consequences on a number of levels. To many a kid, adults notorious for breaking the Sixth Commandment, whether parents or presidents, are just self-absorbed adults notorious for breaking Commandments.

How else could today's problem of so many kids without role models have developed? The murderous outbursts by children, unlike anything known in prior times, and the remorselessness of youthful predators, are manifestations of a promiscuity which has advanced to the next stage.

To understand the Court's role in derailing our culture, consider the arguments of those who contend that the interpretation of text should be approached from the point of view of the reader, rather than that of the authors. "Some interpretative perspective," says Duke University Professor Stanley Fish, inventor of the reader-response theory of interpretation, "will always rule by virtue of having won out over its competitors."

In some applications, Professor Fish's observation may not be wrong. In construing the message of revelational or poetical text—cases where the author is deemed a mere conduit for thoughts inspired by a higher power—large aggregations of various faithful have long claimed the right to approach it from their own vantage point. But the way in which a whole society approaches the interpretation of a constitution, expressing as it does the conclusions of a convention of delegates, must be different. Yet Justice Harlan recognized no difference. What mattered in interpreting constitutional provisions, he said in *Poe*, was "not their text . . . not the statement itself."

Surely, Justice Harlan was wrong.

A written constitution does not cease to be a memorandum of what the people consented to, merely because time has passed. Nor are justices released from their oaths to uphold this compact, merely because the founding generation is dead. Ours is a living constitution because it applies to new situations that are within the contemplation of its clear provisions and because it can always be updated with amendments. But it is not a living document in the sense that some provisions "grow," while others "whither," according to the whim of the current Court.

Can the judicial veto, a power which the delegates in Philadelphia in 1787 pointedly refused to create, be safely ignored, since recently the Court has seemed a bit more respectful of democratic decision-making? I think not.

On issues of policy, experience has shown that the breadth of the legislative hall provides far greater wisdom—and far less risk of locking us into a foolish position—than the narrowness of the courtroom.

As long as the judicial veto is not repudiated, there is a temptation to use it. As Justice Black warned in *Adamson* v. *California*:

> [This] formula . . . has been used in the past, and can be used in the future, to license this court . . . to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals . . . a responsibility which the constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the people.

If, as I believe, bad judgment, not bad faith, is the culprit, it should be possible to reclaim the Constitution's limits on judicial review simply by adding a couple of definitions to the Constitution:

> Liberty, as used in this Constitution, means liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.
>
> The test for what is arbitrary or purposeless in the review of such a law is not whether the Judiciary approves the law, but whether a reasonable legislature could have believed that it tended, from any point of view or in any degree, to promote the people's health, safety, morals, or welfare.

With these additions, we would restore the legislature as the policy-making department of government and help convince the American people that the votes that they cast for their elected representatives are not futile.

George Ward is the chief assistant prosecuting attorney for Wayne County, Michigan. This article is drawn from his forthcoming book, Liberty and Law: The Culture, the Court, and the Consent of the Governed.

Legislative Tyranny in Massachusetts

by Eugene Narrett

"A dog's obeyed in office," and the power of the welfare state to grab your money, property, health, and—through "no-fault" divorce—your children, too, is already bad enough. Now it is getting worse, via the usurpation of punitive court prerogatives by bureaucrats whose sole purpose is "revenue enhancement" and the growth of the state. The case in point here is Massachusetts, where social-service "providers" and "caregivers" increasingly assume the task of fleecing and/or jailing taxpaying citizens.

Armed with legal immunity, bureaucrats are winning the right to fine, incarcerate, hospitalize, and drug people at whim, subsidizing these depredations with tax and insurance monies. Take, for example, section 12, as it is commonly known, a Massachusetts statute. Enacted in 1970, section 12 enables a psychiatrist to have a citizen incarcerated for ten days if the doctor believes that "serious harm" might otherwise ensue. This standard may be variously defined or merely indicated by check marks on a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pink form.

Several years ago, Lifeline Ambulance Service of Lynn, Massachusetts, had police break down the door of an elderly woman who had been "pink papered." The cops and orderlies dragged her down the steps of her apartment building. Her bladder burst, and she had a heart attack. A jury found the city guilty and awarded a $1.3 million judgment, but in 1996, an appeals court overturned this decision, ruling that the action had not violated the dead woman's Fourth Amendment right to be free of "unreasonable search and seizure" even though there was no warrant. Because the city and company were in compliance with state law, strict construction was briefly back in fashion.

Those involved in issuing, serving, and enacting section 12's are immunized from prosecution if they "act in good faith." Private hospitals, physicians, and psychiatrists who act "under color of state law" also are immune.

Every year, Massachusetts serves about 8,000 section 12's. The ten-day confinement can be increased to 24 days at the direction of the hospital staff before there is any judicial review. (This is in order "to ease the burden on the courts," the legislator who drafted the statute told reporters.) Well before 24 days, people may have been drugged, beaten, intimidated, and may have suffered pain far worse than anything they might otherwise have experienced or even imagined before they began to receive state "care." "There is no burden of proof on psychiatrists" or social workers, commented an expert on mental health law, and the availability of medical insurance helps create "a bias toward incarceration." The increasing number of clients thus served helps the state demonstrate a "crisis" and cajole more taxes to heal "the problem."

The source of Massachusetts' deadly compassion is its lust for money and power. It is gratified fully in the industry of child support. One of the point men for the attack is Mitchell Adams, head of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR). Early in Governor William Weld's administration, Adams made a media splash by publicly "marrying" his homosexual partner; under his stewardship, the DOR has displayed cutting-edge hostility to fathers.

In September 1998, Senate Bill 2044 was passed into law by the Massachusetts legislature. This statute transfers most power regarding collection of child support to the DOR and allows it to define compliance and set support levels independent of the already draconian state "Guidelines on Child Support," the nation's highest at 33 percent of pre-tax income. (Judges often use their discretion to set the rate even higher.)

As Dr. Ned Holstein pointed out in the Spring 1998 issue of *The Banner, the Massachusetts Newsletter of Fathers and Families*, S2044 lets the DOR initiate review of child-support orders and amend them by formulas that the DOR devises. Any such modification acquires the legal status of a court order, although there is no judicial review. The DOR sets the criteria for determining who is in arrears. (This can be done solely on the basis of a claim by the mother, with no substantiation required.) A defendant must exhaust his "remedies" with DOR before appealing any such modification to the courts. Without judicial hearing or review, the DOR can suspend drivers' licenses, attach retirement or pension funds, and tap bank accounts for health insurance. There also is a mandatory 14-day imprisonment for being in arrears.

The peremptory nature of S2044 mirrors the method of section 12, and there is a further similarity. The statute exempts the state from liability should an accused person ever manage to fight through the bureaucratic thicket and demonstrate that the DOR was in error.

Near the core of this tyranny is greed. While the DOR and "child protective service" cadres boast that S2044 will help children, Holstein notes that most monies collected are absorbed into the general revenues of the commonwealth and serve to balance the budget. The death of the family is the health of the state.

Driving this point home was the unanimous passage in late summer 1998 of Massachusetts House Bill 5621. Changing its name and number frequently to throw citizens off its trail, this statute mandates that parents (read, fathers) accused of abuse will be barred from any unsupervised contact with their children. The trigger can be checked if a judge provides written findings to the contrary, but that is an unusual course in family court. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the state already has safeguards against false allegations of abuse, though it failed to identify a single one. Claims that a woman is in fear of future abuse are routinely used in divorce cases to trigger *ex parte* orders that bar fathers from gaining shared or full custody of children. The court and the legislature both rejected requests that the hearings at which these orders are granted be subject to evidentiary standards. As one municipal judge explained, she sees the role of the court as "cracking the denial of the defendants" who dare to assert their innocence.

The picture is clear: Due process and equal protection are disappearing, have already all but disappeared in Massachusetts. The principle of "innocent until proven guilty" has been discarded for citizens and especially for fathers. The state and its officers are beyond the law that, thus, becomes lawlessness. Those who do not wish to be objects of the state will have to assert the principles of justice and natural law or America may yet go further. Indeed, in Oregon and Connecticut bills are being considered mandating Medicaid coverage for assisted suicide. The slide is on.

Eugene Narrett teaches writing at Boston University.

LIBERAL ARTS

THE NEWSPAPER OF RECORD

"Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi said Thursday that Libya would have to negotiate certain guarantees before he could feel confident about turning over for trial two suspects . . . Qaddhafi seemed obsessed with fears of U.S. and British trickery. . . . "I am not sure America and the U.K. have good intentions to solve this problem," Qaddafi said in English. . . . Arab diplomats here say that while Gadhafi knows he is now closer to having sanctions lifted than he has been in more than six years, he also knows that he faces some political risk in turning over one of the two men."

—*from "Qaddafi Says 'Negotiation' Is Needed on Lockerbie Suspects,"* New York Times *(August 28, 1998)*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Hundredth Meridian

by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

The View From Out Here



There is a story about the man who surprised another man in bed with his wife. "What did you do about it?" his friend demanded. "Hell," replied the fellow in disgust, "the sonofabitch lied his way out of it!"

My inclination, on this 15th day of February 1999, is to take the anecdote as a parable about the government of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, and the American Republic, in that order; the only problem I can see with this interpretation being that the original story is, to use the words of the President's men over the last few months, "just about sex," while the parable has to do—in a way the 13 House managers would understand—with several millennia of Western political theory. Like most of my journalistic colleagues with whom I'm acquainted, I spent 13 months dismissing people whose first—and often last—question in any conversation was "When is he going to resign?" with a little of the impatience I used to feel when Easterners with an interest in American regional politics sought to discover from me when the Western states were going to secede finally from the Union (as if I'd know!).

I still don't believe that the fate of the United States hangs on Bill Clinton's going or staying, just as I still don't believe in the likelihood of Western secession. But since the constitutional "crisis" (no more acute in itself than a quadrennial national election), I have to admit that the Western landscape—this vast, open, glorious, and gloriously inhospitable spaciousness, this metaphysical opening away to the region of the gods—has new meaning for me in a "civilization" (since termites are allowed to have civilizations, too) in which the constriction of mental space leads to a felt lack of physical space as the end of consciousness approaches, heralding the end of truth. "Why, this is Hell, nor am I out of it," Mephistopheles tells Faust in the play by Marlowe. Does the current economic prosperity *really* convince Americans they've arrived in the Promised Land? There is a terrible story in one of Orwell's essays where a wasp the humane author has snipped in two at the waist as it dines on strawberry jam realizes the terrible thing that has happened to it only when it tries to fly away. If the Lewinskiad has taught me nothing more, it is that the country I was born into and grew up in no longer exists, that an evil facsimile or shadow country has taken its place. In order to be loved, Burke said, our country must be lovely. And more and more, it seems to me, the American land—the shrinking little that has not yet been destroyed in order to "develop" it, that is—is all that remains to be loved of this once glorious America.

Of course, we are told by our government leaders and opinion-makers that Destruction is actually Progress, but a few of us—a remnant which is also shrinking—know better. When words lose their meanings, people lose their freedom, Orwell warned. And Unamuno reminds us that Progress, being the result of the Fall, is *only* the best man can hope for in this life. (But why am I quoting Burke, Orwell, and Unamuno? They aren't taught in the schools anymore, and continuing, adult education—"Education is Forever!"—means that their books are removed from the publishers' warehouses, owing to a cretinous decision some years ago by the IRS, pulped, and rerolled into soiled-looking gray paper marked RECYCLED and used by pollutive utility companies to bill their customers with.) Terrifying as the 20th century was, the 21st promises to be more terrible still.

The impeachment fiasco may have been nothing in itself, while history conceivably will record that Bill Clinton was no more than town trash from a state whose name is rumored to be an old Indian word for trailer park. (Unfairly, perhaps, the Duke and the Dolphin having been natural aristocrats by comparison with much of what proceeds from Arkansas to the District of Columbia nowadays.) If not the proximate cause, the impeachment fiasco amounted certainly to a critical demonstration of the extent to which the mania for diversity has degenerated into demonic divisiveness and a vicious, quite literally insane hatred of the type whose emergence throughout history has consistently preceded political and social catastrophe. I doubt seriously that anyone—in particular, anyone happening to be male, white, of European extraction, Christian, and anti-"progressive"—who listened to the floor debates on the four Articles of Impeachment in the House of Representatives heard the procession of so-called New Democrats (blacks, Hispanics, feminists, secular Jews, a few Muslims probably) to the microphone without perceiving that here was the new America speaking: glowering, ranting, raging, threatening, foaming at the mouth on behalf of the aggravated, aggrieved, indulged, precivilized, barbaric, and unsexed "minorities" that together lack—for the time being, anyway—the majority status to send the rest of us packing to the concentration camps they so evidently believe to be our historically determined and much-deserved end. "All right: we are two nations," John Dos Passos wrote in the 1930's. Two nations—only *two*? Today, we probably amount to about a dozen of them, thanks to imperialism, the global economy, multiculturalism, and the nearly open immigration policies that produced it. Is the country already in a state of civil war, which the cultural war has so often seemed to adumbrate? No, because the nation (it seems quixotic to call the United States a "union" anymore) is divided along fault lines separating class from class, race from race, men from women, and sodomites from heterosexual couples producing and nourishing children created in the image of God—not geographic or regional boundaries. How

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can people so intermingled geographically—many of them more or less forcibly so, by order of the federal government—possibly disentangle themselves from one another and withdraw; assuming, of course, that they wished to do so? So far no one has discovered such a means, but where the will is, there's a way. And if physical separation should ever come to pass, the result will surely be big trouble: not so much secession as a sorting out, perhaps of the kind that our leaders in Washington are simultaneously prohibiting *and* promoting in Eastern Europe.

Judging by the hate-filled voices, hysterical with the sense of approaching triumph, lately arising from the floor of the House, the people who have succeeded in deconstructing America—together with their beneficiaries and janissaries—have concluded that the displacement of the old America by the new is already accomplished, and that all that is left is the task of mopping up the messes left by the last senescent English spaniels, trapping or poisoning the few remaining mice hiding out in the wainscoting of the family manse. Yet, as Sam Francis has suggested in an article published recently in this magazine, the awakening—however late—of the Euro-American majority is all but inevitable, while history offers no reason to suppose that, once aroused, they will not fight, and that, fighting again, their valor and martial spirit rediscovered, they will fail to give battle better than they receive it. The specter of this awakening is what progressives fear most: It is why politically correct opinion in this country reflexively and massively retaliates against the slightest show of resentment evinced, the briefest note of anger sounded, by the old American majority.

The House impeachment hearings that so glaringly revealed social and racial divisions in this country set the United States Senate up, however inadvertently, by forcing its hand to reveal the moral and political corruption of the American ruling class. Cicero, in his *On Moral Duties*, insisted that the citizen's highest duty is to his commonwealth and the society that produced it. Unamuno, a couple of millennia later, believed that the social entities we call nations share with the "I"—the individual man—personality as well as continuity: that they, in fact, are persons too. You might suppose that no act is too monstrous to expect of a class of people who, after they have been duly elected by their fellow citizens to act as public servants and custodians of the commonweal, choose instead to betray their trust by assassinating the national "I" in a blizzard of knife wounds behind the arras—and you'd be right, of course.

Among the cutlery to hand are products forged by a deliberate and systematic misuse of language and logic, to the end that "criminal" is redefined as "inappropriate," adult men and women cannot determine whether the fondling of genitalia is intended to "arouse," and the word "immoral" is blotted from the dictionary of the English language. As late as the days of Abraham Lincoln's youth, lawyers were the most respected figures in American society, including that of the backwoods: Since approximately the time of the Lincoln presidency, their reputation has declined so far as to make them the butt of a popular humor far more deadly—on account of being more deeply felt—than any ethnic joke ever heard of. ("I'd like to speak with Lawyer Jones, please." "I recognize your voice! You're the man who called yesterday, and the day before that. I've told you three times, Lawyer Jones is dead!" "I know that, ma'am. But I just love hearing it.") Last January, a federal judge in Brooklyn ruled—about the time President Clinton was being "acquitted but not exonerated"—that three major arms manufacturers had violated the law by "oversupplying" guns in Southern states where gun control laws are relaxed, in the hope and expectation that the "excess" sales would find their way north into the hands of the Yankee criminal class. With legal arguments like this being rewarded with a verdict in a court of law, it hardly matters that the underclass has been so corrupted and envenomed by the ruling one that the jury system is close to breakdown anyway. When words lose their meaning, people lose their freedom. Orwell might have added that when people have no freedom (verbal or otherwise), meaning has no words to express itself.

Nor should we Westerners be illusioned: The rot has spread as far as here—the mythical apotheosis of American truth, firmness, honor, and strength—as Eastern ideas, Eastern manners, and (above all) Eastern people have arrived to dilute and pervert the old Western culture through the creation of a liberalized, effete, dishonest, and increasingly dangerous political climate.

As the whole world knows, the International Olympic Committee is being investigated on charges of having accepted bribes from the commissioners sent by Salt Lake City to bid to have their great municipality chosen as the site of the Winter Olympic Games in 2002. The worthy ambassadors, it is alleged, offered sexual favors, sports equipment, scholarships, and other emoluments as a means of furthering their suit. And how does counsel for the plaintiffs plead? This way, according to a report broadcast by National Public Radio:

The good people of Salt Lake City and the State of Utah are a highly moral and principled people. They are good people who deeply desired the chance to host the Olympics in February, 2002. They therefore sent trusted commissioners to bid for the honor on their behalf. A terrible thing, alas, befell these commissioners in the course of their mission. Having ventured bravely into the gentile world beyond the Salt Lake Valley to meet with the IOC and plead their case, they made a shocking discovery. Ultramontane peoples fail to share, or they ignore, the principles and morals of Salt Lakers and Utahns! What to do? The good people of SLC and the State of Utah wish desperately to host these games; therefore, they deserve to. Their representatives must, in consequence, bow to reality and lower the moral bar that would prevent them from running the good race and attaining the laurels by offering "contributions"—just like in a democratic political campaign!—to the most sympathetic of the IOC members. And so, "This is what has brought us here today"; this is what has led, not to criminal actions, but simply to what might be termed—how does one say it?—"inappropriate" activities. . . .

So: The Blob—the Sludge, the New World Order, the Pod People from Mars who have taken over Washington, D.C.; the Horror!—is coming for those of us, too, who wish for nothing more in life than to be left alone in peace, at home on the range. You can run, but you can't hide. It's the last lesson of the frontier and the hardest to learn, too: the Discouraging Word. If only we old Americans can have Cascadia when we need it, perhaps the best we may hope for is to cut a deal with the noble Chicano, allowing him to take the southernmost half of the Great American Desert and build his beloved Nation of Aztlan there. We get the upstream water rights, though.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Classic Works for Readers Today

VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
With Selected Writings

By St. George Tucker
Foreword by Clyde N. Wilson



As professor of law at the College of William and Mary, St. George Tucker in 1803 published ***View of the Constitution***—the first extended, systematic commentary on the United States Constitution after its ratification and later its amendment by the Bill of Rights. ***View*** was originally part of Tucker's "Americanized" or "republicanized" edition of the multivolume *Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone*. Generations of American law students, lawyers, judges, and statesmen learned their Blackstone —and also their understanding of the Constitution—through Tucker. As Clyde N. Wilson notes, "Tucker is the exponent of Jeffersonian republicanism . . . in contrast to the commercial republicanism of New England that has since the Civil War been taken to be the only true form of American philosophy." In addition to the entirety of ***View***, the Liberty Fund volume includes seven other essays from Tucker's renowned edition of Blackstone. These include "On the Study of Law," "Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England," and "Of the Several Forms of Government."

St. George Tucker (1752–1827) was an officer in the American Revolutionary Army, a professor of law, justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, judge of the Federal District Court for Virginia by appointment of President James Madison, progenitor of a long line of jurists and scholars, and stepfather of John Randolph of Roanoke.

Clyde N. Wilson is Professor of History and Editor of *The Papers of John C. Calhoun* at the University of South Carolina.

478 + xxvi pages. Foreword, sources, note on the text, index.

Hardcover	$19.00	0-86597-200-1
Paperback	$10.00	0-86597-201-X

(Indiana residents add 5% sales tax)

Call 800-955-8335
Fax 317-579-6060
or write:

Liberty Fund INC

We pay
UPS shipping on
prepaid orders.

8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite #300, Dept. S12N, Indianapolis, IN 46250-1684
Explore Liberty Fund's catalogue on the World Wide Web at
www.libertyfund.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A FEMINIZED CHURCH?

"A lucid effort to repair our understanding of Christian truth."

— Joseph Sobran, Nationally syndicated columnist; Editor, SOBRAN'S

"This is a very significant book, one that is sociologically and historically well researched, theologically well thought out, and forthrightly and clearly written. It deserves a fearless and serious discussion."

— Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M., Cap., The Warden of Greyfriars, Oxford; Tutor and Lecturer in History and Doctrine, the University of Oxford.

Why do men stay away from church? Why do men think that churches are for women? Is the absence of men a result of modern feminism, or does it have deeper roots?

In *The Church Impotent: The Feminization of Christianity,* author **Leon Podles, Ph.D.,** shows that men view Christianity as a threat to their masculinity.

The book explores the medieval developments that caused misunderstandings of masculinity and femininity within the church and harmful effects to society as a result.

"By documenting and criticizing the long-term feminization of Western Christianity, Leon Podles has written a major book — one that has identified a fundamental challenge for the Church in this coming century, namely how to bring men back to the Faith. Church leaders ignore this challenge only at great risk."

— Paul C. Vitz , Professor of Psychology, New York University

SPENCE
PUBLISHING CO.

Hardbound, 290 pgs., **$27.95**. Available from **barnesandnoble.com** and **amazon.com.** Save 10% by ordering directly from Spence Publishing Company, **www.spencepublishing.com,** or call toll-free **1-888-773-6782.** Ask for discount code **CHRWI99.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED